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Abstract
In the course of the global transformation from industrial to post-industrial
economies during the twentieth century, the roles of computer technologies have
changed. Whereas these technologies began as tools for industrial engineering, as
enabling mechanisms to redefine industrial production processes, they eventually
became a significant industry in themselves: hence the post-industrial economy has
also become known as the information economy. Concurrently, the roles of the state
in relation to economic development have been challenged by new conditions
shaped by the continuously evolving characteristics of information technology.
Against this backdrop, the thesis explores some different technologies in the
IT industry to examine how the post-industrial characteristics of these technologies
interplay with technology-upgrading approaches conducted by various actors in
Vietnam. The thesis also examines how these technology-upgrading approaches
relate to the Vietnamese state’s economic developmentalism. The thesis examines
four sectors of Vietnam’s IT industry: outsourcing, cloud computing, the app
economy and online games. The thesis finds that technology-upgrading approaches
for each of these four sectors were conducted in different ways. Moreover, the roles
of the Vietnamese state also differed in relation to each of these four technology-
upgrading approaches. Based on these findings, the thesis presents three arguments.
Firstly, the relationships between technology-upgrading approaches and the state in
Vietnam are different from what the literature suggests. Secondly, technology is not
simply an instrument of the state to be used for economic development; technology
is also a structure shaping the role of the state in economic development. Finally
there can be more than one role for the state in the IT industry, and these competing
multiple roles can actually jeopardise state economic developmentalism. The thesis
characterises this phenomenon as the ‘counter-developmental state’.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The research intends to answer two main questions: (1) How should we
characterise the nature of the technology-upgrading approaches that are employed
domestically in Vietnam, and how are these approaches processed within the context
of Vietnam’s IT industry? and (2) How should we characterise the state’s roles
regarding technological upgrade in Vietnam’s IT industry, and to what extent and in
which ways do these different state roles affect domestic technology-upgrading
approaches? Focusing on these two questions enables the research to analyse the
impact of being a state with a highly controlled political-economic regime on the
technology-upgrading approach of a late-industrialising country. Vietnam is a case
study representing the state with a distinctive mixed economy known as the
socialist-market economy; its information technology (IT) industry is selected as a
unit of analysis representing a high technology-based industry. The original
contribution of this research is that it examines the extent to which the findings of
the literature on the development of the IT industry in technologically ‘backward’,
market-oriented states also apply to states where the government plays a more
dominant role in the economy, such as Vietnam.
The research questions arose from the existing literature on the state model
in technological development and especially in latecomer nations, which mostly
have the characteristic of being technologically backward societies. This literature
notes that such technologically backward nations have upgraded their technology
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and integrated with international technology production by changing their state
model in regard to economic development from a dominant and ruling role to a
consultative role. The consultative role is claimed to be the most effective state role
in dealing with the logic of technological development at the present time, when
technology generation and assimilation are taking place outside formal settings and
market transactions, and changing at a rapid pace. Because of these changes, states
are no longer able to direct national technological development. However, the
existing literature does not provide an explanation for the case of a technologically
backward nation with a socialist regime, in which the idea of taking a consultative
role is against the logic of its political ideology.
There are five remaining socialist countries, only three of which have been
integrated into the global IT market: China, Vietnam, and most recently, Cuba. Of
these, China is far larger than the other two. Its size has provided it with a different
level of economic resource, a huge domestic market and an international economic
integration trajectory in which China is aiming at global economic hegemony rather
than just being another highly competitive economy in global production, like many
smaller states. If we compare the regional and economic performance of Vietnam
and Cuba, we see that Vietnam, situated in the Southeast Asian region commonly
described as a development success story (McGregor 2008: 1), has been one of the
world’s fastest growing economies in the 2000s and is an attractive newly emerging
site for both U.S. firms and Asian nations with strong IT sectors, like Japan and
China. Since the proposed research aimed to study the impact of a socialist regime
on the technology-upgrading process of industrialisation, Vietnam seems to be able
to offer more than Cuba, especially given Vietnam’s complicated relationship with
another powerful socialist regime, China.
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Vietnam is often compared with China as a result of their close cultural
socialist alliance within the region; more importantly, since the collapse of the
USSR, Vietnam has learned much from China’s experience of adjusting to the
outside world. The collapse of the USSR, which had a closer mentor relationship
with the Vietnamese Communist Party than China, served to warn Vietnam of the
danger of applying shock therapy; while China’s open door policy and reform
strategy has been viewed by Vietnam’s economic development elites as a good
model to follow (Evans and Bui Duc Hai 2005: 219).
However, when it comes to industrialisation, especially in technology
production, the huge size of China has permitted a different economic development
trajectory from that possible in Vietnam. With its great natural and human resources,
China contains a large and diversified supply of and demand for manpower and
industrial capacity. This is consistent with the country’s great historical hegemonic
status, leading to China’s path of avoiding international economic dependency
during its early industrialisation process (White 1988: 159). Even though China has
successfully integrated with the so-called fragmented global production since the
1990s, such integration does not follow the post-Fordist economic development
blueprint. Lall and Albaladejo (2004: 1441-1442, 1457) analyse the logic underlying
China’s international economic integration, which as can be seen from its allowing
FDI in domestic markets since 1992 and joining the WTO in 2001, is to obtain
technology and resources for its export activities rather than to form international
alliances and connections to international technology markets as a main consumer.
In more detail, Lall and Albaladejo argue that China is aiming to be a hegemonic
engine of growth for technology production, starting in Asia and the Pacific region
(2004: 1457). It uses its market size with lower wages and greater industrial depth to
negotiate with MNCs in the areas of technology transfer and the local linkages that
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the MNCs have been establishing with other nations (2004: 1442). On the basis of
this agreement, MNCs can use China as their manufacturing base of technology
production to export to other Southeast Asian developing countries, while China
benefits by learning new technology from the MNCs through a short-cut and the
rapid rise in connections with production in the rest of the world. All of this
ultimately serves China’s exporting goal: to upgrade its technological capacities
through the MNCs to advance its export industrial structure to supply a resource-
based technology for other countries’ technology-based production (2004: 1457).
Since China’s international production collaboration is for the purpose of
promoting its status as an engine for processing and manufacturing in global
production rather than integrating directly in specific technology production chains
in the fragmented global alliances of technology production, Vietnam was chosen as
a potentially rewarding case study for this research.
1.2 Background and Academic Originality
Since the end of World War II, the pace of technological production has
increased at a phenomenal rate in western countries, at first due to military concerns
fuelled by the Cold War. Then civilian technology took over from military
technology starting in the 1980s. However, in terms of economic performance,
those who make and implement policy later realised that radical innovative
technology determines national competency in economic development and
international economic competitiveness (Archibugi 1997: 121). Nonetheless,
utilising the benefits of technology in economic activities is not something that can
be done easily in a short period of time. As the most crucial factor generating
technological development is innovative capacity, a long time is needed to
accumulate knowledge as a strong foundation for the creation of innovations.
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Economists and policy makers, who are interested in employing innovative
capacity for economic development, have paid particular attention to the approaches
that many countries have adopted to cultivate that capacity. In the early years of the
use of high technology in commercial activities, radical technology production was
something that only occurred in technologically advanced societies, most notably
OECD members and countries in the G7 group. Because these countries invested in
human resources and R&D infrastructures earlier and had the advantage of early
industrialisation, they had a more robust technological base than developing
countries.
Nowadays, however high-technology based production is not the preserve of
only technologically advanced and wealthy nations. Computerisation along with
globalisation makes it easier for technologically backward societies to access new
and more advanced technologies at minimal cost. This also has implications for the
conventional approach to technological know-how and technology assimilation.
Individuals are much more independently able to learn new technologies without
being embedded in the R&D system. Furthermore, after and even during the process
of learning, the acquired technologies are diffused across the society by informal or
non-market channels, and even through intangible assets (1997: 122). These have
made innovation affordable and unrestrained within the science and manufacturing
sectors.
It is undeniable that IT is one of the most important technologies ever
invented, as it is not only a production technology, but also an enabling technology,
which allows and makes possible other technological productions. Hence, an
investment in IT production also indirectly establishes firm foundations for other
innovation-led industries. For these reasons, the IT sector has become a notable
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strategic sector for industrialising an economy that is industrialising late, and for
maintaining the international competitiveness of advanced economies.
In terms of the study of political economy, the significance of IT is more
than simply its role in cutting-edge and enabling technologies. Recent and
unprecedented developments of the IT industry in many technologically backward
societies have epitomised the modern technology-upgrading approach that
determines the success of economic transformation from a resource-based to a
knowledge-based order. This approach signifies a new structure of the high-
technology professional network community that restructures the conventional
production processes as well as redefines the roles of the state in technology-
learning for economic development.
American computer companies have dominated the computer industry from
the very early commercialisation of viable computers (1945) to the birth of personal
computing with Microsoft (1975), then Apple (1976) and IBM’s first personal
computer: model 5150 (1981). Other industrialised countries saw that the computer
industry would be a ‘trigger atom’ causing a chain reaction leading to the
technological hegemony and economic superiority of the U.S.; hence, since the
1950s there has been a plethora of new names and nationalities in this industry,
which made their reputations not only on technical grounds but also through their
impact on economic development and the technological development regimes that
made them fiercely competitive.
While the U.S. and its computer companies competed on a global scale
through trade liberalisation and free market mechanisms combined with radical
innovative capacities, the second wave players in this industry from Japan, like
Toshiba (1950), Fujitsu (1952), NEC (1955) and Hitachi (1956) (Yonekura 2004:
- 7 -
125) competed against each other under the roof of trade protectionism adopted by
their state, using incremental innovation as a method of technology production.
The atmosphere of this industry from the 1950s until the 1970s, started with a major
emphasis on hardware production followed by the rise of software production, was
well portrayed as a catch-up game, in which one particular computer industry would
succeed only if it came up with a new model of a complete computer before its
competitors.
The rise and fall of these leaders and followers was made more complicated
by the entrance of a few more players into this international dynamic during the
1990s. As the computer industry progressed over time to become an Information
Technology industry instead, it also became more and more cosmopolitan in its
international alliances. Nowadays, many well-known cutting-edge IT technologies
are not invented and implemented by Americans or advanced countries like Japan
and Germany: for instance, Israeli network security system technology, Indian
enabling services and software-outsourcing hubs, and Taiwanese memory chip
design.
The newly prominent nations in this area are Ireland, Israel, and India, who
have advanced one of their innovation-driven industries, the IT industry, based on
the aforementioned emerging concepts of technology generation and diffusion
through a professional network community. Academic studies link the economic
phenomena in these countries together, studying them as nations formerly
characterised as technologically backward, that nevertheless were successfully
transformed to compete at the global IT frontiers within a generation (Breznitz 2007:
2). For convenience, they have been dubbed the ‘three I’s’ (Carmel 2003: 1). Since
this impressive technology-led economic transformation was recognised, there has
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been an emergence of research trying to examine what actually lies behind the three
I’s’ success, and their experience, which has not been replicated elsewhere so far,
has been examined to see whether other developing countries could nurture IT
sectors. Although the research findings uncover various causes, these countries’
cultural-professional networks constitute the most common explanation for the three
I’s’ success. They effectively utilise the informal IT professional networks of
knowledge linkages as a technology-upgrading approach by providing a sustainable
economic habitat for the intangible communications between such networks, and
link them flexibly with economic mechanisms at the national level. For example, in
the case of Israel, the Israeli IT industry is succeeding at the global level by
specialising in network security. The prototypical Israeli company in the network
security field is Checkpoint, which established and produced its software before the
government realised that such technology would become an internationally
competitive strategic technology in the future. The three founders of Checkpoint
also took part in other IT projects outside Checkpoint, which spontaneously spread
and developed further technical knowledge about network security among local
Israeli IT firms. Checkpoint and other local IT firms started to connect to each other
through an informal IT professional network beyond the Israeli state’s institutions.
Eventually, led by Checkpoint, these communities have provided Israel with a
network security market niche and the dynamics of its own endogenous technology-
learning capacity (Breznitz 2007: 8-9).
If the success of the three I’s has been based on each country building a
distinctive national technological specialisation in certain innovative products and
technology-learning in the form of professional proxies, especially from the same
culture, then it is worth monitoring how a new wave of countries that wish to follow
the three I’s and differ in political and economic contexts, national identity, culture,
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and history that construct their national innovative capacity. as well as their potential
success with technology-learning for industrialisation. Additionally, to provide a
clearer picture of these countries, Carmel’s taxonomy of global software exporting is
referred to here.
According to Carmel (2003), the three I’s have joined the global IT frontier ,
which consists mostly of nations that are OECD members and were already at the
top of the global software hierarchy during the late 1990s and early 2000s, followed
by Russia and China, which were thought to be highly capable of joining the tier 1
nations by 2010. The tier 3 nations were emerging software exporting nations,
including a few such as Brazil, Korea and Mexico, that had the potential to move up
the hierarchy. The tier 4 nations were those who had just entered the global software
market, such as Vietnam, Cuba, Indonesia and Iran. Lastly, the tier 5 nations were
those with almost no impact on the global software market, such as most African
nations (2003: 3-4).
Of course, Carmel’s 5-tier taxonomy is now somewhat out of date, especially
considering that the software sector is rapidly shifting despite the existing hierarchy.
However, it still provides a clear picture of global competition stages and potential
IT industries around the globe. Out of the tier 4 countries, Vietnam was chosen to be
the research’s case study for the reasons stated earlier in the introduction. To date,
work on the impact of the socialist state on development has focussed on China, but
China does not fit into the three I’s concept in that it already has a large domestic
market for high-technology goods and is also connected with the global market
through the mass manufacture of IT goods (OECD 2004), particularly hardware and
computer peripherals rather than software.
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Vietnam’s IT sector is still young, yet it is striking that the country was in the
world’s top ten in terms of spending on the development of the IT industry during
2004-2008 (U.S. Department of Commerce 2007). IT has only recently been
recognised by the government as a strategic sector for industrialising the country,
but the sector has already drawn a great amount of attention from major IT
companies, which see Vietnam as an attractive business partner. Vietnam is now
being labelled as a new destination for software outsourcing (2007).1
Vietnam is one of those countries that have long struggled politically both
internally and externally. Not long ago Vietnam began to catch up with the world
economy, and not much earlier that that it was able to shift further from the shadow
of a socialist economic regime; however, Vietnam is now facing another challenge
from the new form of economy that is knowledge based and intensive in high
technology. In this kind of economy, the nation’s capacities come from individuals
rather than state institutions. This thesis argues that this new economy relies less on
the state and more on international networks and the community of IT professionals;
it demands a profound decentralisation of state authority that threatens the survival
of the state’s communist ideology.
The emergence of skilled and talented IT workers, the IT industry, and IT
alliances with its old enemy, the U.S., are challenging Vietnam to prove its socialist
market economy competent to cope with a modern form of economy. In this
economy, the state’s roles as well as other critical success factors are redefined by a
dynamic of technological learning that is removing national technological and
economic borders. How Vietnam will respond to this challenge within its political
context is a question yet to be answered.
1 For Revenues of Vietnam’s IT Industry by sector (2008-2011) see Appendix A
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1.3 Research Terminology
The terms employed in this research are multidisciplinary, being drawn from
the fields of computer science, politics, economics and business. Although most of
them will be clarified as they occur in the research, a few will need to be defined at
the outset to establish the primary scope of the research. .
As for the connections between the three fundamental terms central to this
research: information and communications technology (ICT), information
technology (IT), and innovation, all of them are related to information and
knowledge production.2
The IT industry is defined in this research as an industry that consists of
three sub-sectors: hardware; software; and digital content. This definition is
consistent with the breakdown of the domestic IT industry according to the
published documents from the Ministry of Information and Communication, which
supervises the development of Vietnam’s IT industry (MIC 2010).
However, such breakdowns (hardware, software, and digital content sectors)
are tentative when it comes to considering guidance for conducting the research’s
fieldwork, which required more detailed guidance about what type of IT activities
the three sub-sectors involve. For this reason, I define what types of IT activities are
included in the three sub-sectors.
I define what types of IT activities are included in the three sub-sectors. In
the case of this research, it focuses on IT production, IT spending, IT service and
any IT production-related fields such as industrial automation, telecommunications,
2 The term ‘IT’ and ‘ICT’ are seem synonymous; however, the term ‘IT’ is preferred to be used here in this
research.
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software and microelectronics (Duysters and Hagedoorn 2000: 212), but will not
include uses of IT such as E-Government or PC usage in education. As Okada
(2005: 274) suggests, ‘the ICT industry should be distinguished from the sectors that
use ICT’. I apply the same principle to the definition of the IT industry in this
research.
With regard to the term ‘innovation’, the research defines the term based on
the definition provided by Gobeli and Brown (1988, cited in Huizenga 2004: 15).
For Gobeli and Brown, there are four classifications for the term ‘innovation’:
application (high innovative level with low benefits); radical (high innovative level
with high benefits); incremental (low innovative level with low benefits); and
technological (low innovative level with high benefits).
To apply Gobeli and Brown’s definition to the IT industry, I connect their
four classifications with Okada’s ranking of skill level in the Indian IT industry.
Okada (2005: 257) breaks down this sector by ranking it from semi-skilled (a) to
high-end skilled activities (d): (a) includes IT-enabled services (call centres, finance
and accounts), and data processing (medical, insurance, banking); (b) includes
software services (programming/application development, network solution and
management, system development and consulting); (c) includes software product
development, network solutions and management, systems development and
consulting and finally, (d) includes R&D and computer hardware engineering, chip
design and embedded software.
Okada’s skill ranking is linked to innovative levels in Gobeli and Brown’s
four types of innovation (with level (a) being the lowest innovative level and level
(d) is the highest innovative level), but not linked to Gobeli and Brown’s benefit
levels. The capability to produce high-end skilled IT activities from category (d)
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does not always mean that producers have entered an innovative production level or
are themselves being innovative, since these tasks can be designed, implemented
and integrated by different producers. For instance, a firm might implement a very
innovative software program, but if such a program was designed by another firm,
then the production by the implementing firm is certainly not an innovation. On the
other hand, producers can enter an innovative production level even though their
products are located in lower skilled IT areas ((a) – (c)). This leaves the gap for the
research to ascertain the benefit level of technology examined in the case studies
from the fieldwork.
Furthermore, another issue related to the term ‘innovation’, is the context of
intellectual property rights (IPRs), which differ from country to country. At the early
stage of technological development, incremental innovations were protected by
IPRs; however, as time progressed, only radical innovations remained protected in
most technologically advanced societies. The generally accepted definition of
innovation among developmental statists covers innovations that might have already
been created somewhere else but are newly introduced to firms mainly though the
‘innovation by learning’ approach; in other words ‘imitation’ is a major technology-
learning strategy for the developmental school at this early stage. However, IT, as
conceived by this research, requires radical innovations rather than incremental
innovations if entrepreneurs are to survive.
Thus, against this backdrop, the term ‘innovation’ in this research is defined
in the manner provided by Gobeli and Brown, with the addition of Okada’s ranking,
and the concern over IPRs issue, as newly created IT ideas, which can be
implemented in the form of products, processes or services (Dodgson 2000: 231),
and has constituted radical innovation even when the owners of such ideas pay
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another firm to implement the end technology (Breznitz 2007: 211). Moreover, the
use of technologies is location specific (Mani 2002: 3). Thus any technologies that
are merely adapted to match local demands will not be counted as innovations in this
research.
In this section, the basic terms central to the thesis research are defined.
However, in the following chapters, a few chapter-specific terms will be introduced
and defined in their contexts.
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives
The research aims to examine the Vietnamese state relations with the IT
industry during the industrialisation process, which occurred with the challendge of
knowledge-based economy. Vietnam’s domestic IT industry is the case study this
thesis researched to examine the state’s role in industrial development. The specific
focus was the technology-upgrading process employed by the local IT industry, both
in the public and private sectors. A close and systematic examination of this process
provides a broader picture of a hi-tech industrial path for catching up with other
innovation-driven economies around the globe.
Unquestionably, the industrialisation process is not merely a passive object
of the polity, as the emergence of high-technology based industries in
technologically backward societies creates unfamiliar circumstances that challenge
the political dynamics of those countries. It is a two-way interaction: as Doner
(1991: 819) writes in delimiting the political economy it is, ‘[…] the ways in which
politics influences aspects of economic policymaking, and economic interests and
outcomes influence political processes and outcomes’. This addresses the research
fields that should be included when elaborating the core research questions, which
are as follows:
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Question I: How should we characterise the nature of the technology-
upgrading approaches that are employed domestically in Vietnam, and how are
these approaches processed within the context of Vietnam’s IT industry?
The research examines the Vietnamese approaches to technology catch-up at
the national level in the age of post-Fordist production. In this age, the product life
cycle has fragmented from mass production into a production-specific network from
the perspective of the technology-upgrading approach. Therefore the research began
its investigation at the firm level, which is the smallest sub-cluster in the
organisation of technological change.
There are a few terminologies related to the concept of the technology-
upgrading approach. To begin with there is a difference between an approach and a
process of technological upgrading. In this field of research, a process of
technological upgrading is employed within a technological realm, where it is
exploited by the research to examine a technological advancement or change free
from the context of the state’s roles. While an approach of technological upgrade is
employed here to examine the broader context in which the interplay between the
state’s roles and the process of technological upgrade occurs, making a distinction
between these two terms in the way this research does is not a heuristic device. I am
fully aware that the process of technological upgrading in Vietnam is in no way
totally free from the state’s interventions, as the process is embedded within an
economy in which the main governance is still from the state. Nonetheless, I
propose ways to look at the two phenomena separately to capture the differences in
how political factors affect the nature and true dynamic of technological
development.
The first research question can be unpacked into sub-questions as follows:
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(1) What are the best ways to describe Vietnam’s domestic technological-
upgrade approaches and their processes, and the nature of the accumulation of
technological capacities to conduct such processes? Addressing both the process and
the capacity will enable the bigger and more complex ecosystem, the system of the
technological upgrading approach, to be placed in the context of Vietnam’s national
industrial development.
(2) What are the factors that shape the development of such approaches and
processes?
Question II: How can the state’s roles regarding technological
upgrading in Vietnam’s IT industry be characterised, and to what extent and in
which way do these different state roles affect the domestic technology-
upgrading approaches?
It is important to note that the technology-upgrading process of
industrialisation involves both policies that directly deal with industrial
technological activities and those that have less to do with such activities.3
Therefore, to examine the channels through which the state exercises its political
power upon the technology-upgrading process, numerous institutions and
development agencies that play an important part in drafting and implementing
policies in the fields of education and finance, as well as those in the industrial field
of science and technology, are the fields of this research’s investigations.
3 There are three main related policies that are analysed in this research, namely science, technology and
innovation policy. These three policies are distinct from each other in theory, but this is not always the case in
practice (Dodgson 2000: 231). Science policy aims to promote new scientific knowledge breakthroughs in the
national R&D units, whereas technology policy aims to develop specific technologies and related infrastructure
(Dodgson 2000: 230-231). Innovation policy aims to use science and technology policies to create new products,
processes and services of domestic firms, combining science/technology policy with industrial policy (Dodgson
2000: 231; Rothwell 1982: 3).
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The list below consists of a few particular points, which are the focus of this
research, drawn from the analysis of such policies.
 The allocations of industrial resources, especially to high-technology
and software agglomerations
 The conditions of domestic market competition
 The performance of national research and development institutions
(R&D) with regard to both civil and military technology
 The relations with foreign firms and MNCs, and international
industrial financiers.
 The relations with small IT firms in various IT sectors.
 The perceptions toward unconventional practices of newly emerged
technological production and consumption.
Investigating these policy-related areas will provide the researcher with
empirical evidence on how the socialist regime affects the state’s role in industrial
development in a post-Fordist production context, and will enable an understanding
of the constraints high-technology industries are facing under economic
development directed by a socialist regime.
1.5 Theoretical Framework
The thesis research aims to analyse the impact on the technology-upgrading
process of being a technologically backward country governed by a highly
centralised regime. This research objective is developed based on an argument
about the process of technology production and dissemination that is intensive at the
micro level beyond the institutional setting. Therefore, the nature of the research
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touches upon many disciplines to construct the theoretical framework for this
argument: starting with the theoretical literature on IT development, then moving to
the broader theme of technological upgrading in late industrialising countries; next,
discovering what can be understood about the technology-learning process from
economic and business theories; and finishing with the political economic theory of
industrial policy and state roles in high-technology development.
These theories will not be considered separately in the thesis research
framework, as such a separation can never lead to an understanding of their
interactions or the impacts they have on each other. The key phenomenon that
prompts this research is the evident increase in the IT professional network
community around the world, along with many states’ attempts to connect
economically with such networks. Therefore, building this research’s framework
will focus on the interactions between theories surrounding this phenomenon.
With this in mind, I have divided the theories under discussion into three
scenarios in accordance with different industrial development regimes which make
different choices concerning the technology-upgrading approaches that can be
adopted by late industrialising countries. The first two scenarios illustrate
conventional analytical accounts of technology-learning approaches that are
employed by two conventional industrial development regimes: neo-liberalism and
the developmental state. The third scenario illustrates the challenges posed by the
phenomenon of the IT network community’s conflict with the conventional wisdom
of industrial development regimes. There is to date no panacea for states to handle
the rise of the IT network community, which limits the power of the state in the
national technology upgrading process. The incomplete character of the theory
concerning the relationship between the state’s role and the technology-upgrading
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approach leaves a gap to be filled, and the recognition of this gap was the thesis
research’s starting point.
There are three main models of technology learning in the literature. The
first scenario of technology-learning is what I call a market-led model. The neo-
liberal economic school focuses on this model, recommending that latecomers allow
FDI and encourage MNCs to invest and have local affiliates to promote technology
transfer and knowledge spillovers. Inevitably, the technical approaches advocated by
neo-liberals are full of biases. Because the technological giants have codified all the
technical knowledge in a form that can be traded with IPR protection, it is
questionable whether the neo-liberals’ recommendations are remedies for
technologically backward societies or a tool for advanced economies to exploit a
new market in developing countries, which normally have weak IPR protection and
high barriers for FDI. However, the rich literature provided by economic and
business theorists seems to demonstrate that late industrialising nations benefit by
allowing FDI and encouraging MNCs to have a local presence (Fosfuri et al. 2001;
Gӧrg and Strobl 2004; Korgaonker 2004; Møen 2005; Zhou 2008; Buston 2008).  
Theories associated with the market-led model provide a framework dealing
with the process of technological change from an external perspective only. They do
not consider internal accounts of technological change that occur under local
conditions. This shortcoming leads the research to examine the second scenario,
concerning accounts of the domestic technological change process led by the state:
the state-led model.
As suggested by its name, the state-led model of the technology-upgrading
process focuses on the national scope of technological change driven by domestic
dynamics along with a statist economic policy designed to protect infant high-tech
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industries. The relevant technological change theory associated with this model is
the National Innovation System (NIS) theory (Nelson 1992; Niosi et al. 1993;
Freeman 1995; Archibugi and Michie 1997; Rooji et al. 2005). The theory offers a
structure of innovation systems based on the capacity of various state institutional
arrangements to create productive interactions between science and technology,
educational, financial, civil, military, economic, entrepreneurial, legislative and
political units within national borders. However, recent work on the NIS tradition is
increasingly concerned with how globalisation is breaking down the foundation of
NIS’s technology-learning capacity. Its failure to offer satisfactorily an explicit
technology-learning format in the era of technological globalisation drives this thesis
research to develop theories on industrial policy that are capable of coping with the
contemporary setting, where technological change, particularly in IT sector, is
generated on the ground.
The third and most recent model, the network knowledge-led model,
attempts to examine the dominant accounts explaining the success of high-
technology-based economies. Work in this tradition comes closest to the needs of
the thesis research, in the sense that it investigates the factors that particularly
underlay the emergence of IT clusters in new and less advanced economies around
the world during the 1990s. The IT clusters in Taiwan, Ireland, India, and Israel are
the prototypical examples of a notable success story, while Malaysia’s Multimedia
Super Corridor is often described as a case of failure.
Unlike the previous two models, which debate whether neo-liberal or statist
economic regimes provide the high-tech industrial policy that best fosters the
technology-upgrading environment in latecomer nations, this latest model is well
aware of the emergence of IT professional network communities in particular
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regions and concludes that these communities are the key device facilitating the
technology-learning environment in technologically backward economies (Breschi
and Malerba 2001; Brehahan et al. 2001; Saxenian and Hsu 2001). Moreover, recent
innovation theory on the rise of tacit knowledge as an ideal type of knowledge for
international competition (see e.g. Ernst and Lundvall 1997) strengthens the
significance of technology-learning in such network communities.
There are important analyses of the changing industrial development role of
the state in accordance with the rise of technology-learning through network
communities (Ansell 2000; Cooke 2001; O’Riain 2004; Ohmae 1993; Breznitz
2007). Most of them are developed from developmental state accounts, but advocate
a flexibly structured development regime rather than a rigid bureaucratic structure,
as presented in classical theory. This school of thought provides the last theory to be
deployed in constructing a conceptual approach for the thesis research.
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Chapter 2
Research Methods
The research methods were designed prior to the fieldwork phase in a very detailed
manner, as can be seen throughout this chapter. However, not all of them worked
out in the way originally planned originally regarding both the methods to collect
data and the research participants during the fieldwork phase. In this chapter I will
outline both the original and revised research designs and methods instead of
omitting the original research designs and methods that did not work during the
fieldwork, for two main reasons. Firstly, doing so will highlight the pitfalls of
researching the dynamics of Vietnam’s IT industry. This may act as a reference for
others who plan their research in a similar context as mine, whether in Vietnam or in
any other newcomer country to the global IT industry. Secondly, I believe that the
failed methods did not work for a reason – they did not fit the context of Vietnam’s
IT industry at the time when they were conducted. Thus outlining them in
comparison with what-worked-well will provide more understanding of the
circumstances and dynamics between different agencies and the circumstances of
Vietnam’s IT industry.
2.1 Research Design Prior to Fieldwork
In order to answer the research questions, practical and effective research strategies
are required before planning fieldwork. The researcher needs, firstly, to determine
the key concepts that should be used to answer each research question rationally
according to the defined theoretical framework, and secondly, design appropriate
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procedures to enable the questions to be answered by employing suitable strategies
and methods within financial and time constraints (Burnham et al. 2008: 42-43).
To conceive appropriate research strategies and methods before the actual
fieldwork was conducted, I followed Pierce (2008), who recommends aspects that
political researchers should consider to narrow down the choices of method, notably:
academic requirements that regulate the researcher, recommended methods for each
sub-discipline of politics, resources available for the researcher to conduct
fieldwork, and the accessibility and types of data (Pierce 2008: 51-53). The selected
research methods and samples are presented according to Pierce’s suggestions, and
are outlined for each research question, as presented in Table 2.1.
The research fieldwork had three phases: preliminary work, data collection
and data analysis. The fieldwork took place over a course of ten months (from April
2010 to January 2011). Table 2.1 below presents the three phases of the fieldwork in
greater detail.
Table 2.1 Distributions of Research Questions, Form of Answers Needed, Methods,
and Techniques by Phases of Fieldwork
Fieldwork
Phase
Research
questions*
Form of
Answers
needed
Methods Techniques
Preliminary Question I , II Exploratory Survey within a
case study
(planned, but did
not work)
Online survey
(originally planned,
but did not work)
Observation,
Content analysis
(Solutions to
unworkable
Local tech-
conference/workshop.
Archival document
analysis (news,
- 24 -
Fieldwork
Phase
Research
questions*
Form of
Answers
needed
Methods Techniques
plans) business analyses, IT
industrial policies, and
academic work on
related topics)
(Solutions to
unworkable plans)
Data
Collection
Questions I, II Explanatory Case study,
Content analysis
Interviews, participant
observation, document
collection
Data
Analysis
Questions I, II Exploratory
and
Explanatory
Content analysis,
Non-parametric
statistical
analysis
Archival documentary
analysis, conversation
analysis, and field
notes analysis, policy
analysis
*Question I: How should we characterise the nature of the technology-upgrading
approaches that are employed domestically in Vietnam, and how are these approaches
processed within the context of Vietnam’s IT industry?
Question II: How should we characterise the state’s roles regarding technological upgrade
in Vietnam’s IT industry, and to what extent and in which way do these different state roles
affect the domestic technology-upgrading approaches?
2.2 Preliminary Phase
There were a few pieces of information on the composition of Vietnam’s IT industry
that this research required before the data collection process in the actual fieldwork
setting was conducted. Yin (2009: 8-9) suggests the use of the survey method to
answer quantitative enquiries involving what and how much/many questions. Thus,
in the preliminary phase of the field research, I selected a case study and conducted
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a background analysis using an exploratory survey method. Although Vietnam’s IT
industry is still young and small, collecting data from the entire industry would
create pitfalls rather than benefit the research due to the limited time and financial
resources available to the researcher and the diversity of conditions among the sub-
units within the industry, which might lead to misrepresentation of the actual
situation. Therefore, a structured single case study which would identify the
geographic scope and a list of prospective participants was the first step taken to
answer the research questions.
2.2.1 Case Study
A single case study for explanatory purposes was employed as a research method to
find the answers to the two research questions. Since the units of the case study
came in different forms, such as events, phenomena and individuals, choosing the
most suitable unit that could be generalised to the entire context was an essential
step for ensuring the valid interpretation of the findings (Yin 2009: 29, 33-34). In the
case of this research, the sub sectors of Vietnam’s IT industry were taken as a unit of
analysis. There are four case studies employed in this research that were selected out
of a total of seven case studies from which data was gathered during the fieldwork
phase. In more detail, the selected four case studies were Cloud Computing,
software outsourcing, App economy, and online games sectors. The three case
studies that were not used as in the research were embedded system, online survey
software, and databases. There were several justifications explaining the selection of
these four case studies out of the seven cases.
Firstly, the selected four case studies provide sufficient data for the research
to insightfully use for answering research questions. This was a crucial justification
for a selection of research case studies as sufficient data enables the research to have
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a concrete ground for data analysis. Nonetheless, the non-selected three cases were
not wasted, as they as well provided the research with an insightful overview on the
dynamics of Vietnam’s IT industry, which was also important for the research data
analysis phases.
Secondly, the selected four cases also represent a fair share of cities that have
significant roles in Vietnam’s IT industrial development, namely, Ho Chi Minh City
and Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh City is the site where the most active and intensive
agglomeration of IT firms takes place, while Hanoi is a capital city where the central
government is located. To date Ho Chi Minh City has developed more intensive IT
and other high-technology industrial agglomerations than anywhere else in the
country. According to Vu Xuan Nguyet Hong (2007), there are four high-tech and
software parks under the authority of the Ho Chi Minh City municipality, compared
to six high-technology clusters under the authority of Hanoi, Hoa Lac, Danang,
Haipong, Cantho and Hue municipalities. This data suggests that selecting a case
study from Ho Chi Minh City had the potential to yield findings that well
represented the dynamics of technological development through networks. However,
Vietnam is governed by a one-party state firmly based in the capital city of Hanoi –
home of the central government and of many local pioneering IT companies – hence
the research also collected data from the government bodies, IT pioneers and
industrial consortium that are located in Hanoi. The selected four cases were from
these two cities. While data on the cases of Cloud Computing and software
outsourcing were gathered from Hanoi, data on the cases of App economy and
online gaming were gathered from Ho Chi Minh City.
Thirdly, the four case studies provide the research a variety in research
findings regarding the state’s industrial developmental roles and technology-
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upgrading approaches. This led the research findings to be comprehensive and well
representative of the state roles and technological drivers of Vietnam’s IT industry.
2.2.2 Survey
In the primary stage of the fieldwork, an exploratory survey was employed as part of
the original methodology. This technique can aid researchers when they have very
little information about their topic, for example when the research is about a
phenomenon that has not yet been studied previously (Manheim et al. 2001: 122).
In my case, an exploratory survey was intended to make it easier for me to
obtain the most up-to-date details about local IT enterprises, MNCs, their
relationship with other firms (locally and internationally) in the demand-supply line,
types of IT product speciality, approaches to technological change, membership of
IT consortiums and venture capitalists. Besides the above information, O’Riain
(2004: 245), from his research on Ireland’s software industry, suggests the types of
primary data on the software industry that he thinks are useful for breaking down the
industry in greater detail. These include alliances with other firms or sectors, sources
of innovation or technological learning that firms obtain for their production and
worker training, and details of a company’s workforce such as the qualifications of
employees and the specifications of technical positions. In the case of Vietnam,
besides these types of primary information, information on the composition of
shareholding in domestic IT companies is essential. This would permit the public
and private ownerships to be distinguished before further analysis. It is often the
case that private firms that have shares in companies have connections with state or
public agencies; moreover, state-owned enterprises in the economic sector are often
characterised as being established for purposes other than economic ones (Ning
2007: 583).
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In the exploratory survey, the required information was collected by means
of a list of questions. Different survey instruments can be used, depending on their
suitability to the context, sample convenience and the opportunities available to the
researcher. Manheim et al. (2001: 123) suggest several types of survey instruments.
The researcher can choose to conduct the survey using questionnaires (by mail or
self-administered) or interviews (by telephone or in person); however, a common
problem found in using a survey method is a low rate of response. To address this
problem and limitation, the original plan was to use an online poll sent to the
respondents, since most IT professionals are available online, and it should in theory
be easier to obtain their co-operation by asking them to fill in an online poll. In the
case of the respondents who did not reply, they would be followed up by telephone
interviews. This aimed to ensure a high response rate and optimise data collection.
In selecting the survey’s respondents, a list of firms was to be obtained from
the membership lists of high-technology clusters and other IT consortiums –
VINASA, Quang Trung Software Park, and a directory of IT companies from a local
computer magazine. This would allow IT firms located outside industrial clusters to
be included in the sample.
Data obtained from the initial survey was to provide information on all
current IT firms (whose number is constantly increasing) and their ownership in
Vietnam. These selected companies would then be approached. A number of
interviewees would be identified after acquiring the information from the initial
survey in the first phase of the fieldwork. Furthermore, the data obtained from the
survey would be presented in the form of descriptive statistics, rather than being
statistically analysed, due to the aim of the preliminary survey being to obtain
primary information rather than to test research hypotheses statistically.
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The rationale of using a survey was promising; however, when implemented
it proved too limited to generate the primary information required. The survey was
available online on my postgraduate research profile on the university website from
10 September until 31 December 2010,4 however only a very small number of firms
responded to this. Later, I managed to meet up with many firms that received the
invitation to participate in this survey. They said that they could not afford to spend
their time on an academic-related survey due to the lack of incentives.
Following this setback, I opted for an alternative, which I had considered
previously: archival documents and observation. The information listed above to be
retrieved from the survey might be available in the form of archival documents.
However this method had some limitations, as the volatile nature of the IT industry
creates difficulties for the researcher who wishes to follow the most recent trends, as
such documents rapidly become outdated. Additionally observation could not be
done on a large scale within the time, human resource, and financial constraints
which I was facing during the research fieldwork phase.
As I was fully aware of the downfalls of both methods, I conducted them in a
selective way, only filtering data and information from active sources to avoid out of
date material. For archival documents, I selected the most up to date lists containing
IT firms, their business type, their industrial alliances, and workforce from two main
sources: the Vietnam Outsourcing Portal and VINASA. However, as both sources
contain lists of domestic IT firms, clustering heavily on outsourcing businesses
(especially with the Vietnam Outsourcing Portal), I also employed an observation
method to help me consider a wide variety of businesses. I selected two IT related
venues, observing two technology conferences: the Fourth Annual Technology
4 http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/research/students/phothiyarom-uer-aree.php
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Business Conference, 11-14 October 2010, Ho Chi Min City, held by Strategic
Alliance Vietnamese Ventures International (SAVVI); and the Workshop on the
Promotion of Open Source Software Applications and Development, on 14
December 2010, Hanoi, held by Ministry of Information and Communications. I
also made regular visits to software and hi-tech parks in Ho Chi Minh City where
there is a high density of IT firms.
2.3 Data Collection Phase
Table 2.2 Distribution of Key Information, Key Informants, and Data Collection
Methods for Answering Each Research Question
Research Question Key Information Key Informants Research Techniques
Question I 1. Technology-
upgrading process
2. Source of
technology-change
process
3. Retrospect of key IT
professional networks
A. Vietnamese IT
forums
B. IT consortium,
associations
C.IT diaspora
network
D. Local
enterprises
E. FDI
- Participant
observation
- Interviews
- Archival
documentary analysis
Question II 1. Related policy
drafting processes
2. Related policy
implementation
processes
3. IT’s standardisation
process
4. Physical
infrastructure
A. Experts from
related ministries
B. HCMC
authorities
C. FDI
D. Private
enterprises
E. Public
- Participant
observation
- Interviews
- Archival
documentary analysis
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Research Question Key Information Key Informants Research Techniques
development
5. International
political and economic
relations
6. The connection
between the state and
the IT industry
(government actions)
enterprises
F. R&D units
G. Universities
H.IT consortium,
IT associations,
and industrial
associations
I. Other industrial
participants such
as business
consultants and
financiers
2.3.1 Participant observation
Due to the nature of technological learning, which is a source of the capacity to
upgrade particular technologies, technical knowledge accumulation processes do not
occur only in the formal settings of R&D, educational and training units, or market
transactions (Archibugi 1997: 122). Hence, encapsulating the patterns of such
processes, including the interactions between each actor within the network,
between the network and other regional networks and between the network and the
state, should be conducted in informal settings.
The participant observation technique has principles that are suitable for the
study of the Vietnamese IT informal knowledge network as it is a data-gathering
technique designed to obtain information on a set of behaviours with a view to
understanding the context explored by the research that might be distorted if the
questions are answered verbally or by written accounts, especially those concerning
on-going behaviours (Manheim et al. 2001: 330-331). This technique identifies
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patterns of behaviours from particular events, as well as the factors in the natural
context that influence such behaviour, and operates by the researcher being part of
such a context (2001: 332).
The natural context of the Vietnamese IT professional network appears both
in the physical world and the online world. Undoubtedly, the latter has become a
norm of the technological learning approach through online spaces offering
information sharing and technical problem solving on IT material, especially now
that most technical input is becoming available through open source material rather
than proprietary material. As a consequence, participant observation techniques
enable the researcher to collect field-data from online settings by means of
observation, interactions between the researcher and informants via online space,
and even through the researcher’s perception from the viewpoint of being a member
of the group (2001: 345-348). Several Vietnamese IT forums are already well
known among IT professionals as rich sources of technical learning and also
problem-solving communities covering broad disciplines of computer science.
Specifically in Chapter 7: The App Economy and the Irrelevant State, the main
discussion is set around open source software as a case study. In this chapter I
observed the dynamics of how members of this network obtain and exchange ideas,
knowledge, and hints relating to an Android operating system on a specific IT
community network called ‘The Open Embedded Software Foundation’
(http://www.oesf.biz). Participant observation was also conducted at several local
Internet rooms, in order to gain information on Vietnam’s gold farming activities.
In terms of the approaches within the scope of the participant observation
technique that will be employed, Manheim et al. (2001: 332-334) advise the use of a
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mixed approach consisting of obtrusive and unobtrusive approaches,5 and structured
and unstructured approaches6 rather than employing a single approach. These mixed
approaches usually provide considerable benefits at each stage of the research. This
research followed this advice and employed a mixed approach where appropriate.
A main concern of using this method is how the researcher was to
communicate with the studied group. Fielding (2004: 148) points out that
communication with respondents in the natural setting requires some knowledge of
not only the study group’s native language, but also the special meanings of words
likely to occur in the conversations. In the case of this research, Vietnamese and a
technical knowledge of the terms used in IT industry are the native language and the
special meanings respectively. To overcome the language barrier, the researcher had
studied basic Vietnamese, and Vietnamese research assistants were hired when
needed. Regarding the IT technical knowledge barrier, basic IT knowledge has been
obtained through the researcher’s academic IT background.
2.3.2 Elite Interviewing
Elite interviews have been chosen as the interview methodology in this research.
The term ‘elite interviewees’ refers to people who politically influence the outcomes
of the research foci, in both direct and indirect ways (Pierce 2008:119).
The research in practice utilised the information collected by this method in
two main ways. Firstly, to quote Burnham et al., the elite interview ‘[…] is often the
most effective way to obtain information about decision makers and decision-
5 Obtrusive observation occurs when people are informed that they will be observed, whereas unobtrusive
observation occurs when people are not informed, thus are unaware that they are observed (Manheim et al. 2001:
332).
6 Structured observation occurs when a researcher observes events by following guidance which indicates
what that researcher should look for (in this case it refers to theoretical framework). Unstructured observation
occurs when a researcher observes the events without a framework as to discover a pattern of phenomena
(Manheim et al. 2001: 333-334).
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making processes’ (Burnham et al. 2008: 231). One of the research’s objectives is to
explore the implications that the growth of the IT industry has for Vietnam’s policy
in its industrialisation period; thus the examination of the political issues behind the
making of IT policy is well suited to this method as IT is one of the strategic sectors
in the industrialisation of the country.
Secondly, elite interviews are an excellent aid when the interviewees appear
to hold expert knowledge on the topic that is greater than that of the interviewer
(2008: 231). Central to the proposed research is inevitably the pool of technical
knowledge and terminologies; hence, the elite interview appears to be a sound
interview technique, bridging the gaps in technical knowledge between the
researcher and the sample.
In terms of sampling technique, snowball sampling is a recommended
method for conducting elite interviews (Burnham et al. 2008: 233). Snowball or
network sampling is a method where a sampling frame is not available; thus the
initial interviewees will be indicated by the literature or an Internet search. The
sample can be extended by consulting the initial set, who can identify the related
population that they know in the same network or area of interest (Arber 2001: 63;
Burnham et al. 2008: 233).
In addition, non-elites were also included in the proposed research. These
people are impacted directly or indirectly by the outcomes of the events or policies
that are the foci of the research (Pierce 2008: 127); for instance, the people or
organisations that are responsible for the implementation of IT policy, and the local
IT firms that are affected by IT policies.
The proposed research’s population of interest, which can be identified as the
initial sample, could not be reached during the fieldwork phase. Therefore, leading
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on from the snowball sampling, the actual research participants are different from
those who were initially targeted; the differences between the two groups are
presented in Table 2.3 below.
Table 2.3 A comparison between the research’s original population of interest prior
to the fieldwork phase and actual research participants during the fieldwork
phase
Information
Groups
Population of Interest Research Participants
Line of
related
ministries and
local
authorities
- MIC: Department of Information
Technology: Director, Mr. Nguyen
Anh Tuan
- MOST: Information
Communication Technology Centre:
Director, Mr.Phung Bao Thach
- MOIT: Science and Technology
Department: Deputy Director
General, Nguyen Phu Cuong; and
Vietnam E-Commerce and
Information Technology Agency:
Director General, Nguyen Thanh
Hung
- MPIP: Department for Economic
Zones Management: Director, Mr.
Le Tan Cuong
- HCMC’s Department of
Information and Communications:
Director, Mr. Le Manh Ha
- Department of
Information Technology,
Ministry of information
and Communication:
Nguyen Thanh Tuyen,
Deputy Director General
- People’s Committee of
Ho Chi Minh City
Department of Information
and Communications:
Nuyen Anh Tuan, Deputy
Director
-Quang Trung Software
Park: Lam Nquyen Hai
Long, Director of the
Cloud Service Project
R&D
agencies
- The Software Technology and
Digital Content Institute: Director,
Dr. Le Hoang Minh
-Vietnam Academy of
Science and Technology:
RD1, Senior position
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Information
Groups
Population of Interest Research Participants
- The Information Technology
Agency: CEO, Dr. Nguyen Anh
Tuan
-FPT Technologies
Research Institute: RD2,
Senior position
-iDragon BCC:
RD3; RD4; RD5, Senior
positions
- TMAs R&D Centre: Bui
RD6, senior position
IT
consortium
- Ho Chi Minh City Computer
Association (the first IT association
in Vietnam, established1988):
Chairman, Mr. Chu Tien Dung
- Overseas Vietnamese Club for
Science and Technology
- Vietnam Software Association
(VINASA)
- The Software Engineering Institute:
Professor, Dr. John Vu – a member,
and also Chief Engineer of the
Boeing Group’s IT Centre
- ITCon: IC1, senior
position
-VINASA (Ho ChiMinh
City): Tran Cong Tuong,
Director
-VINASA (Hanoi):
Nguyen Thi Thu Giang,
Director
- Ho Chi Minh City
Computer Association
(HCA): Tuan Phi Anh,
Director
MNCs - Intel Corporation
- International Data Group (IDG)
- Global Equipment Company
Services (GES)
- Intel Corporation
Vietnam: Than Trong
Phuc, Ex-General Director
Indigenous
local firms
- Corporation for Financing and
Promoting Technology (FPT)
- Computer Communication
Company (CCC)
- Business Information Technology
Co., Ltd (BITCO)
- Harmony Co., Ltd
- Sirvina: ILF1, Founder
- VNG:, Le Hong Minh,
CEO
- TMA Solutions: Nguyen
Huu Le, Chairman
-TMA Solutions: Hong
Tran, Director Assistant of
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Information
Groups
Population of Interest Research Participants
- High Performance Technology JSC
(HPT)
- Vietnam Data Communication
Company (VDC)
- Enterprise Software Development
and Trading Co., Ltd
- Hong Nam Computer
Communication JSC
CEO
- ISB Vietnam: ILF2,
Senior position
-3D Network: ILF3,
Country Sale Director,
-Lacviet: ILF4, Director
Journalists
and
academics
- Ho Chi Minh City University of
Technology (Faculty of Information
Technology) Dr Tran Anh Vu
- Runckel and Associates - Chris
Runckel and Ly Tran
- Professor, Academician Dang Huu
- Nguyen Tu Quang
- Posts and
Telecommunications
Institute of Technology :
Dang Thi Viet Duc,
Lecturer
- Faculty of Computer
Science and Engineering,
Ho Chi City University of
Technology: Tran Vu
Pham, Head of Systems
and Networking
Department ,
- Ho Chi Minh City
University of Technology:
JAA1, Lecturer,
- Ho Chi Minh National
Academy of Politics and
Public Administration:
JAA2, Deputy Director
Centre of Information
Technology
Financers - none -DFJ Vinacapital: Than
Trong Phuc, Managing
Director
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Information
Groups
Population of Interest Research Participants
-DFJ : FN1, senior
position
2.3.3 Archival Documentary Analysis
Several sorts of archival documents were examined for this research, especially
those that analyse similar patterns of impacts to the research. First of all, archival
research was conducted in disciplines related to the conceptual framework. This was
not limited to academic research, but also included research conducted for business
purposes. As the latter tends to be published more often than the former, it provided
more up-to-date information for the needs of this research. Secondly, official
reports, policy statements and relevant publications on sciences, technology,
innovation and industrial development were consulted. Thirdly, voluminous
publications such as newspapers, journals, magazines and conference papers were
included as sources of documentary evidence. Lastly, published statistical data were
obtained from reliable sources such as the Vietnamese General Statistics Office,
Vietnam’s National Organisation of Intellectual Property Agency (providing
statistics on granted licences of intellectual properties) and the U.S. Census Bureau
for statistics on trade in advanced technology products.
2.4 Data Analysis Phase
The data analysis phase in this research has two purposes. First of all to assess
whether there was enough data collected from the data collection phase to frame
issues for addressing the research questions. Following this, the data analysis phase
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was to analyse the obtained data to answer the research questions and the research’s
contribution to the theories on state developmentalism in high technology industry.
Research’s data analysis phase was processed in the following stages;
1. Case study selection: four case studies were selected out of a total of
seven case studies by using sub-sectors of Vietnam’s IT industry as a unit of
measure (Section 2.2.2 Case Study). As the research employed snow ball sampling
as a sampling method, this enabled the research to obtain multiple samples that were
clustered in the same sector segments providing sufficient data for each case study.
2. Quantitative data analysis: the data obtained were analysed based on the
type of data. Firstly, the quantitative data from archival documents and the survey
were statistically analysed on a nominal scale, using descriptive statistics in the form
of percentages and means where applicable. The obtained quantitative data were
used for comparative and illustrative purposes rather than for testing hypotheses or
finding correlations between variables.
3. Qualitative data analysis: regarding the qualitative data, content analysis
was employed as an analytical method. Pierce (2008: 263) defines content analysis
as the textual analysis of the message communicated via various sources notably
readable, audio and visual sources. He also notes the comparative capacity of this
method to evaluate the similarity and dissimilarity or agreement and disagreement
between informants on the same topic (2008: 264). Politics is generally a sensitive
topic, especially in socialist nations. Research regarding Vietnam, especially during
the transitional economic stage, can cause difficulties as informants may not
necessarily want to provide what they think could be socially unacceptable answers.
Thus, using content analysis allowed the researcher to obtain sensitive information
from messages that are communicated through non-spoken sources such as
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advertisements and photographs, and also from indirect spoken sources such as
speeches, without placing the key informants in difficulties.
The research followed Pierce’s guideline to analyse the content data with
two more specific techniques of content analysis: non-frequent technique; and
successive approximation technique.
3.1 Non-frequent: the first step in content analysis is to use a non-frequent
technique, identifying content evidence from obtained field data. George (2009:
144-145) posits that the non-frequent technique is conducted by observing the
consistency of the presence or absence of content features in the context, without a
concern over the features frequency values. The content features can be anything
that the research defines as research variables such as content characteristics,
dichotomous attributes or coding judgements (2009: 144-145). In the case of this
research, the content evidence was loosely classified into three groups: the state’s
industrial roles; technological upgrading; and other attributes that connect the first
two groups together.
3.2 Successive Approximation: after obtaining content evidence using the
non-frequent technique, the successive approximation technique of qualitative data
analysis was conducted in order to relate the content evidence with research
questions and research frameworks (Neuman 2003: 451). The research looked into
the content evidence and located them within the research frameworks of three
models examining state roles with technology-upgrading process (Chapter 3:
Literature Review). This technique helped the research to evaluate whether the
identified content evidence fit well with the theories or act beyond what the related
theories suggest. Neuman (2003) suggests the key strategy for this method as ‘[…]
repeatedly move back and forth between data and theory, until the gap between them
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shrinks or disappears’ (2003: 458), as by doing so the evidence and theory will
structurally shape each other (2003: 451).
2.4.1 Research Constraints and Ethical Considerations
Being a researcher with no direct connection to the country where fieldwork takes
place imposes certain limitations. First of all, I was not familiar with the field area,
which made the fieldwork more time consuming than originally planned. I paid the
price for this when the original research design was not successful, as a great delay
occurred in the fieldwork. Secondly, there were language constraints, which were
overcome by hiring research assistants when needed and taking a Vietnamese
language course. Because of the nature of the research, the key informants use
English as the main technical language in their professional lives, and thus most of
the interviews were conducted in English. The Vietnamese language ability gained
from the three-month-language course came in handy when attending technological
conferences or workshops, and when observing local Internet rooms. Thirdly, being
an outsider means I had no connections with the informants at all, and there were a
number of rejections and a high probability that the informants would not participate
if they had no interest in my research or did not benefit from it. To overcome this
barrier, I made use of a personal network which I have been developing since the
beginning of this research, which brought me in to the proximity of local IT
engineers as well as IT firms. Moreover, I established a local affiliation with Dr.
Cao Hao Thi, from the School of Industrial Management, Ho Chi Minh City
University of Technology who provided me with local connections as well as
credentials when contacting the informants during the period of July 2010 to January
2011.7 Being an outsider also has its advantages, such as seeing things from a
7 For an original copy refer to Appendix B
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different perspective from individuals who are entrenched in the Vietnamese system
and the ability to be more objective in my analysis.
Lastly, as a Thai citizen, I am permitted to travel ASEAN member countries
such as Vietnam without obtaining a visa for any single three-month period. This
saved me time as I did not have to deal with visa procedures. However, owing to the
limitations of the three-month visiting period, I had no choice but to enter Vietnam
more than once in order to complete my fieldwork, going back to Thailand then
returning to Vietnam again.
Regarding ethical considerations, I provided the participants with the details
of my research before the data collection took place in order to enable them to make
an informed decision about whether or not to participate in my research. During data
collection, research participants were all informed and asked for consent when
recording devices were operated. Following the guidelines agreed to for ethics
purposes, informants in this thesis have been anonymised using pseudonyms, except
where they gave explicit permission for their real identities to be specified. The
research obtained retrospective ethical approval from the university research ethics
community (reference number AREA 11-041).
In conducting participant observation, a mixture of obtrusive and unobtrusive
techniques was used based on ethical considerations. Whenever, an event was open
to public participants, for example in the case of this research when I accessed the
sites or events where non-members had access to information, participants were not
informed about my observation (except when this was required). On the other hand,
if any forms of communication took place between informants and me they were
informed about the research and asked verbally if they agreed to the use of the
information for research purposes.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
Technological-learning Approaches for Late Industrialised Economies
This section is organised in three parts, in accordance with the needs of this
research. Aiming to examine the relationship between politics and technological-
learning capacity under a highly centralised political regime in the state like
Vietnam, the research requires as its foundation a focus on explaining how
technological-learning capacities are generated for economic purposes.
In general, the literature touches upon multi-disciplinary issues around
technological-learning for industrial catch-up in late industrialised economies.
However, in this chapter, such literatures are reviewed from the point of view of
innovation and technological-learning theories, in association with different
industrialisation strategies, which can be presented in three ways: as market-led,
state-led, and network knowledge-led models. The purpose of categorising the
relationship between technological-learning approaches and industrialising regimes
is not to justify which model is best but rather to illustrate the diversity of the impact
the latter has on the former.
The three models are not of equivalent value. As the first two models, the
market-led and state-led ones, seem to receive more criticism of how ineffective
their related industrial regimes are in relation to technological upgrading, the last
model seems to be a more effective approach to deal with the emergence of
technology network communities outside formal industrial and R&D settings. These
communities are widely accepted to be the actual source of technological-learning
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nowadays (early works on this are: Breschi and Malerba, 2001; and Saxenian and
Hsu, 2001). However, in reality the conditions facing the late industrialised
economies are more complicated than the theories suggest. The work on the network
knowledge-led model emerges largely from a new model of technology production
that relies largely on less-institutionalised knowledge which is out of state’s techno-
economic apparatuses, leaving a big gap regarding the applicability of this model to
a state with a highly centralised regime, such as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
Therefore this research aims to provide an analysis beyond the scope of the existing
theories of the network knowledge-led model.
The second condition arises from the fact that the first two models are still
active in most of the late industrialised nations; this includes Vietnam, despite the
empirical evidence illustrating their ineffectiveness on technology-upgrading
capacity. Thus reviewing the first two models not only provides the background on
conventional approaches for technology upgrading, but also identifies the area that
the research needed to investigate and on which it needed to gather data for
answering the research questions.
3.1. The Market-Led Model
The market-led model of technological learning suggests that developing economies
will be able to upgrade their technological capacities mainly through neo-liberal
industrial policy prescriptions, such as liberalised trade and market conditions. The
focus point of this contention is that less technologically advanced economies will
upgrade their technological capacity by borrowing new or more advanced
technologies from more technologically advanced countries, rather than attempting
to generate an indigenous technology in the infant phase of industrialisation.
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Liberalising trade and market conditions will favour the inflow of FDI and
encourage MNCs to manufacture in developing countries. Consequently,
technologically-backward developing countries can acquire the already produced
technologies though various technical channels of technology transfer and
knowledge spillovers. This will enable them to catch up with technologically
advanced countries and connect them better with technology consumers on a larger
scale as exporters to the international market.
With regard to technology consumption, developing countries will benefit
from economic liberalisation mainly in terms of technology standardisation.
Historically, at the beginning of the rise of the computer industry IBM was a pioneer
in standardising the industry (Coopey 2004: 4). The United States, as both the home
of IBM, and a major advocate of the free market, from the late 1950s onwards
became hegemonic in the computer industry as any product, service, or marketing
that involved computers had to be compatible and upgradeable with IBM machines
(2004: 3-4).
As such, neo-liberal proponents contend that trade liberalisation will foster
technological upgrade for catching-up nations via their connection to the global IT
industry, which is a source of learning about the latest technology abroad, including
principles of technological production and means of technological standardisation,
as well as being an actual market for technology consumption. Using India’s IT
industry as an example here, a few scholars point out that economic liberalisation
was a turning point in the remarkable growth of India’s IT industry during the
1990s. According to Saxenian (2001), India was once given an opportunity to catch
up with global IT production through the presence of IBM manufacturing during the
late 1970s. Nevertheless, the economic environment at the time was characterised as
- 46 -
being unfriendly to FDI, for instance in Foreign Exchange Regulation Act areas,
which caused IBM’s departure in 1978 (2001: 5). Following the nationalist
economic trajectory of the Indian government during the 1980s, India’s IT industry
was isolated from global production (2001: 4).
The Computer Policy (1984) and the Computer Software Export,
Development and Training Policy (1986) followed with the economic liberalisation
process (1991) and have brought India back into the technological market. In
contrast with the import substitution industrial policy that regulated imported
technology and made national technology capacity obsolete, the new liberalised and
exported oriented industrial policy put India back in touch with cutting-edge
technology through foreign investment. Moreover, the technical capacity of local
firms has been modified in accordance with competition and international standards
both in technological production (through the International Organisation for
Standardisation: ISO) and technical management (through Total Quality
Management: TQM) (Korgaonker 2004:110 - 114).
In addition to the neo-liberal mechanism at the international level, there is a
well-known regional Asia-specific model that advocates the benefits of the neo-
liberal market mechanism. This model is known as the flying geese model. The
model praises neo-liberalism by advocating that pro-trade economic policies will
allow FDI to act as a transmitter for moving countries up the hierarchy of an Asian
production chain; this mechanism is referred to as ‘pro-trade-oriented FDI’ (Kojima
2000: 376). The flying geese model is a regional hierarchy in two dimensions: the
first dimension is a hierarchy of countries in which Japan is the lead goose; and the
second dimension is a hierarchy of production in which the higher stage of the
hierarchy, the more capital intensive and sophisticated are the products (2000: 376).
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The flying geese model connects neo-liberalism to technology upgrading by
suggesting that superior technologies from more developed countries will be
transferred to less developed countries when the economic conditions of the
destination countries are liberalised enough to allow FDI from the more developed
countries to flow in (2000: 383). However, the flying geese model has been
criticised over its claimed advantages for technology transfer. We shall examine this
critique in the remainder of the chapter along with other criticisms of neo-liberal
economic policy’s effects on technological learning in less technologically advanced
countries.
The critics of this tradition argue that neo-liberal economic policy benefits
the technologically advanced nations rather than backward ones (Ning 2008; Zhou
2008). For example, technology transfer in the flying geese model is critiqued for
not encouraging indigenous innovation in the following geese, since they are
dependent on foreign technology rather than creating their own (Kojima 2000: 393).
In another example, bilateral or multilateral trade agreements are a means for
wealthy nations to remove any trade tariff that is a disadvantage for them when they
trade with or want to exploit productive resources from developing countries (Ning
2008: 265-268, 288). Wade (2003) and Weiss (2005) suggest two angles to view
how neo-liberal economic policy benefits developed countries rather than
developing countries. Wade points out how the WTO (led by developed countries)
passively obstructs developing countries from moving up the global developmental
hierarchy through strategies that Wade refers to as ‘a modern version of Friedrich
List’s “kicking away the ladder”’ (2003: 1). In more detail, Wade argues that the
Uruguay Round’s agreement on investment measure (TRIMS), trade in services
(GATS), and intellectual property right (TRIPS) make illegal many industrial
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measures that benefit domestic technological upgrading in developing countries
(2003: 9). These agreements thus act as global rules to diminish the measures for
developing countries to move up the global developmental hierarchy. Furthermore,
Weiss’s critique of neo-liberalism comes from the opposite angle of Wade’s by
focusing on direct strategies of how the leading developed countries create
opportunities through the WTO’s rules to favour themselves in a zero-sum manner
(2005: 723). For Weiss, the post-GATT WTO appears to be strategically influenced
by developed countries to give themselves more space in global industrial
governance to increase their global economic prosperity (2005: 744-745). Apart
from Wade (2003) and Weiss (2005), there is a great deal of literature on the issues
surrounding the impact of international trade agreements and disputes on economic
development for developing countries, however, it is out of the scope of this
research to review them.
In terms of technological production, some research has investigated the
technology transfer and knowledge spillover effects from FDI and MNCs in the host
economie. However, the results of such research do not always evidentially support
neo-liberal arguments on technological learning (Archibugi and Michie 1997: 132;
Fosfuri et al. 2001: 207; Zhou 2008: 2368). When examined further, the evidence
suggests that transfers and spillovers rarely took place straightforwardly in the host
countries, contrary to the predictions of neo-liberal economic theorists.
Technology transfer is an arranged process of technical training and/or
supports through the client-supplier role between the host countries and the MNCs.
When enterprises from the host country are local suppliers for the MNCs,
‘backward-linkage technology transfer’ occurs as local firms receive offers to
improve their technological capacity as suppliers. By contrast, ‘forward-linkage
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technology transfer’ occurs when local enterprises are the clients and receive
technical support from the MNCs through FDI (Nguyen Ngoc Anh et al. 2008: 8-9).
Knowledge spillovers are an involuntary process of knowledge transmission caused
by the presence and economic integration of the MNCs with domestic firms through
FDI in the local market (Gӧrg and Strobl 2004: 2).  For technologically backward 
host countries, the benefits from permitting MNCs to have their affiliates and
engage in FDI in their countries come through three fundamental channels: namely
demonstration effects, increased competition, and labour mobility (2004: 2).
Many scholars, mainly from business schools and economics departments,
find mixed evidence to support the argument that economic liberalisation advances
the technological upgrade capacity of developing countries, and argue further that
some types of technology transfer and knowledge spillover rarely occur in the
contemporary setting of the high-technology based economy. In comparison with
knowledge spillover effects, technology transfer is a more deliberate process as it
arranged between the MNCs and the local government. However, the host
government cannot build economic competitiveness simply by relying on such a
process, due to many conditions in the host economy. For instance, the technology
gap between the original source of technology and the host reduces the likelihood of
local firms absorbing new technologies (Fosfuri et al. 2001: 207). What is more,
even if the transfer takes place, the host will hardly obtain cutting-edge or core
technologies (Archibugi and Michie 1997: 132; Zhou 2008: 2368), as the MNCs
protect their patented technology, especially in developing countries with weak
intellectual property right protection frameworks (Zhou 2008: 2368).
In terms of knowledge spillovers, the most out-of-date channel is the
‘demonstration effect’: in other words, technological learning by reverse engineering
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or imitating an already existing technology. Undeniably, imitating technology
crucially accounted for the phenomenal rapid industrialisation of the East Asian
NICs in the 1970s. At that time the product life cycle was still characterised by scale
economies. However, in the 1990s, the pace and level of advancement in key
internationally competitive technologies, such as IT and ICT, have ‘de-verticalised’
the production processes (Korgaonker 2004: 108); this means that the competitive
capacities in global high-tech production do not require firms to enter into an entire
vertical production chain. On the other hand, production processes are driven by
specialised innovation and become increasingly fragmented (O’Riain 2004: 5).
Anecdotal evidence from successful emerging IT frontrunners illustrates that their
IT industries only connect to the market in some parts of the production lines in
which they specialise, notably Taiwan’s emerging devices’ hardware; India’s
technical problem solving for Y2K and European integration; and Israel’s and
Ireland’s Internet- and network-security. Even the centre of global IT alliances, the
Silicon Valley, once made its entry by specialising in integrated circuit production
(Bresnahan et al. 2001: 842). Therefore, the technology imitation approach, which
is time consuming, non-innovative, and lacking long term potential to develop a
speciality in an unexploited market opportunity, is no longer sufficient for current
global high-technology based development.
The evidence, provided by empirical research in the economics and business
disciplines, might provide a more comprehensible picture of how technological-
learning from MNCs through FDI is actually taking place. However, as mentioned
previously, the evidence is mixed in different countries, despite their experiencing
the same macro-economic trajectory towards trade and market liberalisation.
Regarding the two other channels of knowledge spillovers – competition and labour
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mobility effects – these two seem to be evidentially more closely associated with
neo-liberal mechanisms rather than the FDI channel covered in the discussion above.
Trade liberalisation generates a competitive effect as it offers local exporters
an exposure to more advanced technologies outside their home country, as well as
pressuring local exporters to improve their technological-based production to be able
to compete with other foreign traders (Bustos 2008: 35). Along with market
liberalisation, the degree of competition is improved among local firms, although the
overall infrastructure and educational sector affect the potential of all economic
mechanisms. Apart from the benefits for their technological competitiveness, the
host countries also improve their human resources by allowing MNCs to have a
local presence through FDI. This type of local human resource technical training
without an explicit investment from the local host is one form of technology
spillover known as labour/worker mobility.
Labour mobility is thought to occur whenever MNCs fail to keep the local
technical workers, such as those who are scientists and engineers, from leaving the
MNCs after they have received training, accessed the research results, or
accumulated knowledge through on-the-job learning (Møen 2005: 83). The
spillovers will only take place when the workers use such knowledge for a local firm
or set up new spin-off firms on their own after leaving the MNCs (Gӧrg and Strobl 
2004: 4). Furthermore, worker mobility is not only a source of technological-
learning, but is also considered to be a source of technology diffusion that benefits
the host countries (Møen 2005: 82).
At first glance, knowledge spillovers via labour mobility might appear to be
a great advantage that neo-liberal industrial policy can offer to developing countries.
However, the increment in technical knowledge of local workers from MNCs does
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not support the idea that the host can exploit such knowledge as a significant
resource for mastering the technology-upgrading process. There are several reasons
supporting this point of view.
First of all, the MNCs are well aware of the spillovers from labour mobility
even before they employ local workers. A main reason that MNCs choose to hire
local workers rather than expatriates is the cheaper labour cost offered by local
workers (Fosfuri et al. 2001: 206). Consequently the MNCs tend to offer only
general technical training to local workers and preserve the core knowledge for their
home countries (2001: 207). They also under-invest in local R&D activities (Møen
2005: 83).
Secondly, labour mobility is not always a form of spillover as it can be
characterised as a fair exchange between easy access to new technology and cheap
labour. Møen (2005: 106-107) argues that technological workers, with cheaper
wages at the beginning of their employment, expect an increase in wages after they
have worked for MNCs for a certain period of time. This means that even though
such local workers do leave the MNCs and exploit with local firms the technological
knowledge they have gained at the MNCs, these local workers actually pay for this
knowledge through the lower wages they received earlier. Furthermore, although
this labour mobility might still result in technology transfer; it is not a short term
strategy for developing economies to build transfer capacities.
The more specific literature on socialist market economies, such as China
and Vietnam, notes that they are increasing their degree of economic liberalisation
due to various trade agreements and joint membership in international organisations.
Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007. The effect of economic liberalisation on
technological-learning might have started to show with regards to technological-
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learning. There is empirical evidence from Nquyen Ngoc Anh et al. (2008: 24-25)
who conducted research on statistical data from the Enterprise Census of 2000-2005.
They suggest that Vietnam’s local enterprises in the manufacturing sector benefit
from the technological spillovers through backward linkages and labour mobility
rather than from demonstration or competition effects. However, such research
offers only preliminary data and still lacks empirical evidence to address whether the
increase in technological capacity is sufficient to catch up and compete with other
global high-technology frontrunners.
Although the evidence used for the discussion of the relationship between
macroeconomic policy and technological change for catching-up might be less well
established in firmly linking liberal economic policy and technology-upgrading
processes together, it is based on too much solid scholarship to dismiss the idea that
liberal economic policy supports technology upgrading processes. As mentioned
before, global IT production has increasingly fragmented into specialised
production. This means that the more the degree of technological specialisation
progresses, the more economies need to be oriented toward international trade: the
domestic market is simply too small for specialised suppliers, and domestic
technological production must obtain more diverse fragmented pieces of technology
from international suppliers rather than develop its own (Rooji et al. 2008: 164-165).
Therefore, and to sum up, the market-led model, which mainly represents a
technological-learning approach in association with export-oriented trade policy and
economic liberalisation with a minimum of state intervention in the market, has a
crucial implications for technological change. Market-led policies are not a direct
scheme for technological learning, but rather fulfil the needs of contemporary
innovation-driven industry with respect to the consumption of technology by
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connecting nations to the global market, since technology-based industries are the
backbone of economic performance. This benefit occurs whether the limitation of
domestic revenues is due to the country’s being small in size or being large but with
a technologically backward national economy, such as in the case of India.
3.2. The State-Led Model
The counterbalance to neo-liberal theory is statist economic theory, which advocates
nationalistic economic development. This is based on the ideas that nations whose
economies are at the infant stage of industrialisation should be protected by their
own governments from exposure to international economic competition.
Furthermore, states should master their economy by themselves rather than leaving
this task to market mechanisms, which will never be in the ideal condition advocated
by the neo-liberals.
Historically state interventions have often taken the form of import-
substitution trade policy, which aims to protect the domestic market from fierce
competition, and arranges various economic institutions to allocate economic
resources and administer the intervening economic regime. Technological capacity
building through the import-substitution measures was notably used earlier among
East Asian countries; however, as we discussed in criticism of the market-led model,
technology upgrading though an import-substitution trade policy is very difficult to
carry out under the WTO agreements after the Uruguay Round wiped away these
industrial measures that had been used by the earlier wave of East Asian countries
(Wade 2003: 1).
Against this backdrop, scholars in this tradition support the role of the state
in controlling the trajectory of the technological innovation process; beginning with
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the process of selecting the strategic technology, through to developing the chosen
technology, diffusing it across society, and obtaining feedback from users to
improve such technology. The literature on technology and innovation policy puts
forward the state as a dominant actor in the technological-learning process through
the notion of National Innovation Systems (NIS). The NIS theory advocates nation-
specific accounts that specify the actual determinants behind the diversity of types of
selective technology, stage of innovative development, and innovative processes
belonging to each nation, and as a result lead to the difference and unique outcomes
of a nation’s industrial innovative productivity.
The notion of NIS comes from Friedrich List’s (1984 [1841]) concept in
‘The National System of Political Economy’ (cited in Freeman 1995: 5). The
pioneers in the NIS literature have developed List’s ideas to explain the association
between industrial technology and economic performance. These pioneers include
Lundvall (1992), who originally coined the term National Innovation Systems;
Nelson (1992) who adopted List’s idea to explain how Japan competed with the
United States to be a global technology hegemony during the 1970s and the rise of
East Asian NICs like Korea and Taiwan; and Freeman (1995) who has applied List’s
argument to explain from an historical perspective the development and utilisation
of technology from the first World War until the fast growth of the East Asian NICs.
Like-minded NIS theorists agree with classical economic theorists that firms
are the actual source of innovation. Nevertheless, the classical theorists do not see
positive effects from a government role in the economy, while NIS theorists suggest
the opposite, arguing that the innovations generated at the firm level will never be
integrated into the economy at the national level without an active state. The NIS
theorists posit two fundamental suppositions, the first about the factors that underlie
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the difference in the ability to produce innovation, and the second with regards to
the system that processes such factors to produce innovations and utilise them.
With regards to the factors that determine national innovative capacity,
nation-specific factors are positioned at the core of this tradition’s analytical
accounts. Such factors arose and were formed by the historical circumstances
forging nation-states, such as political norms, social behaviour, economic customs,
and even geographic characteristics. Despite the diversity in each national
combination, proponents of this approach find a few common analytical factors that
can be used to rationalise the profitable factors that have nurtured the economic and
technological power of many advanced economies such as Japan, the United States,
European nations, and the Latin American and East Asian nations that became NICs
in the 1980s.
Several writers in this tradition suggest that while the innovative capacity of
each country lies in specific factors that are unique and national in scope, there are a
few analytical factors that lie behind the success and failure of innovative
technological capacity among countries. Nelson (1992: 353-354) acknowledges that
geographical conditions, such as country size, and having rich or scarce national
resources, exert different influences at the foundational stage of technological
development. Large countries have more market demand, and also engage in a wider
range of manufacturing than smaller countries. Countries with resource scarcity
problems also have to develop their national economic competitiveness through
export-oriented manufacturing and thus are forced to develop a strong innovation
system to support this. Moreover, Nelson (1992) suggests that the degree of
affluence also makes a difference to the innovation system. This is due to countries
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with wealthier populations being able to afford to engage in economic activities that
are technologically advanced, while countries with poor populations cannot.
Another crucial factor to which the NIS theorists pay attention is the concern
over national security. Countries with higher security concerns will commit more to
military R&D than those who do not. However, this only produces economic
benefits when there are linkages for military technology spin offs to the civil
economy (Freeman 1995: 12). A good example of IT generated from military
technology is the early-development of computer languages such as COBOL from
the U.S. defence R&D sector (Richard 2004: 3). These factors are embedded
fundamentally in a variety of political, social, technological, and economic
institutions that co-ordinate to created linkages of interactions among all the actors
(both from users’ and producers’ sides) across sectors in a national fabric (Nelson
1992: 351-352; Freeman 1995: 10, 12, 14; Niosi et al. 1993: 208–211; Archibugi
and Michie 1997: 122).
In terms of the system of innovative production, the mainstream researchers
argue that the most powerful actor who determines technological change cannot be
anyone else but the state, as technological change is a series of occurrences, which
involve the stages of innovation generation, finding uses for the technology,
technology marketing, receiving feedback, technological improvement and the
assimilation of technology. Such processes cannot be taken away from the social
structure in which these innovations are grown and exploited (Freeman 1995: 11;
Archibugi and Michie 1997: 122). Therefore, national innovative capacities have to
be created through national action (Nelson 1992: 348). Niosi et al (1993: 212)
explains that the state is a main financier for national R&D activities, a view also
confirmed by Rothwell (1982: 4) who emphasises the need for government R&D
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investment. Rothwell argues that R&D is an area where the private sector rarely
spends enough: it requires huge investments but is prone to failure, thus it is hard for
private firms to justify their investment in conducting R&D activities. However, this
argument is now rather outdated: the willingness of the private sector to invest
despite the high level of risk is a key factor in cutting edge technology. However, to
nurture technological upgrading processes requires not just financial policies, but
also a variety of organised technological policies affecting the national level, such as
procurement policies and intellectual property laws, which are exercised on the
political impetus of the state (Niosi et al. 1993: 211-212).
Although the NIS concept offers an explicit account of how different
countries with different nation-specific factors experience different innovation
outcomes, it has a poorly established foundation. Firstly, the NIS literature is
ambiguous on the scope of its concept. The NIS theorists strongly believe that every
country has an NIS, as for them even a country with just a system for using
technology but without system of technological production counts as a national
innovation system (Sharif 2006: 760). Due to this ambiguous structure, employing
the NIS concept to analyse a technological upgrade approach, can be difficult.
Secondly, the term ‘innovation’ for the NIS theorists encompasses every technology
that is newly introduced at the firm-level, rather than at the national or global level
(Nelson 1992: 349), because this type of ‘innovation’ already produces economic
growth (Hobday 2000: 131). This means that innovations that already exist
anywhere else in the world, but are introduced to firms for the first time can be
called ‘innovations’. The reason for assuming that this type of activity is an
innovation is understandable, at the literal level, as NIS views innovation as a series
of processes in which technology assimilation is as vital as technology generation
(Freeman 1995:10); however, there is not strong empirical support that such
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‘innovations’ can provide nations with technological competitiveness in the present
global technology market. As noted above, the fragmentation of technological
production has been increasing rapidly. Technology entrepreneurs around the globe
have adjusted to the new environment of production by turning themselves into
technology specialists. This specialisation means that market competitiveness relies
on an ability to create technology that has never existed before, which could either
be a brand new type of innovation, or new technology on the top of skills in which
firms already specialise. Thus, defining innovation as NIS theorists do is
inconsistent with the condition of current global production.
Moreover, the fragmentation in technological production also diminishes
some of the nation-specific factors. Large countries are no longer in a more
advantageous position than smaller ones, as even the more recent works on the NIS
note. Rooij et al. (2008: 164-165) found during research on NIS theory in the
Netherlands that there could be more than one innovation system in a country as a
result of technological specialisation. This means that each country needs to be
connected to a larger market at the international level to export its speciality and
import other technological specialisms from abroad. Hence, market variety should
be viewed from an international perspective rather than one based on a nation’s size,
as the aforementioned NIS theorists suggest.
What is more, Rooij et al.’s analytical account questions further whether
firms are still the smallest unit of knowledge flow in an innovation system at the
national level. Globalisation makes national borders become increasingly
unimportant, thus, human migration happens regularly on an international scale.
This portrays the flow of technical knowledge as geographically footloose due to
individual mobility (2008: 165).
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While the escalation of economic and technological globalisation is a focal
point for the critiques of NIS, a common argument given by scholars on this practice
is that globalisation does not diminish the role of the nation state in cultivating the
national innovation system, but rather the role of nation state is altered in accordance
with the degree of globalisation. As mentioned earlier, the state is the most dominant
actor in the innovation system, especially as a major financier and possessor of the
sovereignty and political supremacy needed to create R&D policies and link them
across sectors (Archibugi and Michie 1997: 133). Globalisation might have
lessened the incentives for the state’s financial role, as the profits might not be
returned to the local level but remain within MNCs to establish their foreign hosts.
However, this change cannot eliminate the prevailing role of the state in the national
R&D unit, in such areas as educational policies and other R&D resource allocation,
which are embedded at the national level (Nelson 1992: 369; Archibugi and Michie
1997: 133-134).
Even though the nation state is still in a leading position to determine
national R&D activities and resource allocations, the NIS school of thought still has
not yet satisfactorily explained whether the state is still capable of commanding the
dynamics of all the actors in the innovation system. This is the case particularly in
the IT industry; for example, Silicon Valley is increasingly independent from other
national institutions in the system (Bresnahan et al. 2001: 836).
Despite all the aforementioned arguments against the concept of the NIS, this
notion still provides invaluable perspectives for the research. The recent
development of NIS theory has shifted from its fundamental concept, in which the
state holds a role dominant to that of other actors in the innovation system, to new
concepts such as the so-called ‘university-led model’, in which the university
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directly plays a significant role in the system through the production and
assimilation of technology. The entrepreneurial role within academic institutions
has created activities concerning dynamic innovation that lie beyond the institutional
capacity of a state. Nowadays, a number of universities run their own business
organisations; academics not only have teaching and researching roles in the
universities, but also analyse the technological demands of the market and provide
services and products in accordance with such demands. The university-led model
demonstrates a robust interaction which occurs outside the rigid institutional
arrangements of the state.
In practice, the premise of an entrepreneurial university is not a new concept,
but can be traced back to the 1930s (Etzkowitz and Dzisah 2008: 654), when MIT
first introduced it as a solution to solve a classic problem of technology diffusion:
the ivory tower. In the ivory tower, newly developed technology did not diffuse to
the market. However, this idea has been notably connected to the notion of the NIS.
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1995) theoretically combined the entrepreneurial
university with the traditional NIS format and introduced it as the ‘triple helix
model’, which is a model concerning the relations between three major actors
namely the university, the industry, and the government. 8
The triple helix model shares similar components to the original model of the
NIS. Nevertheless, a major difference between the triple helix model and the
original NIS model appears in the flow of the interaction between the components
within the system. In the latter, the state acts as a broker who has a dominant role
8 Etzkowitz and Leysdorff introduced the model in their first paper (1995), The Triple Helix: University
Industry-Government Relations: A Laboratory for Knowledge-Based Economic Development. However, the idea
of triple helix was also initiated in Etzkowitz 1993 paper, Enterprise from Science: The Origins of Science-
Based Regional Economic Development and the Venture Capital Firm.
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including controlling, initiating and directing the communication between the
system’s components in order to enable newly created technology to diffuse from
the R&D units to the industrial sector. On the other hand, the state no longer has a
domineering role in the triple helix model. In this model, the flow of interaction in
the system is not directed by the state but is rather initiated at the micro level of the
system, for instance, through the merger between a R&D unit and an industrial unit
in the university-led model.
More precisely, the triple helix model highlights the flow between the
components in the innovation system at both the macro and the micro level
(Etzkowitz and Dzisah 2008: 662). Under the triple helix model, there are three
major fields in the innovation system: (1) the economic field comprised of market
mechanisms, firms and consumers; (2) the science and technology field comprised
of academia and R&D units and; (3) the state institutional apparatus purporting to
control the first two fields (Leydesdorff and Meyer 2007: 210). According to the
traditional NIS format, the economic field and the science and technology field
create the innovation process, while the institutional apparatus brings about the
system of production (2007: 210).
However, the traditional NIS format faces certain difficulties. Although the
outcome of the innovation system is believed to be entirely evaluated through
institutional parameters, such as national labour and production statistics, according
to the traditional NIS format (2007: 210, 216), the triple helix model offers a
different approach. The triple helix model suggests that the increasing advancement
of small-scale high technology and polyvalent knowledge, as well as the Internet,
brings about a network between scientists and engineers beyond the state’s
institutional control. These are the key factors to produce a system of production
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with less assistance from the state. Accordingly, the assessment of the innovation
system does not rely merely on the institutional parameters but also on econometrics
and sciencetometrics, such as patent statistics and number of technology
publications (Etzkowitz and Dzisah 2008: 661; Leydesdorff and Meyer 2007: 210,
213, 216).
For these reasons, the structure of the triple helix model seems to be more
suitable for the purposes of the research than the traditional NIS model. Moreover, it
should be recalled that the traditional NIS model originally aimed at
counterbalancing the neoclassical economic treatment of technological production at
the macro level, not the micro level (Sharif 2006: 753-754). The triple helix model’s
fundamental concept remains based on the traditional NIS model at the macro level:
even though it acknowledges the university-led model at a micro level, it merely
focuses on the academic arena. In other words, it does not extend it to other micro
areas of the system. Overall, both the traditional NIS and triple helix models do not
entirely serve the purposes of this research. Consequently, it is necessary to review
the next relevant model, ‘the network knowledge-led model’.
3.3. The Network Knowledge-Led Model
The third model in this chapter is an alternative model examining the relationship
between the state’s industrial roles and technological-learning capacity. The state’s
industrial roles in this model is referred to as ‘a network state’, which is presented
here as the third way, coming in between the state roles from the above two models
(the market-led model and the state-led model). The network state emerged in line
with a shift from Fordist technological production towards a post-Fordist one. Along
the line of this shift, technological productions become increasingly to rely on
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knowledge that localises in a form of networks. What is more, these networks of
knowledge come in unconventional characteristics that challenge the state’s
industrial roles from the first two models, as they (the networks) locate outside the
sphere of state’s industrial apparatus, for example in the form of regional networks
(either bigger or smaller than a nation), or an amateur IT network.
To start the discussion of this model will be an examination of literature in
relation to the notion of the network state. Generally speaking, work on the roles of
the state in the development of IT industries advocates that technology or innovation
policies and institutional arrangements are designed uniquely to fit the nature of
technological learning and production of each technical speciality (Breschi and
Malerba 2001; 831) This crucially highlights how technological production in the
post-Fordist era, which increasingly rely on technical specialities in a fragmentation
of production lines, shapes the network state, as they pose new industrial
dimensions for the state to come up with a compatible industrial roles
Applying this account specially on the computer industry, production in the
computer industry is more globalised nowadays, undermining older notions of
national industrial strategies. On the one hand, the neo-liberal school offered
industrial development strategies for the latecomers that relied on FDI with
technology transfer and knowledge spillovers from MNCs as a source of
technological change. On the other hand, the developmental state school offered
industrial development strategies that relied on centralised and authoritative state
institutional arrangements to implement such strategies, instead of letting market
mechanisms do their job as the neo-liberals suggested, with the national innovation
system as a source of technological change. However, considering that today
production in the computer industry is completely globalised in both degree and
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kind. The industrial development strategies and technology-upgrading approaches
recommended by both schools can no longer connect the state’s developmentalist
role with the dynamics of their domestic computer industries that have become more
globalise and rely more on networks of specialised production.9 These network of
specialised productions do not demand trade liberalisation in order to gain access to
an international IT market based on production plants with cheap labour as their
competitive advantage. Local firms located in such networks do not compete against
each other in order to be chosen by the state to be financially and technologically
supported by the state and to operate their business following the state’s industrial
strategies. What these networks demand is trade liberalisation to position and secure
them in an international IT production network (O’Riain 2004: 196), and that the
developmental state connects them with the national economy through consultative
rather than authoritative industrial development policies (Cooke 2001: 960-961).
This embeds the state into the web of global IT networks in the post-Fordist era, and
is a backdrop for the network state model.
The higher the degree of embeddedness of the state, the better the state can
support the mobilisation of economic resources among players in these different
networks, and thus their performances are sustained for longer (Cooke 2001: 960).10
The question here is: what are the factors that define the degree and extent to which
9 However, this argument on the validity of the developmental state has gone in many different directions
especially in the information economy. While a few scholars like Amyx 2004 and Jayasuriya 2005 suggest the
developmental state had declined since the late 1990s (Kim 2012: 293), recent work by Kim (2012) challenges
their views on the end of the developmental state in South Korea by examining the roles of the state in the
technological upgrading of a wireless telecommunication technology in South Korea, the American Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) which was later encountered by the South Korean Version of the Wireless
Internet Platform for Interoperability (WIPI). Kim argues that the South Korean state still retains its
developmental legitimacy especially in a long-term strategic approach to help domestic firms catch up
technologically in this instance rather than leaving it to market mechanisms to do the job (2012: 293).
10 Cooke (2001) refers specifically to these networks with geographical connection as regional networks.
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the state can embed itself within these network as well as embed these networks in
the economy at the national level?
Cooke (2001: 959) suggests that the state should provide these network (the
regional system of innovation) with some authority over two issues: namely a
regional public budget and influence over regional investment in infrastructure and
skills units, such as universities and research institutes. This two-part authority will
help by economically mobilising the innovation potential of the region. In order to
accomplish this, the institutional arrangements of the state, which are used by
nationalist states to fill the gaps in imperfect market conditions, are now required to
change their bureaucratic structures from centralised ones into a form of flexible
network. In other words, the state is required to fragment its unitary authority and
cohesion. This new structure for the state’s economic developmental institutions has
been various titled. Ansell (2000) calls it a ‘network polity’, Carnoy and Castells
(2001) call it a‘network state’, O’Riain (2004) calls a ‘developmental network state’,
and Breznitz (2007) calls it a ‘neo-developmental state.’
In comparison with the old model of developmental state, contemporary
governmental regimes – in response to post-Fordist production – are altering local
and global capitalism and regional networks of innovation instead of binding local
large entrepreneurs, state bureaucrats, national innovation system and public and
private domestic financiers together. The regime still retains some flexible authority
over the ties between all these fragments to deter the network polity from capture
and clientelism (O’Riain 2004: 37-38). What is more, such conditions lead to
elementary changes in conventional state structures and the purposes of state
intervention. The state intervenes in the economy not for commanding and
controlling purposes but rather to construct trust, co-operate in mature learning, and
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adjust to local and global interests (Ansell 2000: 305; Breschi and Malerba 2001:
819-820). A similar argument is offered by Carnoy and Castells (2001: 2, 12-13),
who posit that the state was challenged with multidimensional changes in the
reorganization of knowledge that led to the decline of the nation state but gave rise
to ‘network state’ with multi-level state structures, such as sub-state national
government or super national government, in order for the state to gain legitimacy in
new complex challenges which are posed by the progression of globalisation.
These new purposes need to be applied with respect to both policy and organisation
at three broad levels from participations at societal association to public agencies to
the macro-structure of the state respectively (Ansell 2000: 309).
In terms of the state’s bureaucratic structure, the state unit that is preserved
through centralised and discrete ‘hierarchical (many-to-one relationship)’ command
structures needs to be broken down into a decentralised and socially exchanged
form. Ansell refers to these decentralised state command structures as ‘heterarchical
(many-to-many relationships)’communicate structures (Ansell 2000: 305 - 308).
Undeniably, the border of the latter type of state structure is porous and flexible and
thus is difficult to identify. However, one should not confuse the network polity with
the pluralist polity or the corporatist polity. Even though both pluralist and
corporatist ideas have become increasingly out of date, the network polity is a
combination of some parts from both polities, as it adopts the principle of
overlapping between jurisdiction between a large variety of organisations from
pluralism, but using the cooperative approach of the corporatism polity to operate
among them (Ansell 2000: 308).
What will happen if the state is unwilling to embed its institutions in local
innovation networks? Will this diminish the state’s commanding role in economic
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development? Ohmae (2004: 85) reveals the true outcome in such situations: the
significant features that function in the regional economy will move somewhere
else. Of course, the most precious feature here is nothing else but IT human
resources, which will consequently emigrate, posing a brain drain problem for
resistant governments. This view is confirmed by O’Riain (2004: 200, 203).
Although he does not directly discuss the brain drain problem, he constantly
contends that Israel and Taiwan developed their computer industries successfully
based on the capacity to bring their IT-educated diasporas back home.
Despite centring his analytical accounts on the flexibility in the network
bureaucracy of the Irish developmental state that fostered the success of Ireland’s IT
industry, O’Riain importantly suggests the reasons why developmental network
states which employ particular flexible industrial development strategies are not
defined by their state structure, but are rather political struggles in an historical
context that deliver different degrees and kinds of flexibilities in state structure that
differentiate the economic outcome of each developmental network state (2004:
205-223).
This has left a gap for Breznitz to argue that the crucial factor that underpins
the variation in industrial development strategies is indeed the political process in
industrial decision-making that underlay different industrial paths under the same
global conditions (2007: 2). Therefore, the political process should have been an
analytical foci rather than the flexible structure of the developmental network state
that emerged from developmental bureaucratic state, as the neo-developmental state
theory suggests. Breznitz does not deny the neo-developmental state’s assertion that
the state has to be flexible both in its industrial strategies and its structure to be
competent in changing and implementing strategies to respond to the volatile nature
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of the computer industry. Nevertheless, he fully accounts for the political process as
the most influential determinant of industrial development.
As the state is no longer the actor that has the most up to date information
about the specific type of technology that its local technical networks of production
are working on and type of support they need from the state, the developmental state
in post-Fordist production has to figure out the most effective way to connect with
the local networks and receive all this information before crafting an industrial
development strategy. Therefore, Breznitz puts forward that the political process
has enabled the Israeli, Taiwanese, and Irish states (the cases in his comparative
study) to have a developmental relation with their domestic IT industries. The
variation among their political process explains how the embeddedness of the state
in IT industries has developed (2007: 29-30). For instance, the Irish state decided to
have an embedded relationship with IT industries in a way that least affected its
Weberian bureaucracy by setting up flexible structured industrial developmental
agencies outside its central state structure, in order to follow the technical needs
posed by the independent technological achievements of the local IT industry (2007:
32-35).
The most important message that this research gains from Breznitz’s
analytical accounts is that theoretical frameworks for solving the puzzle of how the
state can nurture its high-tech industry in the age of economic globalisation with
growing dominant of local regional innovation networks, must recognise that the
choice of industrial development paths facing latecomers surpasses those which can
be put into the boxes of neo-liberal, developmental state, or neo-developmental state
theories. The unique sets of sectoral politics have proven their power in creating
choices of industrial development paths outside of these three boxes. As Breznitz
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states ‘Yet I believe that choices still exist, that states and societies, through the
political process of crafting and picking alternative modes of action, can follow
diverse paths and still achieve industrial success.’ (2007: 3). This message from
Breznitz is also confirmed by the more recent study by Kim (2010) who examined
the Korean developmental state role in the development of the Korean
telecommunications sector after a catch-up process. Kim argues that the classic
Korean developmental state has transformed to be a developmental network state as
posited by O’Riain (2004). However, his case study illustrates few differences
between the Korean and Irish developmental network, which led Kim to put forward
that there is no single form of developmental network state in East-Asia (2010: 160-
162).
Moving on to a more specific discussion on the new model of technological
production, which relies on networks of production, and is the foundation of post-
Fordist conditions shaping the network state. These network productions come in
many forms. For example, the regional network is connected through geographical
connections - the ‘geography of production’ (Saxenian and Hsu 2001), or ‘regional
innovation system’ (Cooke 2001). Another example of knowledge network, from the
regional network, is IT professional network, which is connected through the type of
knowledge used for IT production. The IT professional network will be the focus of
technological learning for the thesis, as it provides the research a sector specific
framework of IT industry.
The IT professional network is the type of network that is connected through
the type of knowledge known as tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is considered to
be a precious resource for innovative capacity that underlies the differences in
technological competitiveness between the contestants in the international race. The
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superior feature of tacit knowledge compared with other types of knowledge is its
elusiveness in being captured and converted into a form of information: it will lose
its essence after being converted (Ernst and Lundvall 1997: 24-25).
Innovation theorists like Ernst and Lundvall (1997: 22-24) depict the
distinctions between what should be counted as tacit knowledge and what should
not. They taxonomically classify the branch of knowledge in science into four
levels. The first level is ‘know-what’ knowledge, which is the most basic and least
complicated type of knowledge. To obtain this level of knowledge does not require
any scientific skill, as the knowledge is presented only in the form of data or facts.
The second level is ‘know-why’ knowledge, which is more complicated and requires
higher technical skills from the receivers than ‘know-what’ knowledge does. At this
level, the receivers will need to have a basic knowledge of the laws of science to be
able to know why the facts or data occur. These two levels of knowledge are
tangible, thus they can be learnt from formal and direct circumstances such as
teaching in a university, learning from textbooks or science publications, and staff
in-house training. However, they are not tacit knowledge. The other two higher
levels of knowledge are important for innovation generation, hence, are the types of
knowledge on which the research focuses. They are ‘know-how’ and ‘know-who’
knowledge. The receivers obtain ‘know-how’ knowledge through modes of learning
opposite to the two previous levels of knowledge (know-what and know-why). They
need to practice and encounter problems and try to solve and overcome such
challenges by themselves, therefore, there is no non-science skill or quick
transaction to obtain this ‘know-how’ knowledge apart from leaning by doing and
engineers create a set of technical problem-solving algorithms by themselves. The
highest level of knowledge is ‘know-who’ knowledge, which is not only a natural
science knowledge but also a network management knowledge. To ‘know-who’
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means that actors in an innovation system are able to identify who else, in the same
system or somewhere else, knows what and knows how. In other words, the
engineers or managers have to know other actors and the type of technological
speciality in which they have their expertise.
Furthermore, Jensen et al. (2007) put the four levels of knowledge in the
context of two modes of learning and innovation. For Jensen et al, there are two
types of knowledge: codified (know-why) and tacit knowledge (know-who and
know-how) (2007: 682). These two types of knowledge are ideally used in two
different modes of innovation: the Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) mode;
and a Doing, Using and Interaction (DUI) mode. Codified knowledge corresponds to
the STI mode of innovation which is conducted through R&D agencies, education
and training systems (2007: 681-682). Tacit knowledge corresponds to the DUI
mode of innovation that is conducted through the experience of skilled workers or
artisans (2007: 680, 682). Jensen et al. also argue further that the contribution to
knowledge through the STI mode can be made at a global level, while the
contribution to knowledge through the DUI mode is likely to be made at a local
level as the latter is embedded within a person rather than a system (2007: 681-682).
Ernst and Lundvall’s knowledge taxonomy together with modes of learning
and innovation from Jensen et al. thus illustrates the origin of and the environment
in which indigenous innovations are generated from tacit knowledge. The regional
professional network lies at the heart of innovation generation and diffusion.
Entrepreneurs positioned in a particular geography are able to learn new
technologies and advance their innovative activities though close communication
and joint problem-solving activities that are taking place within cultural proximity
(Saxenian and Hsu 2001: 915). Tacit knowledge, which is a vital competitive factor
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to cope with volatile IT market environments, is transmitted effectively within a
particular social network, where the vital intangible resources are embedded
intensively (Breschi and Malerba 2001; 817-820). These resources, such as common
norms and conventions, technical knowledge, skills, institutional and organisation
structures; take time move across geographic distance and cultural differences. IT is
a sort of technology that enables the mobilisation of tacit knowledge between these
more successful areas through various IT applications, especially in the high-tech
era where advanced technologies are more complicated. It thus requires co-operative
production from larger units a single firm can offer.
To be even more explicit, IT is itself a technological product of so-called IT
professional networks. Most computer languages nowadays are developed by IT
professional communities; Java and C++ are among the languages that underscore
this point. Open source software’s increasing share of the market provides further
collaboration for this point. Open source software is one of the outstanding
phenomena of the information technology community, confirming the point that
tacit knowledge cannot be granted intellectual property protection as proprietary
software is, and thus cannot be traded in market transactions or by government
arranged institutions (Boulanger 2005: 239). This validates the argument that the
dynamics of technological development increasingly appear beyond the nation
state’s institutional arrangements in widespread regional or international
professional networks, which lie beyond the national level.
This aspect of technological learning is not limited only to the development
of computer languages, but also relates to other disciplines of computer science,
such as database technology, web browsers and even operating systems, to name a
few. Moreover, professional learning community networks are well connected to the
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learning bodies that codify knowledge which can be institutionalised, for example in
a university IT degree.
This characteristic of IT learning provides greater understanding of why IT
professional networks around the globe are often cited as a case study of network
knowledge for technological productions. As a result of this historical technical
development, local IT professionals interlock themselves with the available
complicated sets of international IT technological learning. However, this
interlocking does not mean that the IT community in a particular knowledge
network is coming into its own or is only shaped by IT knowledge learning approach
through such professional network.
The most difficult problem with works on this model seems to be that there
is no fixed formula to outline how such professional networks cluster together and
connect to the national economy and the broader level of state mechanisms, such as
economic institutions and R&D units, in the first place. This gap has led to common
wrong-headed state efforts to imitate the Silicon Valley cluster in developing
countries employing a state-centric economic model, sponsoring national champion
companies to build a cluster to build a bottom up industrial agglomeration through a
top-down approach; for example, designing an agglomerated industrial structure,
then implementing interventionist economic policy to subsidise the firms located in
such industrial agglomerations to be being active in state-chosen niche markets.
These Silicon Valley ‘wannabe’ nations are leading their industries in the opposite
direction from the original model, as the Silicon Valley is genuinely entrepreneur-
centric, with entrepreneurs rather than the state driving the dynamic of the cluster,
while national institutions simply perform the flexible role of accommodating the
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needs of firms in the cluster (Bresnahan et al. 2001; 836), although the state played
an early spinoff role through military R&D.
In terms of technology upgrading, this model emphasises innovative
technological learning and upgrading capacities that are generated and transmitted at
the local level between individuals within the same network or cluster and at the
global level between networks from different clusters. This process occurs in two
developmental stages: the starting up stage of a nascent cluster and the development
of ongoing clusters.
At the emerging stage of the network, the most important role of the state is
to be able to recognise the clustering of skilled labour within professionally
networked areas. As mentioned earlier, there is no fixed account that explains how
skilled labour emerges in the first place. From the experience of successful cases,
such a pool of skilled labour comes from different sources, such as US-educated
Taiwanese engineers (Saxenian and Hsu 2001: 893), cheap skilled labour with
scarce UNIX skills from India (Saxenian 2001: 9), and Russian émigrés and military
trained engineers in Israel (Bresnahan et al. 2001: 844). Each of these has its own
identity in the global IT market. Carmel and Eisenberg (2006: 851) nicely depicted
this phenomenon meaning that ‘[...], the USA thinks in terms of the cowboy
programmer, Ireland the Celtic Tiger, and Israel the commando programmer.’
Such varied backgrounds also provide different technical accumulations of
skilled labour, which leads to different paths of specialisation in production.
However, one aspect that all the prototypical case studies have in common is that
their specialities were a result of the flexibility of their technological upgrading
approach that enabled them to respond significantly when new international market
opportunities came up that had not been exploited before (Bresnahan et al. 2001:
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842). This understanding of technical speciality means that work in this tradition
cannot offer a fixed formula for other developing countries that are trying to
promote their IT industries to adopt as a standard model regarding how a
professional skilled IT labour force emerges, why it choose to specialise in a
particular technology, why it chooses to stay, and how the state prevents a brain-
drain of skilled IT professionals.
How did these countries develop their specialities in IT production at the
nascent stage of IT professional network agglomeration? A small number of them,
such as Ireland and India, constructed their specialities on the basis of market-
coordinated regimes, while a few of them, such as Taiwan and Korea, built their
specialities from plan-coordinated regimes. For example, Taiwan constructed its
chip design speciality through a reverse engineer approach, known as an Original
Equipment Manufacture (OEM) technique, under a nationalistic economic regime
that dated back to the 1970s (Hobday 2000: 144-147). The OEM technique provided
Taiwan with a solid basis for assembling simple computer peripherals at the
beginning, and combined with Taiwan’s well known reputation among international
IT firms for being a cheap labour assembly point, clustered all the IT professions.
However, during the 1990s, the skills and tacit knowledge accumulated throughout
the OEM years have been upgraded to allow Taiwanese IT workers to specialise in
‘ChipUp’ Technology, in which a leading chip production company like Intel
upgraded their single-chips to the dual-Pentium microprocessing system (2000: 147-
158).
Once the network shifted to the next stage, the embedded units already had
their technological specialties and were connected with other units in different
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network with knowledge of different technological specialties though the demand
and supply positions of each network (Breschi and Malerba 2001; 831).
Despite the rich literature offered by the scholars that are mentioned in this
model, there are still many remaining empirical accounts that need to be clarified. If
their theoretical analyses take their point of departure from the rise of the latecomers
who managed to move to the front row of global IT production during the 1990s,
then there are many more contributions to come from the new tier of global high-
tech production regions. Moreover, if high economic growth from requires
flexibility in economic institutions and political structures as the theory suggests,
then how does Vietnam’s sclerotic political structure determine its economic
outcome? This research aims to answer all of these questions. Highly agglomerated
technical IT communities are new to Vietnam. They exist in a vacuum of a highly
centralised and controlling state regime of a socialist market economy. With these
characteristics, Vietnam’s IT industrial development is sure to be able to offer a new
theoretical dimension to existing notions of the role state development plays in high-
technology industries.
Now we shall turn our attentions to the research analysis of research findings
and tool of analysis in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Technological Upgrade and Research Tools of Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter offers an overview of answers to the research questions. The purpose of
the chapter is to offer a summary of the research findings and set out how these
findings answer the research questions, rather than offering in-depth research
arguments, as the latter will be discussed in a more analytical manner in the chapters
presenting the findings (Chapters 5-8). To recall the two research questions: the first
research question is how we should characterise the nature of the technological
upgrading approaches that are employed domestically in Vietnam, and how these
approaches are processed within the context of Vietnam’s IT industry. The second
research question is how should we characterise the state’s roles regarding
technological upgrade in Vietnam’s IT industry, and to what extent and in which
way these different state roles affect the domestic technology-upgrading approaches.
By providing this introductory chapter prior to the chapters on the findings,
readers can have a synopsis of research findings: the elements comprising each case
study; how each case study links to the other case studies; and the proposed concept
of technological hierarchy that provides basic explanations for the different roles of
the Vietnamese state. In other words, this chapter offers a framework for the
analysis of the research findings.
The chapter’s structure is as follows: it begins with how the research defines
the term ‘technological upgrade’ using literature on technological change (Section
4.2: Introduction to Technological Upgrade). Then the research adopts the defined
- 79 -
notion of ‘technological upgrade’ as a framework to characterise the fieldwork
findings about technology-upgrading approaches and processes occurring across
Vietnam’s IT industry into four models (Section 4.3: Technology-Upgrading
Approaches: Fieldwork Evidence). This section also gives a short summary of
answers to the first research question.
Next, the chapter adds another dimension, the state’s roles, to the four models
of technology-upgrading (Section 4.4: Characterising Vietnam’s Counter-
Developmental State). The state has different roles associated with each model;
however, these different roles yield different degrees of being a counter-
developmental state. In this section, the answers towards the second research
question are also summarised.
Lastly, the chapter proposes a hierarchy of emerging information technology
(Section 4.5 of the same name). The hierarchy is a framework to link the first
research question with the second research question. It is discussed here, rather than
at the end of the thesis to provide a roadmap for the readers to walk through the
research arguments. The hierarchy provides a rationale as to why the research
questions are answered in certain ways as well as the logical flow between Chapters
5- 8, to then better focus on the research arguments.
4.2. Introduction to Technological Upgrade
The research defines ‘technological upgrading’ as any positive shift in
technological productions (in the process of technological invention, innovation, and
diffusion) that implies a sense of 'moving forward', both in terms of scope and
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scale.11 The discussion below in this section will illustrate how this given definition
is based on two concepts of technological change: Arthur’s concept of technological
evolutions (2009); and Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins’ three-stage model of
technological change (2002).
To paint a clearer theoretical explanation of how technologies change, it
would be better to start off with an explanation of how technologies are created and
produced without taking their economic and social value into account. This research
adopts such an explanation from Arthur’s ‘The Nature of Technology: What It Is and
How It Evolves’ (2009) as his explanation chimes with the technology-change
process evident from the fieldwork findings. Arthur suggests that novelties come
from the combination of existing technologies via a mechanism called
‘combinatorial evolution’ (2009: 18-22). He posits two major essential elements of
the mechanism. The first element in the creation of technology is the novelty of
technologies which derive from the combination of previous technologies. The
second element tells us how certain existing technologies are picked and combined
11 Mainstream literatures on technological change do not offer a clear single explanation of what technological
change is; however, the term is commonly used in line with another term – ‘technical change’. Both terms
explain a shift in technologies regardless of the direction they go in; Solow’s explanation of technical change
(1957) is honoured as a classic argument outlining economic productivities in technology production (Barrell,
Mason and O’Mahony 2000: 8). Solow (1957: 2) notes that technical changes do not have to be a shift in the
organism of technology itself. He states ‘It will be seen that I am using the phrase ‘technical change’ as a short
hand expression for any kind of shift in the production function. Thus slowdowns, speed-ups, improvements in
the education of the labour force, and all sorts of things will appear as ‘technical change’ (1957: 2). The
definitions of technological change and technical change provide a background of how this research defines the
term ‘technologcial upgrading’; however, they are not central to the discussion of technological upgrading in this
research.
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into the novel technologies. He notes that ‘Technologies are not thrown together
randomly as a combination of existing components.’ (2009: 22). Rather, it ‘[...] is
the constant capture of new natural phenomena and the harnessing of these for a
particular purpose.’ (2009: 22). For a clearer picture he provides an example, ‘In the
case of radar and MRI, the harnessed phenomena are the reflection of
electromagnetic waves and nuclear magnetic resonance, and the purposes are the
detection of aircraft and diagnostic imaging of the body’ (2009: 22). The
explanations demonstrate how new technologies are produced, but not developed.
For Arthur, technology development arises ‘[...] by changing these interior parts, by
swapping in better ones that improve their performance.’ (2009: 24).
Arthur brings us to the central point where we can identify two
characteristics of the shift in technologies: firstly, the novelty, and secondly, the
improvement in technologies. However, at this point he offers us an isolated
explanation of how new technologies emerge or develop in integration with social
and economic circumstances, and furthers understanding of how such integrations
are different between the context of advance and catching-up economies. In reality,
technologies do not shift only in a forward direction, or only in ways that can be
characterised as technological novelties or technological improvements. When
considering changes in technologies within a social and economic context, there is
evidence that technologies can shift in a backward direction, a parallel direction and
even slow down to a pace where they become out of date.
To understand what constitutes technological change, an economic point of
view is of assistance, as it explains the types of shifts that are involved in
technological production for an economic purpose. In this regard, Heeks (1996: 195)
put forward an economic classification of technological upgrading in the form of a
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scale of producer technological capability which Heeks adapts from the works of
Narasimhan (1984), Lall (1987), and Schmitz & Hewitt (1991), for a study of
India’s software industry. His scale comprises of six levels of producer
technological capacity: starting from the lowest level of technological selection and
usage; technological adaptation without any production which includes
technological localisation; a basic level of production such as copying and
assembling technology; inward-looking skilled production such as technological
modification, redesign and innovation for a domestic market; outward-looking
skilled production which is a similar process of technological production with the
inward-looking level, but for non-domestic markets; and the highest level of
innovation as economic global competitiveness.
However, despite Heeks’ detailed guideline to frame the concept of
technological upgrade, Heeks’ scale of producer technological capacity will not be
adopted as a framework for this research to analyse field data on technological
upgrading. As there was not sufficient data gathered from research fieldwork to
comply with Heek’s detailed scale, that scale cannot be used by the research.
Nevertheless, his scale offers the research an insight of what could be counted as
technological upgrading in the IT industry. Still, the research needs to conceptualise
what it means to have a positive shift of technological upgrading in relation to
economic purposes. To handle this situation, in this research the term ‘technological
upgrade’ will be defined using an outline of the processes in which features of
technologies are changed.
Jaffe, Newell, and Staving (2002: 43-44) suggest that within the large pool of
economic literature on technological change, Josef Schumpeter (1942, cited in Jaffe,
Newell, and Staving (2002)) first discussed technological change in the context of
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capitalism, where technological change is captured from the shifts in three different
economic stages: invention, innovation and diffusion. The shifts between these three
stages result in new or superior technology. Based on Schumpeter’s three stages of
technological change, an invention occurs when the novel scientific piece or
technology is developed. After this stage, technological change will happen once
this piece is commercialised, referred to as an ‘innovation’. Finally, technological
change in the form of diffusion occurs when an innovation is adopted by the society
(2002: 43).
The importance of Schumpeter’s technological change account for this
research is not that it helps to characterise technological upgrades in Vietnam’s IT
industry. Rather, Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins argue that Schumpeter’s account has
influenced the study of technological change in the invention and innovation stage
as being driven by economic motivations to the neglect of other factors (2000: 9).
Their argument is in sync with this research’s main objectives to capture the state’s
roles in the development of the IT industry, and more specifically technology-
upgrading approaches, as both economic and non-economic considerations
determine the character and degree of the state’s roles in such approaches. To bridge
this gap, Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins offer other approaches examining the
determinants of innovative activities rather than just economic ones (2000: 9). They
suggest that innovative activities can be derived from various factors, namely profit
motivations, routine motivations, market structure and public policy (2000: 9-15).
As enumerated by Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins, non-economic factors have supplied
this research with a model of technological change that is driven by economic as
well as social factors. There are also several important variables associated with the
flow such as patent and R&D activities. However, none of these variables ensure the
certain occurrence of technological change. In more detail, a great invention does
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not lead to an innovation; therefore, the number of patents does not ensure the
innovative capacities of a particular country. In addition, the actors who invent
might not be the same ones who innovate, and the actors who innovate do not have
to be the same as those who invent (2002: 43). This argument coincides with Lall
(2002: cited in Yusuf, 2003: 141), who suggests that the level of R&D activities in
one country does not convert directly to a growth in productivity. Therefore, the
factors that really determine technological upgrading capacities are not only
advancements in science and technological knowledge, but other social and
economic components that translate the knowledge into productivity growth.
Given that technology can shift from one particular point to another, and that
shifts are associated with economic and social dynamics, we can see that mastering
technological policies to cultivate a high-tech industry at emerging and mature
stages are different regarding the three stages of technological change. Accordingly,
the findings of this research uncover a variety in the process of technological change
that challenges the conventional view of the character of technological change.
Furthermore, this research argues that the impacts of government policies have a
paradoxical impact upon the nature of flows of technological change in Vietnam’s
IT industry, as detailed in Section 4.3: Technology-Upgrading Approaches:
Fieldwork Evidence.
4.3. Technology-Upgrading Approaches: Fieldwork Evidence
The technology-learning approaches discovered during the research fieldwork, that
served as a foundation for firms learning to change their productions both
technically and technologically, were close to the conventional methods reviewed in
Chapter 3: Literature Review. They yield either some hybrid of the three
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conventional models or contribute new approaches to the network knowledge
model. The research findings can be best seen as a coherent final technology-
upgrading approach, when they are understood as multiple pieces of a puzzle of
technological change, technical change, and their attached socio-technological
interpretations, with strong traces of how they were involved politically with the
state. As will be examined in greater detail in the analytical chapters on the
fieldwork (Chapters 5-8), the types of technology-upgrading approaches that are
available in Vietnam’s domestic IT industry have never been acknowledged before
in relation to defining the state’s high-tech developmental characteristics in
association with each approach.
The directions of the discovered domestic technology-upgrading approaches
are outlined first to provide some technical background about the diversity in how
Vietnam’s domestic IT producers upgrade their technological capacities. Next, the
roles of the state will be added into the discussions in the following sections of the
chapter. Subsequently, the interplay between the Vietnamese high-tech
developmental state's defining characteristics and the domestic technology-
upgrading approaches is analysed: the most complex area of research findings.
Technological upgrading can occur at many levels from the smallest unit of each
individual to firm, cluster, industry and up to the national level. Apart from the
variety of scale, the scope of what should be counted as technological upgrading
also comes in a wide array of formats. Generally speaking, technological upgrading
is perceived as occurring when firms, individuals, or any other collective agencies
improve their technological and technical capacities through a technological change
process. For the technological change process, this research employs the three stages
of Schumpeter as broadly interpreted by Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2002). This is to
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be done in a flexible manner because, while the research needs a framework of how
to measure technological changes, the after-effects of technological change are not
limited to only those which Schumpeter suggested. According to Schumpeter,
technological changes will produce either new or superior technology to that already
on the market (2002: 43). However, a look at the fieldwork evidence suggests that
the outcomes of technology-upgrade in Vietnam’s IT industry are not limited just to
new or superior technologies on the market, but also to achieving saturation in a
new type of economy (the virtual economy) within the ecology of the original
market (the digital content industry). Furthermore, even though the outcomes of
technological upgrading are in the form of inventions or innovations, these do not
mean that such inventions or innovations are limited to occurring in a form of
technological change from an invention and an innovation12 stage as defined by
Schumpeter. The fieldwork findings show that inventions and innovations can occur
at any stage of technological change. This point will be examined in Figure 4.1.-
Figure 4.4, which illustrate the four models of Vietnam’s domestic technology-
upgrading processes evident during the research fieldwork. Each model represents a
different direction in which technology-upgrading proceeds vis-à-vis different types
of technology. This is done in the context of Schumpeter’s three stages of
technological change.
12 Let alone the incongruent innovation classification, which can be categorised by many approaches, including
by using levels of change and beneficial effects of innovation such as Gobeli and Brown (1988, cited in
Huizenga 2004: 15) who put forward four innovation classifications: application (high level with low benefits);
radical (high level with high benefits); incremental (low level with low benefits); and technological (low level
with high benefits).
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Figure 4.1 A Perpendicular Model of Technology-Upgrading Process
Source: Author’s Compilation from Fieldwork Findings
To start with Figure 4.1 which illustrates the perpendicular model illustrates
a technology-upgrading approach in the process of a global value chain. At the
infant stage of Vietnam’s domestic IT-industrial development, Vietnam secured its
position in a global IT market as a low-wage labour site both regarding weight
(hardware manufacturing) and weight-less (software outsourcing and testing)
economies. As foreign companies began to move or ‘outsource’ activities in their
global production chain to Vietnam, the Vietnamese outsourcing sector contributed
to the prosperity of Vietnam’s IT industry in general. Technological upgrading from
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the outsourcing industry occurred when Vietnam’s outsourcing firms accumulated
enough technological capacity through years of outsourced activities to create
technological change outside of the outsourcing industry.
Figure 4.2 A Top-Up Model of Technology-Upgrading Process
Source: Author’s Compilation from Fieldwork Findings
Figure 4.2 illustrates the top-down direction showing the technology-
upgrading approach of the National Institute of Software and Digital Content
Industry (NISCI) is broken down into Schumpeter’s three stages. Cloud Computing
is the technology demonstrating the upgrading process. NISCI, a national-level
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government industrial R&D body, utilises the state's facilities to upgrade
technology at the sectoral level and triggers technological change at the invention
stage by attempting to invent local utility features of Cloud Computing to fit
domestic requirements in Vietnam. However, the invention stage is not completed
until the innovation and diffusion stages are implemented. The innovation stage is
carried out by the iDragon Project, in which NISCI and public Japanese partners
cooperate via a Business Cooperation Contract (BCC). The BCC splits the
ownership of technological changes generated by this stage geographically between
NISCI and its public Japanese partners. The innovations in this are to be diffused
into the society though various channels such as adoption by other projects in
NISCI, e-governance, private industry, other public sector bodies, and the BCC’s
partnership.
The diffusion stage occurs at the same time as the completion of the
invention stage. Given that Cloud Computing is a composite of several existing
technologies to achieve a highly user-oriented utility – such as being tailored to
users’ requirements – the adoption of the Cloud is cyclically linked to invention via
the expansion of Cloud Computing’s utilities.
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Figure 4.3 A Bottom-Up Model of Technology-Upgrading Process
Source: Author’s Compilation from Fieldwork Findings
Figure 4.3 illustrates the bottom-up model of technology-upgrading approach
in Chapter 7: The App Economy and the Irrelevant State. This model provides a
more complicated picture of the technology-upgrading approach that emphasises the
informal setting of the technical network which also acts as a linkage between global
and local technological changes. The complications in this model arise from the fact
that an inventive and an innovative stage are embedded outside the national setting,
while the diffusional stage occurs within and outside the national setting.
Accordingly, technological change in this model depends on both global and
national factors, due to the global context outside Vietnam’s national setting. The
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case study used for this model is an outsourcing company that turned into an
innovator, ISB Vietnam Corporation (IVC), who obtain knowledge for its
technological upgrading from an online technological knowledge sharing
community (an Open-Embedded Software Foundation). The results of its R&D
activities were diffused both to the domestic telecoms market, and contributed back
to the online technological knowledge sharing communities where the companies
first obtained the knowledge necessary for its technological upgrading.
Figure 4.4 A Multi-Layerd Model of Technology-Upgrading Process
Source: Author’s Compilation from Fieldwork Findings
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Figure 4.4 illustrates the multi-layered model, presenting an emerging
technology upgrading approach from the case of an online game and its Virtual
economy in Chapter 8: Online Game, Virtual Economy, the Counter-Developmental
State and Forward Trends. The multi-layered characteristic of this model derives
from the diffusion stage of a virtual economy (which is a result of technological
upgrade in this model), lying within with the digital content sector. This diffusion
stage acts as an environment for a new form of economy, in this case a virtual
economy within the digital content sub-sector, which is home to a new technology-
change process. The complication in this model arises not only from the
development of technology itself, but also from the emergence of a new, inevitable
virtual economy from the digital scarcities that are created during the social
consumption of the digital content by gold farmers.
These four models of technology-upgrading approaches can result in either
higher value products or services in the IT industry, or its expansion into another
type of economy that relies heavily on the existence and activation of the original IT
economy. No matter what form the outcomes take, they determine the ability of the
country to catch up.
These four models of technology-upgrading approaches are employed to help
answer the first research question in this thesis. Furthermore, the models will be
linked to another important element, the Vietnamese state, to answer question two:
how to characterise the Vietnamese state’s roles in technological upgrade within the
IT industry. Table 4.1 presents the different levels of the state’s embeddedness
within and between each model by using two factors driving technological upgrade:
‘technological advancement drivers’ and ‘political drivers’. Table 4.1 provides a
brief introduction to how the state fits in with all the variables involved in the
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technology-upgrading approach, before the characteristics of the Vietnamese
counter-developmental state are discussed further.
4.4 Characterising Vietnam’s Counter-Developmental State
The research defines the counter-developmental state the state that allows non-
technological factors to undermine its technological drivers in the development of a
domestic IT industry, even though such factors would jeopardise the advancement of
Vietnam’s IT industry. This section outlines the different degrees in which such
technological and non-technological factors interplay with each other, which also
reflects different degree of the Vietnamese counter-developmental state as are
presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 The Matrixes of the Interplay between Vietnam’s Counter-Developmental
State and Technology-Upgrading Approaches
Technological
Advancement Driven
Political Drivers
Low Level State
Involvement
High Level State
Involvement
High Level
Technological Drivers
Perpendicular Model (Co-
Operative state and an
outsourcing business)
Top-Down Model
(the Technocratic State
Cloud Computing)
Low level Technological
Drivers
Bottom-Up Model
(the Irrelevant State and
an App economy)
Multi-Layered Model
(the Counter-
Developmental State and
online games)
Source: Author’s own compilation (as will be explained in Chapters 5-8)
Table 4.1 presents a matrix demonstrating the level of technologically driven change
and state involvement in the four models of Vietnam’s domestic technological
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upgrading approaches. The matrix displays how the characteristics of the
Vietnamese counter-developmental state are embodied in several characteristics to
differing degrees.
All of the four technology-upgrading approaches comprise an engine that is
empowered and constrained mainly by two driving forces: the evolutionary traits of
information technology as a technological force and the Vietnamese counter-
developmental state’s characteristics as a political force. The two forces integrate
with each other to act as a mechanism that then shapes the domestic IT industrial
structure, as well as creates a certain environment where technology-upgrading
opportunities occur. The variation of technological and political drivers conditions
the opportunities that underpin the specific path of technology choices, likely
progress with different technology-upgrading approaches, technological outcomes
and their social, political and economic implications.
Within this mechanism, the roles of the state in IT industrial development
change tremendously according to the state’s socio-technological perception or
cognition of the four case studies’ technologies. The research elucidates four
characteristics of the Vietnamese state’s response to the contemporary setting of IT
advancement: the cooperative state, the irrelevant state, the technocratic state, and
the counter-developmental state. All the four characteristics echo differing degrees
of the counter-developmental state. These four state characteristics are introduced
below in short outlines of the four case studies. Chapters 5 to 8 each presents an in-
depth analysis of each case study relating it to the research arguments.
Case Study 1: Outsourcing Businesses and the Cooperative State
The defining characteristic of Vietnam state developmentalism, according to
the perpendicular model of the technology-upgrading process involving the
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outsourcing sector, is that of a cooperative state. The cooperative state occurs when
the Vietnamese state allows non-political actors, in this case a local IT
entrepreneurial class and overseas Vietnamese citizens with IT occupations, to
influence IT industrial policy advice, both in drafting and implementing the
processes.
Tracing back the history of outsourcing in Vietnam sheds some light on how
the cooperative state was formed at a stage when Vietnam’s IT industry was still at
the infant stage. Initially, Vietnam’s IT policy was heavily state oriented and had
little success. Nevertheless, amidst the failure of the first IT policy a prominent
outsourcing trend emerged, similar to India’s well-known outsourcing business. An
IT entrepreneurial class arose comprising Vietnamese living overseas and working
in the IT sector, and those who had worked previously for the state’s science and
technology divisions. Together these factors shaped the cooperative state in the
domestic outsourcing business. Logically, the state responded to the failure of the
first IT policy by cooperating with the contemporary entrepreneurial class in IT to
make the second IT policy more industry oriented than the first one. The lack of
domestic demand for IT entrepreneurs’ products and services also led these
entrepreneurs to seek work outsourced from abroad. As a result of this dynamic, the
cooperative state is linked to not the domestic IT industry in general, but is heavily
focussed on the domestic outsourcing business. This backdrop explains why
Vietnam’s outsourcing industry has overshadowed other sectors of its domestic IT
industry, especially at the infant stage.
The cooperative state in the perpendicular model of the technology-
upgrading process fertilises the outsourcing business in a cooperative manner by
providing enough facilities for the firms in this sector to accumulate sufficient
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knowledge and skills to move their technological production higher up the value
chain. Generally speaking, even though outsourcing firms are hardly likely to
specialise in the development of certain technologies through research and
development, they have somehow accumulated the knowledge and skills necessary
for technological upgrading in two areas: software implementation and global
business practices. These two sets of knowledge and skills are essential when it
comes to technological upgrade, as they enable outsourcing firms to move out of
outsourcing and apply these sets of knowledge and skills to R&D activities that
relate to software production. The two software outsourcing companies in the case
study illustrate the relations between the cooperative state and the perpendicular
technology-upgrading model.
These two firms, FPT and TMAs, represent two influential groups of
Vietnam’s entrepreneurial class which have participated in the formulation of the
cooperative state. FPT is a local entrepreneurial firm and state spin-off, while TMAs
is an entrepreneurial IT firm founded by Vietnamese overseas (TMAs). Despite their
different origins, both of these firms share a common approach to technological
upgrading. After years of cooperating with the state and building their success in the
outsourcing business, the two firms are now ready to apply the knowledge
accumulated through this business to non-software sectors and to enter R&D
activities, such as innovating software to solve flooding problems. Even though their
technological upgrading no longer depends on their outsourcing business, the state
continues to cooperate with them based on connections established earlier due to
their outsourcing business.
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Case Study 2: The Cloud, the iDragon, and the Technocratic State
The reaction of the Vietnamese state towards the world-wide adoption of Cloud
technology is analysed here in terms of an insecure state facing information security
issues. State insecurity is one of the initial motivations for the state to upgrade its
technological capacities by establishing an industrial research and development
institute, NISCI. NISCI is home to its Cloud project, iDragon. The state directly
implemented iDragon, demonstrating the technocratic characteristic of the
Vietnamese state.
In terms of the technology-upgrading approach, the case of iDragon
represents the most straightforward approach the Vietnamese state executed at the
national and cross-national level, as the required knowledge for innovating, the
Cloud platform, was acquired from Japan. The role of the state in this type of
technological change process is a leading technocratic role. The state chooses a
particular technology to invest in for the country’s R&D activities based on both its
economic and social purposes. It finds technological partners to consult with at the
technology selection stage and the innovation and diffusion stages. Finally it creates
a domestic market for diffusing the technology into the public sector such as through
the Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation (VNPT) or the Ministry of
Natural Resource and Environment (MONRE).
Case Study 3: The App Economy and the Irrelevant State
As mobile phone technologies have advanced into smart phone technologies, a
related technology, mobile applications (or the ‘App’ for short), has bloomed
simultaneously. The technological trend of the ‘App’ is being cultivated in Vietnam,
where a huge and growing domestic telecommunications market has developed with
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a high rate of mobile phone subscriptions. App producers benefit as the nature of
App production requires types of knowledge and skills that are mostly available
outside formal institutions at a minimal cost.
Evolution in IT advancement does not always require wholesale engineering
and big scale manufacturing. On the contrary, the fieldwork found a case study firm,
ISB Vietnam Cooperation (IVC) that has transitioned from being a software
outsourcing firm to being an innovator conducting R&D activities in the App
economy, by acquiring knowledge from an informal and sharing knowledge-based
online community. The community enables the development of non-proprietary
software from non-privatised knowledge and IT skills. IVC decided to learn how to
innovate from a non-proprietary software online community as its main approach to
upgrade its technological production due mainly to the company’s resource
constraints, although there were additional reasons.
IVC is based entirely on foreign investment from Japan. It has been in
Vietnam since December 2003. The company’s Japanese mother is ISB Japan, who
outsources software development and system integration tasks to IVC’s IT
engineers. The company was originally established for the main purpose of being an
offshore hub implementing IT work for the Japanese parent company. Since there
has been no incentive for ISB Japan to divert resources from outsourcing to R&D,
especially since the global economic downturn, IVC decided on the ‘R&D with no
investment’ option. Under this option, the company acquires new knowledge for its
own R&D activities from open-source mobile platform knowledge of Android.
Among IVC’s approximately 121 local employees, only two, who are Android
developers, work in the R&D department. They have been learning new knowledge
from and exchanging solutions with other Android developers from all over the
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world via an Open Embedded Software Foundation (OESF). IVC is now launching
an application called an ‘Android Printing Framework’, which claims to be a very
innovative Android printing solution with its own algorithms.
This sharing of knowledge and skills is a crucial element that currently
drives advancement in the development of IT as a technology in itself and its related
economies. Moreover other research arguments about high-technology industrial
policies have missed out these key elements in the evolution of information
technology. In this case, government policies, which aim to promote the upgrading
of the technological capacities of domestic IT firms, have no direct influence upon
domestic firms’ acquisition of novel and superior IT knowledge and skill from the
international network community. In this regard, the role of the state in industrial
development is irrelevant: the counter-developmental state has no weight in firms'
technological upgrading processes. The state is behind the curve of development
because it does not understand the full potential of non-proprietary software beyond
its being a cost-saving alternative to proprietary software.
Case Study 4: Online Games, Viet Gold Farmers, and the Counter-
Developmental State
The characteristics of the Vietnamese high-tech developmental state in the leisure-
related sector of the domestic IT industry are captured by the term ‘counter-
developmental state, as in the case studies here of online games and gold farming
activities. Although the state expresses a desire to empower the development of a
domestic IT industry, it suppresses certain emerging economic activities in this
industry, such as online games and gold farming, because it associates them with
conceptions of ‘social evils’. The Vietnamese state in this case has a counter-
developmental role, as it has questioned the ethics of certain emerging economic
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activities. This questioning has not only had negative effects on the development of
such activities, but also prevented the state from optimising any related economic
benefits. Technology-upgrading in this case in the digital economy has occurred in a
multi-layered manner, in which the consumption of certain digital content when the
gamers play online games has produced a new type of economy, the virtual
economy. This new virtual economy resides within online games and thus depends
on its existence to be productive.
In Vietnam especially, online games is booming as a high potential hi-tech
economic activity. The case study of a local online game distributor (VNG) is
investigated in Chapter 8: Online Gaming, the Virtual Economy, the Counter-
Developmental State, and Forward Trend, to illustrate how online games has
benefitted Vietnam’s IT industry. However, Vietnam’s online games hve been
criticised as a ‘social evil’ and blamed for negative effects on young gamers. The
sector has been subject to several state restrictions, such as limiting playing time.
Technological upgrading in online games occurs when gamers adapt the game to
overcome the game’s scarcities that come in several forms, such as challenges to be
overcome, passing though the game’s levels, or obtaining certain virtual in-game
items.
Gamers sell such achievements as virtual commodities to other gamers who
are willing to pay rather than play. This type of activity is called gold farming,
where the gamers play the game to trade their in-game achievements to other
gamers. In the broader picture, gold farming is part of a new type of economy
referred to as the virtual economy, the economy whose products are based on digital
scarcities. Furthermore, the gold farming business places Vietnam in a global
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production chain of such businesses: it has been reported that Vietnam and China
are key suppliers in this gold farming business.
A multi-layered technology-upgrading approach, as in the case of online
games and gold farming, is a complex phenomenon; however, it affirms the extent
to which IT as a technology itself has evolved to the point where the division of
labour between producers and consumers on the one hand, and work and leisure on
the other hand, is blurred.
Since the Vietnamese state views most of the economic activities related to
the virtual economy as socially unacceptable and much of the Vietnamese public
sees online games as a social evil, state policies that support the development of
digital content try to suppress and control online games activities rather than
nurturing them. Moreover, suppressive policies towards online games activities
affect not only the development of the digital content industry (online games), but
also the survival of the virtual economy (gold farming). This is truly the case of a
counter-developmental state, where the state allows non-technological factors to
guide the state’s economic decisions in the online games sector.
4.5. The Hierarchy of Emerging Information Technologies
In this section, the research proposes a hierarchy of emerging information
technologies as a tool of analysis to be used in Chapters 5-8. The four case studies
derived from the fieldwork findings have prompted the question of why certain
types of information technological advancement receive different treatment from
society in terms of their perceived value, economic advantages, and political
implications. The thesis puts forward possible answers to this question based on the
perspective of the technological consumer. These answers were developed from
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fieldwork in Vietnam; nonetheless, they are also relevant in other global contexts.
One explanation is that when society becomes aware of particular features in the
context of information technology, it constantly assigns non-technological meanings
to such features. This assignment of meaning gradually creates a collective system
that places these technological features into different levels of social values, creating
what is referred to here as a hierarchy of emerging information technologies.
The social consumption of such features of information technology products
redefines their social value as technologies. These redefined values are not based on
their real technological merits, but rather on their perceived social merits, in which
the technological values, functions, and meanings, collectively are referred to here
as the perception of IT, are socially delineated based on what society values or
believes to be true, normal, or factual. Such perceptions do not represent the actual
technological reality of IT advancement. Instead, understandings of emergent
information technologies constantly privilege some technologies while ‘othering’
different ones. This behaviour eventually leads to the gradual formation of a
hierarchy of emerging information technologies. This hierarchy has a tremendous
impact on economic development in information technologies, especially as it
underpins the interplay between politics and IT industrial development, as the
fieldwork’s findings suggest.
The notion of ‘othering’ is a foundation upon which the hierarchy of
emerging information technologies has been developed. ‘Othering’ posits that how
we understand other societies is defined by a subconscious hierarchy of people,
rather than being purely defined by sets of scientific facts. This concept was made
famous in Edward Said’s Orientalism, where he discussed how the West’s view of
the East was greatly shaped and tarnished by this subconscious hierarchy (Said:
- 103 -
1978). Michel Foucault (1980: 131-132), upon whose ideas Said built Orientalism,
explains this point:
‘In societies like ours, the ‘political economy’ of truth is characterised by five important
traits. ‘Truth’ is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which
produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement […] ; [‘truth’] is
produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great
political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media)’.
Adopting a Foucaultian perspective, this thesis outlines how certain types of
emerging information technologies are privileged or are made to be less than what
they are though social mechanisms. However, the thesis moves beyond the
‘othering’ doctrine to elaborate a more technologically specific notion of
‘bricolage’, the discourse of institutionalised human ideas that are used for
technological innovations. The idea of bricolage in relation to knowledge was
famously laid out in the key work of Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (1966), which
offers ways to categorise human thoughts related to science and technology. Lévi-
Strauss suggests how knowledge is acquired through two groups of people: the
engineer group and the bricolage group. The engineer group contains thinkers who
generate novel thoughts at different levels and do not reuse existing thoughts for
achieving other purposes. This mode of thought is referred to as scientific thought
(1966: 10-13)), while the bricolage group is comprised of bricoleurs, people who
take existing thoughts or ideas to create knowledge for different purposes. Lévi-
Strauss refers to this mode of thinking as mythical thinking (1966: 16-17).
Ciborra (2009) takes the concept of bricolage applied specifically to the case
of information technology. Ciborra advocates bricolage as a radical source of
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innovation in strategic information system, as it emerges at the grass-root of an
organisation close to end users, and in an organisational reality where skills are
constantly experimented with and perfected (2009: 208, 217).
The importance of the distinctions between these two groups is that they
underline the modes and tools that are used to process human thoughts into
knowledge. This aids the thesis’s formulation of the proposed hierarchy of emerging
information technologies as it appears that the less institutionalised elements of
information technological production (beyond but broadly surrounding the mode of
bricolage) are ‘othered’ by society to be a peripheral class in the hierarchy of
information technology, while the more institutionalised and formalised elements of
information technological production are privileged by society as the core class of
the hierarchy.
Based on the concept of ‘othering’ and ‘bricolage’, the thesis develops a
hierarchy of emerging information technologies, whereby the elements of
information technology are classified broadly into two groups: core and peripheral
artefacts, as are presented in Table 4.2.13
13 The term ‘artefact’ is employed in this section (a discussion on the hierarchy of emerging information
technologies) instead of using the term ‘technology’ to reflect the outcomes of reciprocal interactions between a
social-shaping and a techno-shaping of technologies in an IT evolutional process. Using the term ‘artefact’ also
covers both products and by-products of such processes better than the term ‘technology’.
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Table 4.2 Comparative Perspective of Core and Peripheral Artefacts
ARTEFACTS’ ATTRIBUTES
CORE
ARTEFACTS
PERIPHERAL
ARTEFACTS
1. Human
Resource
Human Resources Employee-Centric People-Centric
Innovation Model
Open and/or Mass but not
Ubiquitous
Open and/or Mass but
Ubiquitous
2. Societal
Linkages
Distribution and
Monetisation
Embedded Within an
Official Framework of
NIS
Embedded Outside an
Official Framework of
NIS
Economic
Competitiveness
Appearing to Public in a
Straightforward Manner
Appearing to Public in
a Non- Straightforward
Manner
Lack of Visibility
Mainstream Government
Awareness (step by step,
gradually)
Outside Mainstream
Government
Awareness
3. Private-
Owned and
Public-
Owned
Knowledge
IPRs Protocol Applicable Inapplicable
Resource Scarcity Imposed Scarcity
Artificial Scarcity from
Imposed Scarcity
Consumer Relations
Black Box (customer
cannot modify)
White Box (customer
can modify)
4. Formal and
Informal
Economic
Setting
Process of
Improvement
From Non-Technological
Hype to Technological
Reality
From Technical Hype
to Technical Reality
Informational Flow
Original Digital
Content’s Creator, and
the Creator of Related
Service
Navigator of Already
Created Content
Capital
Accumulation
Strong Dependency on
Capital
Weak Dependency on
Capital
Source: Author’s Compilation
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In Table 4.2, there are eleven attributes that distinguish core from peripheral
artefacts into four main categories.14 The term ‘artefact’ is brought into play here
rather than the term ‘technology’ because I want to distinguish between technology
as a socially shaped outcome, and an artefact as a piece of artificial intelligence that
is initially produced in a technological and science environment. Furthermore, the
proposed hierarchy of emerging information technologies is the thesis’ ultimate
attempt to capture the contemporary traits of the ongoing progression of IT in the
post-industrial economy.
The relations between the proposed hierarchy of emerging information
technologies with the matrix of the interplay between the different degree of
Vietnam’s counter-developmental state and technology-upgrading approaches, as
presented in Table 4.1, is outlined here to provide a connection of how different
concepts in this research relate to each other. To begin with, the perpendicular
technological upgrade model of the out-sourcing sector with the cooperative role of
the state, is dominated by the core artefacts of IT. The top-down technological
upgrade model of the Cloud sector with the technocratic role of the state, is also
dominated by the core artefacts of IT. However, the bottom-up technological
upgrade model of Android’s application sector with the irrelevant role of the state, is
dominated by the peripheral artefacts of IT. Lastly, the multi-layered technological
upgrade model of the online games sector with the counter-developmental role of
the state, is dominated by the peripheral artefacts of IT.
14 These are ideal types. There is no suggestion that the artefacts must have all the proposed features to qualify
as either a core or peripheral artefact. As technologies mature at a fast pace and can be incremented from one to
another, a certain technology might be referred as a peripheral technology if it ticks only one of these eleven
features at a certain point of time and later on might gradually transform to meet the criteria for being a core
technology. This makes it hard to find technologies that stay as either core or peripheral.
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It is obvious that there are certain relations between the hierarchy of
emerging information technologies (as presented in Table 4.2) with different degrees
of the Vietnamese state’s counter-developmentalism. The Vietnamese state poses
more economic supportive and active roles on IT sectors that are dominated by the
core artefacts, while in the sectors that are dominated by peripheral artefacts, the
state poses more negative and less active roles. Here, I employ the Culture Political
Economy approach (CPE) to explain my claim on the relations between the
hierarchy of emerging information technologies and the different Vietnamese state’s
roles in post-Fordist production.
Theoretically, CPE is an approach concerning the cultural aspects of how
semiotics (such as signs that appear in a form of visual symbols, texts, data, and the
contexts where they are represented as well as who representing them) constantly
reorganize the existing of political economic materiality (Jessop 2006). The CPE
approach refuses to accept the existence of economic components and knowledge as
naturally shaped, as they are relentlessly reproduced by social relations (2006: 160).
The CPE approach recognises how social materiality(-ties) interact with each other
through semiotics and reproduce meaning in the economic components. The
emergence of a knowledge based economy is an economic order that was socially
constructed through different scale components of post-Fordist activities via a
chaotic web of representative terms and their related regimes such as smart machine,
lifelong learning, e-government and cyberpolitics (2006: 168-169). Another
example to understand the CPE approach in the post-Fordist economy is by Sum
(2009), who employed the CPE approach to illustrate how the discourse of
economic ‘competitiveness’ was continuously reproduced or reinvented after the
economic crisis in East Asia through the everyday practices of a knowledge
apparatus, such as benchmarking reports, indicts, and charge.
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Nonetheless, the CPE approach was brought into this research to act as a
theoretical back-up, for the research’s recognition of the four state’s role with the
hierarchy of IT artefacts. We shall now turn our attention to see how the relations
between these two orders can be explained by the CPE approach.
The ten artefacts, as posited in Table 4.2, are semiotics in a different form of
information technology. However, the social approach means these ten artefacts are
not interpreted by the Vietnamese state according to their objective materiality but
are assigned new meaning through different social relations (each artefact will be
outlined along with these different social relations in the rest of this section). As the
result of this process, the meaning of these ten artefacts were given in terms of an
economic order characterised as core and peripheral, which determine different state
industrial roles in Vietnam’s IT industry.
In the next four chapters (Chapters 5-8) four case studies representing four
variations of state-industrial relations regarding the technological upgrading of core
and peripheral artefacts are discussed. The analyses from these four chapters will
further illustrate the point from the table above that the state’s role in the
technological upgrading process differs between core and peripheral artefacts;
however, first the other elements of the hierarchy will be discussed.
4.5.1 Human Resources
Human Resource Model
The core artefacts are developed mainly through an employment contract. This does
not however suggest that the numbers of employed developers exceeds that of
volunteer developers. Nonetheless, human resources in this case refers to the source
of knowledge and information that is taken as the main input into the developmental
- 109 -
process of particular technologies. In other words, it is the source of knowledge
from human participation that counts, not the humans themselves.
The core artefacts are employee-centric. The knowledge that is embedded
within each employee is vital to the success of project development. Employees
may learn something from an open source community, but the real potential of the
project relies mainly on the knowledge processed though the project’s employees,
who will have received formal training from their employers.
While the core artefacts use the employee-centric human-resource model, the
peripheral artefacts imply a people-centric model. People-centric means that the
knowledge input for a particular project comes from non-project employees. In this
case, the projects’ employees take the knowledge necessary for implementing an
artefact into the project with some degree of its original features intact and
coordinate or adjust them to fit into the project’s technological requirements. I use
the term ‘people’ here to emphasise that individuals who contribute to knowledge by
making their contributions available though many channels on the Internet, such as
an open-source community or an online technological problem shooting site, are not
necessarily engineers. This activity could be just a hobby for them to learn and
advance their computing skills via these channels. Many technologies that are
classified as peripheral artefacts are heavily people-centric, as they are not
dependent on formal training. Technologies analysed in Chapters 5-8 are an example
in this regard.
Innovation Model
Information technology is naturally a highly networked technology itself. This has
posed some difficulties in making distinctions between open, mass, and ubiquitous
innovation models, as all of them are subject to differences in the degree of
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networking. These degrees of networking take place in particular aspects of the
social structure of knowledge or information accumulation for innovation.
An open innovation model is subject to the social structure of information
accumulation for innovations based upon the process of consumer feedback.
Additionally, this accumulation is limited only in the form of information but not
knowledge. The type of innovation within this model is likely not to be limited to
incremental innovation, where the innovations’ features are user-oriented and
created from the users’ feedback itself.
In terms of the mass innovation model, the degree of networking is greater
than in the open model, as it is subject to the social structure of information
accumulation at many stages of the innovation process, rather than just from the
customers’ feedback, as is the case in the open innovation model. Furthermore,
information accumulation within this mass model is perceived both in the form of
information and knowledge; nevertheless, this knowledge input is not taken directly
as technological knowledge, but rather as technical knowledge for innovation
management.
In contrast, the ubiquitous innovation model has a greater degree of a
dependence on social structure than the previous two models, as this innovation
process is subject mostly to both technological and technical knowledge acquired
from a social structural network. The project’s team members are likely to be
connectors or compilers rather than conveyors. The knowledge accumulation in this
regard is taking technological knowledge from its original source and putting it
together with other technological knowledge to create a final product, unlike in the
mass innovation model, where knowledge is taken as technical knowledge.
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To sum up, the ubiquitous innovation model emphasises more exposure to
information and knowledge outside firms as a main source of innovation, in
comparison to the open and mass innovation models. As such, innovations that are
generated by the open and mass models are seen as the core artefacts in the
hierarchy. Innovations that result from the ubiquitous model are classified as
peripheral artefacts.
The case of innovations based on knowledge obtained from an online open-
source software community, the analysis of IVC in Chapter 7: The App Economy
and the Irrelevant State provides an example of how innovation with the ubiquitous
model is reflected by the irrelevant state being peripheral.
4.5.2 Societal Linkages
Distribution and Monetisation
Not all ideas in the digital world have been implemented in a piece of technology,
such as a software product, and not all of the implemented technologies are
distributed and monetised widely in the market. There are many stages to go through
before a piece of technology is realised through the market mechanism.
Additionally, there are certain types of artefacts that are distributed and monetised
informally within a formal setting among a very specific group of users. Artefacts
with these characteristics are viewed here as peripheral artefacts.
An explanation offered here as to why the peripheral artefacts are distributed
and monetised informally is that they are developed in response to needs arising
from the use of core artefacts that have already been formally distributed and
monetised. The original distributor might not provide these functions or services
when releasing their distributed artefact, thus leaving a gap and opportunity for the
peripheral artefacts to thrive. Furthermore, it can also be the case that the core
- 112 -
distributor provides these functions and services but that they still do not fit well
with the users’ needs or are more costly, thus leaving a gap for the peripheral
artefacts to emerge.
These peripheral artefacts can be distributed and monetised in a form by the
core users of artefacts and, therefore the market organization of peripheral artefacts
is in a form of by-users-for-users, while the core artefacts come in the form of by-
distributors-for-users. Technologies analysed in Chapters 5-8 are an example in this
regard.
Economic Competitiveness
The distinction between the perceived importance of core and peripheral
artefacts for economic competitiveness has consequences for the other ten
aforementioned attributes in Table 4.2. As the core artefacts take place in
mainstream and more formal settings than the peripheral artefacts, the core artefacts’
importance for economic competitiveness is more obvious and easily calculated than
that of peripheral ones. Not only is peripheral artefacts’ effect on economic
competitiveness perceived to be less than of core artefacts, most of the time
peripheral artefacts are also viewed as a grey area which needs to be restricted,
censored, controlled, or clamped down on. This is a way that society justifies the
value of the peripheral artefacts based on social perceptions rather than on
technological or economic ones. Technologies analysed in Chapters 5-8 are an
example in this regard.
Lack of Visibility
If we use an explanation of humanity’s desire for technology to broadly classify
social cognitions of artificial intelligence in computer technology, it can be divided
into two types: artificial intelligence that was crafted in response to the desire to
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push the boundary of science and technology; and artificial intelligence that was
crafted in response to societal demands.
The significant point of this classification is that the variation in humanity’s
desire to advance already existing artificial intelligence underpins the hierarchy of
newly emerging information technologies. Starting with an examination of archival
artificial intelligence that is produced due to the desire to advance science and
technology knowledge, some of it is archived intentionally while the rest is not. Not
all scientific projects manage to accomplish the project’s objectives. The projects
that were classified as failures either produced nothing or produced something that
was not intended originally, which underlines the importance of human involvement
in and recognition of that project.15
Archival knowledge and incremental artificial intelligence are sometimes
commoditised by the market mechanisms within a society. They are presented to the
society as a piece of technology with a social value added, and thus can be placed in
the same group of artificial intelligence that is crafted in response to societal
demands. Again, in the realm of such market desire, the technologies become
involved with social and market values differently. Some technologies are involved
and embedded more within the society, which determines their market value. This
can be either because technologies are socially accepted or become cheap due to the
demand and supply rules of the market.16
This progression is the basis for how society’s technological cognition
works; however nowadays this artificial intelligence has advanced to the point
15 Nonetheless, this discussion is not going into greater detail as it is not a focus point of the on-going analysis
of the hierarchy of core and peripheral artefacts. They are outlined here to illustrate the possible paths in which
artificial intelligence and market mechanisms become involved, and determine a hierarchy of newly emerged
technology.
16 However some technologies do not become widely adopted socially, perhaps of cost or lack of public
awareness.
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where its products are released in an invisible manner. Hence, the visible appearance
determines different levels of social cognition of the merged artificial intelligence.
Visibility makes some technologies widely recognised and adopted both in terms of
their existence and their benefits; additionally, they also are perceived as a
contemporary strategic technology with great economic competitive advantage.
These technologies secure their place as core artefacts in the hierarchy of emerging
information technologies. Alternatively, some technologies receive lesser or
minimal recognition of their existence and impact due to their lack of visibility.
These fall into the hierarchy as peripheral artefacts regardless of their impact and
wide adoption by the society. People might feel their impacts indirectly, as with an
enabling piece of technology, or they may feel the impacts directly but without an
awareness of their different elements. Cloud Computing, as analysed in Chapter 6:
The Cloud, the iDragon, and the Technocratic State, is an example in this regard.
4.5.3 Private-Owned and Publicly-Owned Knowledge
IPRs Protocol
Another feature distinguishing core from peripheral artefacts is their differing
abilities to be assigned to private possession. May (2005) explains that both material
property and intellectual property did not originally exist with a legal ownership
right; they were originally material and knowledge commons. The ownership right
of both commons was created later on through a commoditization process for
commercial purposes under the justification of particular social relations.17 However
unlike the material commons, where multiple consumers can diminish the quantity
and/or quality, the knowledge commons is non-rival: multiple consumptions do not
17 May explains such social relations by stating that the consumption of material commons reduces both the
‘social utility’ and commercial impacts of them, while the free consumption of the knowledge commons hollows
out only commercial impacts not the ‘social utility’ impacts.
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diminish either the quality or the quantity of that knowledge (Shadlen et al. 2005:
49). On the contrary, the consumption of knowledge outside market transactions
multiplies both the quality and quantity of the knowledge; for example, if people
exchange ideas with each other, both parties will end up having more ideas at the
end.
Additionally, there is also another type of knowledge property over which
private possession can be assigned that was not initially of interest to IPRs
advocates: software. This type of knowledge has more recently been assigned
special public ownership as free software to prevent it from being transferred from
the public commons to private ownership. Chapter 7 (Section 7.2.2.1: The Economy
of Free Software) discusses the mechanisms for keeping this type of knowledge in
the public common using the case of GNU’s public general agreement, which is a
license for a free software operating system (GNU is not Unix). As this chapter
shows, artefacts that are constituted as privately owned knowledge or are released
on to the market with private ownership rights are classified here as core artefacts,
while the rest are classified as peripheral artefacts.
Resource Scarcity
Resource scarcity of particular emerging information technologies relates to the
commodification of knowledge and information as technological goods. As
described above, the resources in software and digital content are non-rival.
Therefore, to claim ownership of them is to impose a human-created scarcity with a
temporary monopoly right; such as creating intellectual property rights for software
and digital resources, which are mostly in the form of knowledge and information.
As such, the resource scarcity of software and digital content is not natural but
imposed, and this has been a central development in the software and digital content
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realm. The ownership of emerging information technologies to which this logic has
been applied are categorised here as a core artefacts in the technological hierarchy.
However, within the imposed scarcity, there is another type of scarcity that
has emerged: an artificial scarcity. An artificial scarcity is not imposed for the
purpose of extracting a price out of the knowledge and information resources that
are used to produce the environment where the artificial scarcity takes place. Rather,
the artificial scarcity emerges from the conditions of usage arising from the imposed
scarcity. Online games and gold farming are a clear example of this. Digitizing
games to make them available on the Internet means game providers can earn
revenues from several sources such as advertising, user subscriptions and the digital
goods available for gamers. These revenues arise because game providers make
assets scarce for online consumers of a particular game. By doing so the game
providers own the game content, middleware and other related commercial aspects
such as the trademark. What is more, the storyline content (with all the challenges
that are set initially for the gamers to achieve) creates an artificial scarcity within the
shell of the digital content that is protected by an imposed scarcity. This artificial
scarcity emerges because of the gamers’ entertainment experience, as gamers
themselves set the challenge, requiring more time in the game trying to obtain the
artificial prizes as a special feature or to proceed to other levels in the game. This
has also created a technological gap for the gold farming business to emerge either
though purely human labour as a service or with the help of a new piece of
technology like a ‘farmbot’. A ‘farmbot’ is software that automatically plays online
games rather than having real human gamers engage in highly labour intensive gold
farming. The prices of artefacts are justified by the logic of the artificial scarcity that
places them as peripheral artefacts in the proposed hierarchy of emerging
information technologies. Technologies analysed in Chapters 8: Online Games, the
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Virtual Economy, the Counter-Developmental State, and Forward Trends, are an
example in this regard.
Consumer Relations
Consumer relations are a feature related to the release of the final artefacts into a
market, or in other words the final product model. The conventional way of
releasing the final artefacts under the umbrella of IPRs protection is the black box
model. This is the model where the final product is marketed as a given piece of
technology. The users pay for the technological product without being able to
access, copy, modify or redistribute the product. This is the realm for the core
technologies.
While the core artefacts rely on the black box model for releasing the final
product onto the market, the peripheral artefacts offer a white box model on the
market, or base their technological process on the white box model. With this model,
the users can access, copy, modify and redistribute the final product either to a
certain extent or with no limitations. Nowadays, in particular market niches, most
products use both models; nonetheless this distinction is made to refer to the
difference in the logic of the openness underlining the two models and their
influence upon the division of core and peripheral technologies. Technologies
analysed in Chapters 5-8 are an example in this regard.
4.5.4 Formal and Informal Economic Settings
Process of Improvement
The process of improvement here does not refer to an improvement in the features of
technologies. Rather, the process of improvement here refers to the progress of the
public perception of particular products: about how deeply rooted technologies are
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within a public cognition of technology. Since the Internet has become more and
more affordable and easier to access, the life cycle of many newly emerging
information technologies has become shorter, because the Internet acts as a free
platform to test and trial any technological idea, regardless of its source, size and
form. Everything can be accepted to be released to the public in the Internet world.
The Internet determines processes of improvement that can be seen in four
distinctive trends: an increase in unreleased IT projects; an increase in IT hype; an
increase in IT hype that does not progress to technological reality in the public
realm; and an increase in technological realities that do not progress beyond hype.
In the early days of the Internet as a publicly accessible computer network,
the number of unreleased computer projects increased due to the Internet connecting
projects to a mass of consumers with just a click and at minimal cost. Furthermore
the Internet also acts as a large pool of information, where each project can keep an
eye out for duplication that can emerge at any time. This means large numbers of
projects in their last stages do not release their computer products in the form that
was originally planned, since the market niche has already been taken.
Furthermore, a large proportion of the Internet has become more and more
user-centric. This user-centricity has occurred in many possible ways such as the
rise of Web 2.0 and peer-to-peer user-generated content, and Internet-based source
code sharing communities. This assimilation between technology-producers and
technology-users upon the net space also unsettles the boundaries among computing
activities related to the Internet; the lines between career and hobby, producer and
consumer, and professional and amateur are blurred, and which explains why much
user-generated content is transformed into an artefact with strong Internet hype
around the Internet. Against this backdrop, technological hype can be defined as the
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sense of how popular and well known certain technologies are among Internet users.
However, this hype is not proof that such technologies will have commercial success
once further developed into a formal economic transaction.
Taking the example of the applications industry for smart phone or mobile
phone devices (hereafter the App economy), in the early days they were just
peripheral artefacts which society perceived as a hobby, uninnovative, dependent on
advertisement revenue or at worst an opportunity for young, amateur developers to
practise their IT skills. However the App economy has recently been perceived
socially as more of a core artefact, because of widely-publicised examples such as
seventeen year-old Nick D’Aloisio, who sold his news summary App (Summly) to
Yahoo! Inc. for USD$ 30 million (MacMillan and Thomson, 26 March 2013).
The developments of Android phone application technology as analysed in
Chapter 7: The App Economy, and the Irrelevant State, is an example in this regard.
Information Flows
As the Internet is a universal space where computer networks connect with each
other worldwide, the size of the Internet depends on the type of measurement
employed. Units of measurement include counting numbers of Internet subscribers
(which does not represent the number of Internet users who do not subscribe), by
counting the number of websites, by counting the bytes of data available on the
Internet, and so on. It is pointless to attempt to measure the size of the Internet for
two main reasons: the size multiplies every second so it is hard to capture its current
size, and it does not matter how big the Internet is, as it is the social relations within
the Internet that matter. The latter reason is what distinguishes the core from
peripheral artefacts with regards to information flow.
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Regarding core artefacts, sites that contain original digital content and other
related services that are approved by the original digital content creators are
protected by legislation and thus can be seen as core artefacts in comparison with
what are seen as peripheral artefacts. In terms of peripheral artefacts, many websites
or Internet-based tools that act as an enabler or navigator to content available to the
public on the Internet is not protect by legislation. These artefacts thus end up in a
different position to that of the core artefacts. Technologies analysed in Chapters 8:
Online Games, the Virtual Economy, the Counter-Developmental State, and
Forward Trends, are an example in this regard.
Capital Accumulation
The difference in capital accumulation is related to the distinctions in human
resources between the two artefacts were mentioned earlier. Success in the
development of peripheral artefacts does not rely on financial capital since the
materials required to process the innovation for these artefacts are mostly free of
charge or freely available with the computer and the Internet, as in the case of
ubiquitous innovation previously mentioned. Furthermore, the nature of peripheral
artefacts is highly collectively distributed. To elaborate, even though each of the
peripheral artefacts is small in comparison with the core artefacts, they need
collective action to functionally disseminate into the market. For example, smart
phone applications are collectively distributed through the App store and gold
farmers are organized collectively to be paid through a gold farming website.
Technologies analysed in Chapters 5-8 are an example in this regard.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has provided an outline of the way that this thesis will answer the
research questions:
Research question 1: How should we characterise the nature of the
technological upgrading approaches that are employed domestically in Vietnam, and
how these approaches are processed within the context of Vietnam’s IT industry.
Research question 2: How to characterise the state’s roles regarding
technological upgrade in Vietnam’s IT industry, and to what extent and in which
way do these different state roles affect the domestic technology-upgrading
approaches.
These questions will be answered fully using four case studies, explored
consecutively in the next four chapters, from Chapters 5- 8..
This chapter started with a discussion of how technology-upgrading
approaches and processes have been conceptualised, based on several sets of
literature, for use in this thesis. The chapter then introduced the basic concepts and
structure of how the first research question, regarding the characterisation of
Vietnam's technology-upgrading approach, is going to be answered using four
models. After these four models were outlined, the chapter linked these models to
another dimension, that of the different roles of the state in relation to four different
technology-upgrading approaches occurring across Vietnam's IT industry. This
section of the chapter also summed up the answers to the thesis' second research
question, concerning the character and impact of the Vietnamese state's roles
regarding technology-upgrading.
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Finally the chapter proposed a hierarchy of emerging information
technologies to explain the factors that shape the perceptions and categorisations by
society, including the state, of emerging information technologies as core or
peripheral technologies. This proposed hierarchy has been developed based on the
concepts of 'Othering' and 'Bricolage'. The hierarchy also explains why the
Vietnamese state has either privileged or disparaged certain IT forms from a socio-
technological point of view. In Chapters five to eight, the hierarchy of emerging
information technology will be discussed along with other relevant factors to
provide the answers to the research questions in a more detailed and analytical
manner.
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Chapter 5
Software Outsourcing and the Cooperative State
5.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the perpendicular model of technological upgrade in an
outsourcing business (Figure 4.1: Four Models of Technology-Upgrading Process).
The Vietnamese state has a cooperative role in this model. This cooperative state
arose after the Vietnamese state allowed certain non-political actors to take part in
the policy-drafting stage of the main national IT policy, Directive 58, during the
period from 2000 to 2010. These non-political actors consisted of two main groups:
local IT entrepreneurs and Vietnamese overseas IT entrepreneurs. Prior to Directive
58, Vietnam’s earlier IT policy was considered by the state itself to have failed to
reach its goal because the policy was not sufficiently industry-oriented. The state
sought to ensure Directive 58 did not suffer the same problem by adopting a
cooperative role, rather than keeping a leading economic role.
The outsourcing business is one of the original pioneer businesses of
Vietnam’s IT industry, having started when Vietnam first tried to construct a local
IT industry, which at that time did not consist of many sub-sectors. Hence, the
development of the local outsourcing business happened consecutively with the
growth of Vietnam’s local IT industry. In addition, this period saw the emergence of
Vietnam’s IT entrepreneurial class and the rise of their influence in the drafting of
IT industrial policies.
This backdrop affects the way in which the perpendicular model of
technology-upgrading of an outsourcing business occurs at an industrial level
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(Vietnam’s IT industry) rather than at a sectoral level (as an outsourcing business),
despite the cooperative state having built a connection with outsourcing businesses
for longer than for most of the other sub-sectors in Vietnam’s IT industry. In this
regard, the cooperative state continued its cooperation with the pioneering
outsourcing firms after the local IT industry was established, through the process of
technology upgrading. This relationship, based on technological upgrading, was also
enhanced by the highly institutionalized knowledge and modes of innovation that
were employed for conducting the technology-upgrading processes. The highly
institutionalised knowledge and the modes of innovation are categorised in the
hierarchy of emerging information technologies as core artefacts.
This chapter will start with a short introduction outlining how the
advancement of technologies enabled the rise of a global outsourcing business.
Then, the chapter will examine how the emergence of the domestic outsourcing
business dynamically interacts with the rise of local IT entrepreneurs and the
growing role of these entrepreneurs in shaping the cooperative state through the
making of hi-tech industrial policies. Finally, this chapter will characterise the
cooperative state and its limitations within the context of technology-upgrading
approaches in Vietnam’s outsourcing business.
5.1.1 The Rise of the Global Outsourcing Business and Its Technological
Opportunities for Technologically Backward Economies
In his book The Big Switch: Rewiring the World, from Edison to Google, Carr
(2009) discusses the evolutionary processes of certain types of technologies which
have had a significant impact on industrial transformation from the invention of
electricity to the technologies that were part of the computer revolution, such as the
emergence of information technology and the establishment of software as an
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industry in its own right. Carr acknowledged that the economy of the computer (and
its related technologies) and electricity closely echo each other, as he refers to both
of them as General Purpose Technologies (GPTs). These are the types of technology
that serve multiple purposes, perform various functions in various formats and,
above all, can be remotely accessed:
But electricity and computing share a special trait that makes them unique even among
the relatively small set of general purpose technologies: they can both be delivered
efficiently from a great distance over a network. Because they don’t have to be
produced locally, they can achieve the scale economies of central supply (2009: 15).
Indeed the development of electricity and computing are significant, not
only as GPTs, but also as powerful enabling technologies that empower other
businesses (including IT related business) to break down their production procedures
into smaller tasks and send them to other locations to implement before returning
them to the original source for the assembly of the whole product. This is the
backdrop against which the outsourcing business has been taking place. The network
of production in various industries has been fragmented down not by the type of
product or component as the unit of production, but rather by tasks (whether
completed parts or not). The outsourcing business has been shaped slowly by both
sets of GPTs, which have become more affordable and accessible over time.
In terms of the computer industry, outsourcing offers opportunities for
technologies in backward societies where the domestic IT industry has not yet
become well established enough to connect their skilled IT labour to an already
existing IT industry elsewhere. India and its famous software outsourcing business
exemplify this phenomenon. More important here, in relation to Vietnam’s IT
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industry, Indian’s software outsourcing business has greatly inspired local IT
entrepreneurs who strove to find IT demand outside of Vietnam’s then under-
developed IT market. This rise of global IT outsourcing occurred concurrently with
the rise of Vietnam’s local IT entrepreneurial class as an influential policy lobbying
group, which has continue working closely with the state in a cooperative manner.
This provides one side of the historical background that forms the context for this
research, where the proposed cooperation between the state and entrepreneurs takes
place.
The difference between a supportive and cooperative state lies in the further
developmental stage of the domestic IT industry after the initial constructional stage.
Once the industry has officially emerged, the relationship between the outsourcing
entrepreneurs and the state strengthens in a linear fashion with further development
of the industry, as many IT entrepreneurs have gained power as IT industry
representatives. This means that even though the outsourcing business is not done
by the state, it nonetheless has a closer and stronger connection with the state than
other IT industrial sub-sectors.
The relations between the cooperative state, together with the nature of the
outsourcing industry, create a unique path for the technology-upgrading approaches
of domestic firms who chose to upgrade their technological capacities in other
economic sectors while still continuing their outsourcing business: this is referred
here as the technology upgrading in scope approach.18 However, there is still another
type of technology-upgrading approach in Vietnam’s outsourcing business. This is
18 Chandler’s distinction between the economies of scale and scope (1990) are employed in this chapter. For
Chandler, economies of scale in production and distribution are ‘those that result when increased size of a single
operating unit producing or distributing a single product reduces the unit costs of transaction involved’, while the
economies of scope in production and distribution are ‘economies of joint production or distribution’ (1990:
17).
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the technology-upgrading in scale approach, which demonstrates the counter-
developmental characteristics of the state in that the state’s financial structures
contradict the cooperative character of the state.
5.2. Vietnam’s Information Technology Industry Building, its
Constitutive Circumstances, and the Rise of the Cooperative
State
This section discusses the circumstances under which Vietnam’s information
technology industry has developed. The discussions of these circumstances will be
channelled into two main topics which highlight the indigenous factors that gave
birth to the cooperative state. The first topic is the three main fields on which
Vietnam’s domestic IT industry has taken shape. The second topic examines the
extent to which the domestic outsourcing businesses become a significant sub-sector
in the domestic software consortium as well as in a local IT industry, especially at
the early industry building stages.
Examining the first topic offers an analytical account for such circumstances.
These circumstances are the state’s intention to industrialize and modernize the
country in conjunction with the rise of the industry globally; the emergence of
Vietnam’s domestic IT entrepreneurial class; and its connections with overseas
Vietnamese or Viet Kieu who work in the IT field. Since there was limited domestic
IT demand during the construction period of the domestic IT industry, the rising IT
entrepreneurial class and returning Viet Kieu had to seek IT demand from external
markets that were outsourcing work. This explains the large industrial share of
outsourcing businesses in Vietnam’s domestic IT industry. This background
demonstrates that Vietnam’s outsourcing industry has been highly institutionally
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constructed in two senses: in an active sense when the outsourcing business is
embedded in hi-tech industrial policy making processes, as will be outlined in
Section 5.2.2: The Rise of the Local IT Entrepreneurial Class; and in a passive sense
when the domestic outsourcing business needs collective agencies and the state’s
structures to do their business. Later on in this chapter, two examples illustrating
these two senses will be provided. These examples are of business matching via
industrial consortiums and of a technology-upgrading approach that is highly subject
to industrial financial systems.
5.2.1 Vietnam to be Industrialised and Modernised by 2020
Vietnam is set to be modernised and industrialised by 2020 under the ‘Strategy of
Information and Telecommunications to 2010’ and Vision to 2020 (Government of
Vietnam 2005 cited in Nguyen Thanh Tuyen 2010: 87). Even though the strategy
was issued long after Vietnam’s first IT policy, it still is considered by the
government to be contemporary with Vietnam’s current economic trajectory.
A deputy minister from MIC, Dr. Nguyen Thanh Tuyen, clarifies in an
interview the meaning of modernisation and industrialisation that are mentioned in
this strategy document in the sense of the technologicalisation of Vietnam’s main
economic sector:
there are many terms about "modernization", or even about ""postmodernization", and
some of their synonyms, such as "industrialization" and "post-industrialization" […] In
Vietnam we seldom use the word "post-modernization" but only "modernization" [….]
In 1996, at the 8th Plenary Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the term "the
course of industrialization and modernization of Vietnam" was initiated in the official
document of the Congress. It defined "modernization" is "a process that fundamentally
and comprehensively transforms the production, business, service activities and
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economic management from a labour-basis as the main means to a basis of advanced
technology and scientific progress to create high productivity". By default, the term of
the course is understood in 2000-2020 (personal communication with author Nguyen
Thanh Tuyen, 2012).
This strategy can be seen as a broad canvas for Vietnam’s long-term techno-
economic trajectory for other industrial and economic policies. In this strategy, the
IT industry has already been prioritised in comparison with many traditional sectors,
as it is one of the strategic industries fuelling Vietnam to achieve this vision, as well
as being an enabling technological industry that modernises and industrialises other
industries in the Vietnamese context, as Nguyen Thanh Tuyen outlined in the
personal communication.
Understanding this strategy as well as the government’s IT policies alone is
not sufficient if one is to understand the influence of the contexts that have shaped
the current character of Vietnam’s IT industry. An understanding of other related
policies, including a grasp of the historical background encompassing how
technology-based sectors have developed in Vietnam, is crucial to this research’s
analysis as it provides a broader picture of the national context under which
Vietnam’s IT sector has developed. Thus, this part of the thesis will outline the
related technology-development policies prior to the year 2000, the year in which
the IT sector was officially established in Vietnam.
In contrast with the extensive literature on the Vietnam war, the literature on
Vietnam’s technological development before 1995 is limited. Vu Vao Dam (1995),
Goodman and Press (1995), and Do, Pahn Dinh and Goodman (1996) are among the
few scholars who paid attention to Vietnam’s high-technology development during
the mid-1990s.
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A prolonged period of war, together with a lack of military technology as
well as the non-existence of domestic industries with technological requirements,
such as a petrochemical industry, and the lack of well-equipped ports (Goodman and
Press 1995: 13) left Vietnam in a technologically backward condition by the 1970s.
However, there is evidence that the technological development of the Science and
Technology (S&T) sector did exist in Vietnam even before the economic
transformation programme (doi moi) was initiated in 1986. Nevertheless, Vietnam’s
socialist regime and centrally planned economy created a concrete obstruction for its
national technological capacity. The S&T sector operated under a highly centralised
command system and state-monopoly economy, which prohibited communications
between S&T institutions. This prevented the diffusion and utilisation by society of
any particular piece of technology. As a result, Vietnam was drastically failing to
reach its national scientific objectives (Vu Vao Dam 1996: 251-252).
After 1981, the state responded to this situation by loosening its highly
centralised command system governing S&T (1996: 252-254). One of the key
policies for S&T development was Decree No. 175-CP, which enabled S&T units to
enjoy a degree of autonomy, manage their financial affairs and profit from their
productive achievements. The interesting point is that this Decree also enabled S&T
units to obtain funds from state financial sources (1996: 254-255). At first glance,
the S&T sector seems to have gained advantages from this policy; however, it is
very doubtful whether any public financial resources were actually available at that
time.
After the economic revolution in 1986, the S&T sector underwent partial
privatisation. Private S&T activities were no longer prohibited in Vietnam (Decision
134 – HDBT, 1987), and this decision was followed by the consideration of
- 131 -
protection for owners of S&T products (Decree and Law on Protection of Industrial
Property 1989). In this period, however, the concept of patents and intellectual
property rights did not exist in Vietnam. The state used the term ‘initiative
movement’ in reference to a product’s initial ownership, yet enforcement still
remained very weak in practice (1996: 257-259).
In 1991, five years after doi moi had begun, fostering a minuscule private
sector, bilateral trade with the USSR came to an end. The state had to seek new trade
and investment partners; thus, Vietnam agreed to lift its trade embargo on the United
States in 1995. This event introduced western computing technology and American
computer firms to Vietnam’s economy, while American firms started to standardise
the domestic computers and software used (Do, Phan Dinh Dieu and Goodman
1996: 88).
The 1990s were a period that opened the door to international S&T dynamics
as well as decentralisation. In 1992, private enterprises were allowed to transfer
foreign technology into Vietnam for commercial purposes (Decree 35-HDBT) (Vu
Vao Dam 1996: 257-259). In addition, a series of regulations were promulgated in
order to decentralise state autonomy in S&T administrative and fiscal management
to local governments (Circular 1292 in 1992, and Decision 419 in 1995) (Vu Vao
Dam 1996: 251-252).
However, the emergence of private economic participation as well as foreign
investors convinced the Vietnamese authorities of the necessity to develop ICT for
the advancement of communication in response to new demands from the private
sector. If the ICT and computer technology sectors remained small and elitist,
Vietnamese individuals and enterprises would be at a disadvantage in comparison
with foreign firms (Do, Phan Dinh Dieu and Goodman 1996: 90). With this concern
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in mind, the state declared its first IT policy in 1993 (Resolution 49/CP) with the
title ‘Resolution of the Government on the Development of IT in the Country
During the 1990s’ in order to computerise the public sector and promote the use of
IT in the private sector (1996: 90-91). This Resolution laid the foundation for all of
Vietnam’s IT policy structures after 1993. Notably, IT was not considered as an
economic activity, and this was reflected in this policy through its separation from
the ICT sector (Dang 2009: 102-103). Resolution 49 was drafted with heavy
influence from the Research and Development (R&D) sector (2009:119), home to
the type of professionals that were kept embedded within the state arena (2009:
105), rather than being industry-oriented as in the case of Directive 58, discussed
below.
5.2.2 The Rise of a Local IT Entrepreneurial Class
IT was considered as an industry for the first time in 2000 under Directive 58, which
this chapter considers to be the intersection where the state and domestic
outsourcing industry began to interact in a cooperative way. Despite the policy,
Nguyen Thanh Tuyen (2010: 87) suggests that the ICT and IT sectors were in
practice merged together only in 2002, when the Ministry of Post and Telematics
(MPT) and a National ICT Steering Committee (SC58) were established to govern
both the ICT and IT sectors as a united industry.
One phenomenon under Directive 58 that embraces the cooperative state in
association with an outsourcing business is the level of participation of the IT
entrepreneurial class in the policy drafting period of Directive 58. Unlike Resolution
48, which had researchers from state bodies as a powerful policy lobby, the IT
entrepreneurial class was one among others that participated in – and thus influenced
– Directive 58. As such, Directive 58 is more industry-oriented than Resolution 49.
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The rise of an entrepreneurial class, as well as the participation of this class
in an industrial policy-lobbying process, were gradually formulated against the
backdrop of the transformation of the Vietnamese state’s role from being highly
centralised to less centralised since doi moi was announced back in 1986. Since
then, the Vietnamese state has been characterised by scholars of South East Asia
and socialism, for example Gainsborough (2003), Kokko and Sjöholm (2000) and
Dixon (2002), as a state that endeavours to centralise and maintain its economic
autonomy, in strong contrast with other successful states involved in the IT industry
which consulted their citizens more extensively, as discussed earlier in greater detail
in Chapter 3: Literature Review, Section 3.3: The Network Knowledge-Led Model,
on the notions of the network state The proposed cooperative state might appear to
fit well with the notion of the network state at first glance, but this is not always
true. The Vietnamese cooperative state has limitations, and such limitations are the
result of the centralised financial system that hinders technology-upgrading
processes in local outsourcing businesses as will be discussed below.
Branding themselves collectively as a ‘Developmental-State Performer’
(Abrami 2002: 92), Vietnamese economic policy makers have no choice but to
process elements of the neo-liberal economic development model because of
pressures from international economic integration, international trade partners, and
donors (Abrami 2002: 95; Evans and Bui Duc Hai 2005: 219). Vietnam has joined a
number of international economic associations, such as ASEAN in 1995 and the
WTO in 2007, which have required Vietnam to meet their membership pre-
conditions by increasing free competition in its domestic market. In addition, the
collapse of a traditional donor, the USSR in 1991, forced Vietnam to find new
donors who later became its major trade partners. These partners demanded fair
market competition conditions for their companies to operate in Vietnam. For
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instance, the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement was signed in 2000, and
became effective from 2001 onward. Additionally, Japan became a major source of
overseas development aid (ODA) and a long-term trade partner for Vietnam’s
automobile manufacturers (Abrami 2002: 93).
The Vietnamese state has reacted to such pressures by partial
decentralisation of its economic authority to local government bodies, privatisation,
SOE reform (regarded as an equalisation process) and offering an open door to
foreign direct investment. A few of these policies illustrate this liberalisation, such
as the Law of Enterprise and Decision 171 on bureaucratic reforms in S&T bodies.
However, many scholars criticise the government’s self-projected image as an actor
taking a liberal role in the economy. Gainsborough (2003) perceptively analyses the
evidence to conclude that the state has reasserted political control against the
increasing local autonomy created by economic reform. He suggests that this control
can be seen in the way that the central state can rule local authorities through the
appointment of important local positions and mandates to local institutions (2003:
73). Furthermore, Evans and Bui Duc Hai (2005) support Gainsborough’s argument
by characterising the hidden intention of the state in economic liberalisation as
‘statecraft’. They use this term to describe the Vietnamese state’s manoeuvres
behind the expansion of privatisation and equalisation processes, which are actually
aimed at preserving the political idea of the state in the face of threats via
globalisation (2005: 237).
Against this backdrop, the cooperative state model set out here contributes to
the notion of the Vietnamese state characteristics in its economic transformation
from a planned to a market economy. The cooperative state emerges out of both
political and economic forces and, as will be outlined here, also privileges certain
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groups in the IT entrepreneurial class who represent a large proportion of the
domestic outsourcing sector and who have a connection with the state regarding the
development of the IT industry. In other words the rise of the IT entrepreneurial
class as part of the hi-tech industrial policy drafting process has a significant
meaning for outsourcing businesses rather than for the whole IT industry for two
reasons. First of all, outsourcing entrepreneurs constituted the majority of the IT
entrepreneurs who lobbied for Directive 58. Secondly, this occurred at a time when
outsourcing businesses had the biggest share of the infant domestic software sector,
and when software was considered to be an official IT industry, coinciding with the
time when Directive 58 was issued.19
Dang (2009: 114) provides first-hand accounts of the details of different
policy lobbying groups in the drafting processes of Directive 58 (including
preparation processes). She names some IT entrepreneurs and their contributions in
these processes: Troung Gia Binh (FPT Cooperations) and Ha The Minh (CMC
Software). At the time of Directive 58’s drafting processes, the condition of market
competition in Vietnam was in its least mature condition despite having undergone
an economic revolution since Doi Moi. State-owned enterprises and a few private-
owned ones dominated the market. Troung Gia Binh and Ha The Minh20 led
companies in these groups. Vietnam issued the Law of Enterprise 2000 which
officially introduced an influx of private enterprises into the economic system; the
law reflected the new economic ambitions of the socialist political regime. At the
tenth National Congress in 2006, the Government of Vietnam (GOV) declared its
mission to industrialise the country with a target of 7.5-8.0 per cent annual economic
19 (Resolution 07 is a five-year plan aiming at building and developing a domestic software industry, issued on
5/6/2000 (Dang 2009: Appendix 6)).
20 Considering that FPT, and CMC System and Software Department were established in 1988 and 1996
respectively (FPT Cooperation (n.d), CMC software (n.d.))
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growth rate by the end of 2020. It also allowed members of the Vietnamese
Communist Party more participation in private ownership and capitalism. The result
is that the domestic IT market has been dominated by a few companies that have
connections within the political bureaus of the Communist Party. Again, as said
before, the proposed cooperative state is one type of such connection, and Troung
Gia Binh plays an important role in crafting this connection.
Additionally, the rise of the IT entrepreneurial class during the turn of the
century was not limited only to those who took part in Directive 58’s drafting
process. Apart from domestic entrepreneurs, some foreign entrepreneurs have
gradually increased their shares in Vietnam’s IT industry, the majority of whom are
American or Japanese. While the U.S. companies are major outsourcers in Vietnam,
Japanese companies are said by the World Bank to be the main importers of
Vietnamese software (2007: 53). Although the software sector has dominated
Vietnam’s IT industry, there are signs of a growing hardware sector. Intel
Corporation has invested in an integrated circuits and IT peripherals plant in
Vietnam. Intel claims that this plant is the company’s biggest ever for chip
production (Manager Online unknown date 2009). According to the mission
statement issued by Intel’s chairman, Craig Barrett, who aims to transform the
Vietnamese IT industry, the country needed to move from “made in Vietnam” to
“created in Vietnam” (Craig Barrett interview in Manager Online unknown date
2009). Later on in the second half of 2000s, the digital content industry emerged.
This shows the steady growth in the diversity of the sub-sectors that constitute
Vietnam’s IT industry, as well as how the international economy increasingly drives
Vietnam’s economic development trajectory during the period of Directive 58:
Vietnam’s economy is more industry-oriented than ever before.
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The emergence of an entrepreneurial culture in response to Vietnam’s
transition into a market economy and passage of the Enterprise Law in 2000 also is
in part due to the spin-off of researchers from the state’s R&D sections into the
private sector. Dang states that pioneer IT entrepreneurs in Vietnam had close ties
with other state institutional bodies, such as academics, as they used to be state
employees (Dang 2009: 117). This was done in various ways; however, in this
present research only those who cooperate with the state are discussed, since they
posed a great deal of significance for the construction of Vietnam’s domestic IT
industry. These former state researchers cooperated with the state through a
collective agency, a software consortium called VINASA that tried to connect to the
global IT market in Japan. Tran Cong Tuong, a member of the senior management
board of VINASA Ho Chi Minh City Branch, discussed during a fieldwork
interview strategies to attract overseas Vietnamese who were working in the
international IT industry back to work in Vietnam. He mentioned that the
phenomenon of Bangalore’s outsourcing business had encouraged them to pay it a
visit, during which they realized that the socio-cultural aspects of working in the
outsourcing business were very different between India and Vietnam:
Tran Cong Tuong: […] We were very impressed by the successful approach of India.
Uer-Aree: Was it about the development of the industry or was it about certain
technology?
Tran Cong Tuong: Developing the industry! So we were very impressed by the
successful approach of India, and we were trying to copy it. That is why back to year
2000 and 2001 Vietnam and India had a kind of an agreement that India will help
Vietnam to build the software industry.[…] You see they learnt from India for three to
four years from 1998 to 2001, and they learnt that they could not do the same thing
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India did because of cultural differences. For example I still can recall back in 1999 we
had a conference with Indian companies like Infosic or Apptec, and after the conference
some business owners told me that they could not do the same things India does,
because we had different cultures. When they visited Bangalore they were very
impressed by the way Indian people were working and living in very poor conditions.
[…] and Vietnamese people cannot live in the same way as Indian people. They told me
that typical Indian developers can work about twelve hours a day. They can sit side by
side and after six hours of working non-stop, they just sit down on the floor to have they
lunch, eat very fast in fifteen minutes and they go back to work. Vietnamese workers
cannot do this! It is not the way we’re living. We are used to living an easy life, not hard
work like that. So we have to find our own way to do business to develop the industry.
(Interview with author, Tran Cong Tuong, 2010)
After crossing India off of the list, Vietnam’s search continued for other
venues for them to start their outsourcing business. Close trade connections and
Japan’s longstanding status as an international donor to Vietnam made Japan an
obvious choice. Eventually, a joint venture of seven Vietnamese and six Japanese
companies was established, which also included VINASA. Tran Cong Tuong told
me that even though the joint venture was terminated two years later, VINASA had
already made its name as a business matcher that had mediated the supply of local
IT labour with global IT demands though its outsourcing business.
Furthermore, despite being established with the intention of business
matching, VINASA as an industrial association has other objectives. It conducts
public relations though an annual award programme, and acts as a mediator between
members, but most of all VINASA is a policy consultancy board for the state, since
it is the pioneering software consortium in Vietnam. This consortium exists due to
the needs of local IT firms to find demand for their work, together with the push
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from government, described earlier here, to use the IT industry as a strategic
industry to modernise and industrialise the country. These factors enable VINASA
to cooperate, despite its being a private software association run by private firms,
with the state being closer to VINASA than to other industrial associations in
Vietnam’s IT industry, as Tran Cong Tuong states:
[…] VINASA is the only business association in Vietnam that does the policy
consulting board. We are the board administrator or policy player in every move. Every
movement in policy making we have a voice. (interview with author, Tran Cong Tuong,
2010).
In addition to this, the cooperative state also shares its autonomy in IT
industrial development with VINASA from time to time. For example, with regard
to domestic IT consumption, the government is trying to promote the use of IT
applications within the state administration and state-owned enterprises in the hope
that this will increase the amount of IT demand domestic enterprises are able to
supply by producing new technologies. However, in practice the process of granting
concessions for the state’s IT demands are not equally spread throughout the local
IT industry. The government gives priority to a small number of big companies,
authorising them to issue industrial standard certificates and finance small firms. For
example, the government is in a partnership with VINASA, headquartered in Hanoi,
which is led by a few companies who already dominate the IT market (such as FPT,
TMA, and Paragon Solutions), to provide the industrial standard for IT firms eligible
to receive grant concessions for government IT projects. In this respect, the
cooperative state starts to show some degree of counter-developmentalism, as it
appears not always to be beneficial to all outsourcing firms, especially to small
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firms. Hence, the cooperative state could be seen here as a state that tries to get the
upper hand in the transitional economy, especially in the IT business where the state
has few business skills and the local enterprises have many more, as became
apparent in the failure of Vietnam’s first IT industrial policy.
5.2.2.1 Nepotism and Cronyism Within VINASA
VINASA Corporation, an extremely successful and influential company, has
become a virtual by-word for cronyism and nepotism in the Vietnamese IT industry.
Troung Gia Binh, one of the main founders of Vietnam’s giant technology company
FPT (the Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology) is the best example
of this. He provides FPT with safeguards and privileges for its commercial activities
but is also allegedly claimed to have personal connections with the Communist Party
(Lan Anh Nguyen 2007). According to Vietnam ICT Outlook 2007 (Le Truong Tung
2007), which names the top companies in each IT field, FPT dominated three main
fields in the market: software outsourcing, the domestic software market and
Vietnamese brand-name PCs. Binh hit the headlines in 2007 when he was ranked at
the top of Vietnam’s richest people list by Forbes magazine in the USA due to his
FPT shares on Vietnam’s stock market. He was followed at the head of the rankings
by his FPT colleagues, though only about seven years had passed since Vietnam’s
stock market was established in 2000 (Lan Anh Nguyen 2007; Tuoi Tre unknown
date 2007). This has raised the question of how equal a post-socialist economy can
be when under the direction of a single-party state.
However, the topics of FPT’s nepotism and cronyism were not a focus of the
investigation during the research’s fieldwork with FPT, as neither issue forms part
of the thesis’ objective. However, the issues are mentioned briefly here because
FPT, under the leadership of Troung Gia Binh, is also a powerful leading company
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in VINASA (Troung Gia Binh is the chair of VINASA). These relationships
strengthen the chapter’s argument that the state has been cooperative, especially to
particular industrial institutions that already have established cooperative relations in
various forms.
5.2.2.2 IT Industrial Development During Directive 58
‘Directive 58 now is something of a legacy’
Tran Cong Tuong: VINASA HCMC
Apart from the rise and participation of the IT entrepreneurial class during
the Directive 58 that constituted the cooperative state, Vietnam’s IT industry also
underwent a great deal of development as an economic sector within the period of
this policy (2000-2010). Ho Chi Minh City in particular underwent a great
reconstruction, being transformed into a high-tech hub with four out of ten of the
national high-tech and software parks.21 These parks are operated under the
autonomous jurisdiction of municipal, provincial and relevant central-state agency
authorities. Following the agglomeration of technology by these high-tech parks,
Decision 181 was issued in 2005 to favour enterprises located within the high-tech
parks (Vu Xuan Nguyet Hong 2007: 29). The state provides a four-year tax
exemption for the companies’ income tax, income tax incentives for software
industry workers, a fee exemption and a support fund for Vietnamese software
enterprises, and concessions in renting land and on land use taxes (Nguyen Trong
Duong 2004: 3).
21Quang Trung Software Park, Saigon Software Park, Ree E-Town, and Unisoft at Ho Chi Minh National
University are in Ho Chi Minh City. The other seven are: Hanoi Software Centre; Hoa Lac Hi-tech Park; Danag
Software Centre; Haipong Software Centre; Cantho Software Centre; and Hue Software Centre
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During this period, the government issued notable sector-related regulations
to favour conditions for IT development (Decree 06, Law on Science and
Technology, Decree 122, Decree 115), including the S&T bureaucratic reform in
Decision 171 in 2004, and several legal documents penalising administrative
wrongdoing and the violation of intellectual property rights (Decree 16 (2000), and
Law on intellectual property rights No. 50/2005/QH11 (2005)) (Vu Xuan Nguyet
Hong 2007: 28-29).
Despite policies that promoted investment in the sector, Vietnam failed to
reach its goals in the first phase of the national IT master plan (2000-2005). The aim
to develop a software industry worth $US500 million by the end of the plan period
was too ambitious, and Vietnam only managed to achieve this two years later in
2007 (Dan Tri, 5 December 2008). This failure was deeply rooted in numerous
political influences, as the sector had developed without the benefit of competition
among domestic firms. Despite the fact that there are six Vietnamese basic
infrastructure licensed providers in the country, VNPT – which is a state-owned
enterprise – still retains a monopoly status in international and domestic markets.
The mobile phone business is run in accordance with government decisions, VNPT
being the major and most influential shareholder (ESCAP (n.d.): 24). However the
state responded to this failure by being more industry-oriented, as can be seen from
other policies afterwards and can thus still be characterised as a cooperative state.
For example, the state demonstrated its awareness of this failure by carrying out the
development of information technology including telecommunications infrastructure
to support the growth of the IT sector in accordance with the principal GOV IT
vision ‘ICT Orientation to 2020’, which aims to make Vietnam one of the top three
countries in ASEAN for ICT sector growth. This vision statement was issued on 6th
October 2005, in the year that saw the beginning of the continuous second national
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IT master plan (IT2005). The government introduced two subsequent related
policies: the National Strategy for ICT Development to 2010 and the National
Master Plan for Telecommunications and Internet Development to 2010. The
chapter is not going to go into greater details on how the state continued to be
cooperative regarding these two policies, as it is outside of the scope of this thesis,
which focuses mainly on the state’s cooperative roles in technological upgrading
processes and the constructive factors that foster the state’s cooperation in this
matter.
5.3. Characterising the Cooperative State and its Limitations in
Describing the Technology-Upgrading Approach of Vietnam’s
Outsourcing Business
The Vietnamese state still maintains its cooperative roles despite the fact that the
domestic IT industrial building stages are now finished. The cooperative state can be
seen in technology-upgrading processes of an outsourcing business, both of which
aim to increase the scale and scope of technological production. Nonetheless, the
cooperative state faces its own limitations in certain approaches to technological
upgrading, as will be examined in this section.
The motivations to upgrade the technological capacities in Vietnam’s
outsourcing business come in many forms. Some that were captured during the
research fieldwork include the maturity of the outsourcing business, the economic
down-turn (which decreases the amount of global demand for Vietnamese
outsourcing firms). the international creative culture which has been cultivated in
Vietnam through the return of Viet Kieu in IT industry (the latter has created people
who are over-qualified for low skill jobs and thus after successfully establishing a
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connection with the global IT industry through an outsourcing business they simply
would like to obtain higher skilled jobs). Despite these various drives, the research
categorises technology-upgrading approaches in Vietnam’s domestic outsourcing
business into two main approaches: an upgrade in scale and an upgrade in scope.
5.3.1 A Technology-Upgrading Approach: Increasing the Scope of the
Outsourcing Industry
The aims of this type of upgrade are to move up the value chain into higher skilled
production. Higher skilled production can be broken down into two classes: an
upgrade within the implemented line of production, and an upgrade that moves from
an implemented line of production to an innovated line of production. The chapter
offers an analytical case study of the latter upgrade based on the technological
experience of two big domestic companies in the outsourcing business: FPT
Corporation and TMAs.
During the time of my fieldwork in 2010, FPT and TMAs had not released
any products that were the result of their technology-upgrading processes; however,
both of them have founded R&D institutes within their company and the size of their
R&D institutes and projects are large. Unlike the case of IVC found in the last
chapter, FPT’s and TMAs’ R&D projects are highly related to other non-business
sectors within Vietnam’s national innovation system. Many of their R&D projects
are aimed at tackling other problems at the national level by introducing the use of
software as a tool for solutions, such as innovating software for flooding
notification. This is a government concession project.
To start with FPT, its central research body is called the FPT Technology
Research Institute. The institute is part of the private FPT University, to keep its
activities integrated with the higher educational system regarding IT studies. R&D
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activity is not new for FPT. Such activities had been conducted prior to the
institute’s establishment but within a division of the company and these activities
were still kept within the company after the institute was established. The
differences between R&D activities before and after the foundation of the institute
would be that before they were product oriented but today FPT’s R&D activities are
technology capacity oriented. RD2, in a senior position, stated:
We didn’t have a central research department in the FPT Company before, but we had
some research activities which started around in the divisions of the company, and these
activities are still maintained. So it’s independent from the central activities, but the
research activities in the divisions are more product-oriented, while the research here is
wider. It supports the technological strategies of the whole company of FPT, not just a
division. (Interview with author, RD2, 2010).
The Institute was founded in 2010 out of the pressure to grow. In the
interview, RD2 explained that after the successful establishment of the FPT’s
domestic outsourcing business (by connecting local IT-skill suppliers to global IT
demands) this business faced pressure to grow both internationally and domestically.
However, he did not experience this pressure to grow in terms of an increase in the
scope of production. Rather, he believed that increasing FPT’s technology capacities
would sustainably tackle these pressures, whether they were external or internal. He
described this point:
FPT so far has been a successful company but its success relies mainly upon the trading
of low level manufactures such as outsourcing software, testing etc [...] but to go
outside Vietnam and to compete with the international market we must transform
ourselves and we are in the process of transformation from a trading company to a
manufacturing and innovative technological company and to do that we have to have
the intellectual property which should give us some competitiveness in the technology.
[…] The purpose [of the institute’s establishment] so far is to increase the intellectual
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assets of the company […] we have pressure to grow in both the domestic market and
international markets. Our strategy is that in the next ten years we would confirm
ourselves as a leading IT company in Vietnam and to do so it has to have technology
and some assets that are not visible but invisible assets [from a further conversation an
‘invisible asset’ refer to knowledge]. (Interview with author, RD2, 2010).
Since the demand for Vietnam’s local technology capacities in the software
sector is for primitive level work (as the sector consists to a great deal of
outsourcing work for foreign markets), the need for high technologies domestically
has been relatively low. Thus according to RD2, domestic demand needs to increase
to allow companies to move into higher skilled production. This logic underlines the
institute’s R&D trajectories.
If the state’s cooperation with FPT during the domestic industry-building
period is an expression of nationalism in high-technological industrial development,
FPT’s technology-upgrading approaches still contain a high degree of this same
sense of nationalism. The upgrade in FPT’s technological capacities affects more
than the FPT’s or the domestic IT industry’s intellectual assets; it also affects the
state’s abilities to modernize the country. This is obvious in two areas which are
associated with FPT’s R&D activities: the use of innovations in software to handle
other non-technology issues at a national level and cooperation with the university.
In these two senses, FPT completes Vietnam’s national innovation system by acting
as a link between the other national actors in the system, as suggested by the Triple
Helix theory (discussed in Chapter 3: Literature Review), instead of waiting for the
state to do so as in the original National Innovation System theory. To illustrate this
argument further, the details of FPT’s R&D activities are examined in greater detail
below. Even though the details of these activities were obtained during the
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activities’ planning stages, which are at a very early stage in an innovation cycle,
they provide strong evidence of FPT’s R&D roles as a link in Vietnam’s national
innovation system.
FPT’s R&D activities were planned with a ratio of 70 per cent to be
consumed by FPT’s companies and 30 per cent to serve others in society. To start
with the former, information and communication technologies lie at the heart of the
institute’s R&D activities, followed by biomedical and satellite technologies:
[…] besides information and communication technology we plan to invest also on
biomedical like stem cell research and things like that and also space technology, like
satellites. We could have a station and we could have a data service and communication
services so those things in space technology we are interested in. We are interested also
in green technology, sustainable technology, because it is a trend of the century and we
don’t want to miss, or be outside of the wheel. (Interview with author, RD2, 2010).
Funding for 70 per cent of their activities has come from the FPT
Corporation; however another 30 per cent of their activities will be funded by the
government who will own the final innovations, but have hired FPT to implement
such innovations. RD2 provided further information on FPT’s joint research with the
government, firstly, on an air force project, and secondly, on a project on simulating
the flooding situation in central Vietnam. In this respect, there are clear signs of the
cooperative state, as the government increases the demands on domestic IT R&D
activities by either proposing initiating joint projects, as in the case of FPT and the
air force project, or by enabling R&D firms to propose projects to be funded.
Moving on, RD2 provided examples of occasions when the FPT Technology
Research Institute acted as a link between various actors in the national innovation
system. FPT’s research was governed by the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MOST) and the company also worked closely with other government bodies in
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R&D activities, such as the Institute of Information Technology under the umbrella
of Vietnam’s Agency of Science and Technology (VISIT), which is part of MOST.
In terms of academic research collaboration, FPT also works with local academics
on Vietnamese-Japanese language translation software that aims to pair the two
languages together and database the pairs. These two examples illustrate well the
FPT Technology Research Institute’s role as a link between academic research
institutes, government research institutes, private/public funding organizations and
the private technology industry in Vietnam’s national innovation system.
5.3.2 A Technology-Upgrading Approach: Increasing the Scale of the
Outsourcing Industry
With regard to a technology-upgrading approach that aims at an upgrade in the scale
of production, the nature of the outsourcing business is such that it is already about a
scale of production, where the quantity of outcomes a priority before quality. This is
not to say that the outsourcing industry does not care about the quality of their work,
but most outsourcing in Vietnam begins with lower skill jobs. Tuan Phi Ahn (Chair
of HCA) mentioned during an interview that the majority of outsourcing firms are
on a foundational level in the outsourcing value chain. They perform tasks such as
data input, testing and developing components. A few firms are on a higher level
conducting business analysis and business consultancy (interview with author, Tuan
Phi Ahn, 2011). Vietnamese outsourcing competitiveness initially offers a number
of heads rather than intellectual assets, thus any upgrade in this sense is all about an
expansion in the scale of the business.
Considering this backdrop, technology venture capital serves as a prominent
financier to enable the technological upgrade of scale. The business nature of
technology venture capital requires unit measurements in the scale of innovation or
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technological production, especially venture capital that is foreign funded as
explained by Breznitz (2007). Breznitz argues that foreign-funded venture capitalists
aim to put firms on a stock exchange as a business objects so, they can be acquired
by an MNC (2007: 27). There are two technology venture capital funds in Vietnam
among fourteen other private commercial banks and venture capital funds in
Vietnam, and both of them are foreign-financed technology venture capital funds. 22
The first technology venture capital firm in Vietnam is IDG Venture Vietnam which
was established in 2004, followed by the establishment of DFJ Vinacapital in 2006.
Even though there are no official statements from the two stating that Breznitz’s
account is their business model, the funds were known among local IT professionals
for going public with foreign shares to aim at a larger scale of production. Tran
Cong Tuong from VINASA agreed on this point when I asked him about the roles of
technology venture capital as a financier for the software industry:
I tell you, I’m working with many companies who received budgets from VCs. The
only message the business owners can keep in their head is ‘burn’! They said the faster
we can burn our money, the more we will get.[…] They spend on investment, for
example, the simple application they need for a server maybe 10 machines or 100
machines, they can actually buy 200 or 400. This is the way to burn. The way to burn is
to do PR. When they sell the company shares to the public, all of them are targeting
IPOs and to get money back from initial public offerings (IPOs) not from sustainable
model. (Interview with author, Tran Cong Tuong, 2010).
Technology venture capital in Vietnam has a strong bond with the IT
industry in general via several linkages. One of these two ventures is led by an IT
veteran, Than Trong Phuc, who is a managing director of DFJ Vinacapital with a
22 Source: http://www.amchamvietnam.com/?id=479, AmCham Member Banks and Venture Capital Firms in
Vietnam - Financing Development, Accessed 22 March, 2012.
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formal fundamental role in Intel’s Vietnam USD 1 billion chip testing facility23.
Both IDG’s and DFJ’s portfolios have a bigger presence on the Internet and in
digital content than other Vietnamese venture Capital Funds. DFJ is part of the
Draper Fisher Jurvetson network (USA) with vital experience in technological
turning points. The DFJ parent company was behind the success of Skype and
Hotmail. There are also empirical ties between the two venture funds and the growth
of the domestic outsourcing sector, as DFJ publicly supports the India-plus-one
model of Vietnam’s IT outsourcing (DFJ (n.d.)).
With regard to their roles in the development of domestic Internet space and
digital content in Vietnam, the portions between the numbers of venture capital
funded Internet space and digital content companies are compared with other
venture funded companies in Table 5.1.
23 He was also selected as one of the top ten IT persons of the decade (2000-2009) for his role in locally
establishing an Intel assembly facility in the HCMC hi-tech park (the ranking was made by the co-operative of
IT journalists from over 30 newspapers, including the Post Newspaper under the Ministry of Information and
Communications (PV November 16, 2010)).
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Table 5.1 Domestic firms funded by domestic technology venture capitals by
sectors (numbers of firms)
Tech-VCs
IT Industries
Other
Industries
Total
Internet
Space and
Digital
Content
Other IT
Sectors
DFJ
Vinacapital
5 - 2 7
IDG Venture 32 7 2 42
Total 37 7 4 49
Source: Author's compilation: from DFJ Vinacapital. Portfolio official site (Accessed 11 February 2012) and IDG
Venture Capital official site (Accessed 11 February 2012)
From Table 5.1 it is obvious that most companies funded by the local
technology venture capital funds are in the digital content industry. This can be
analysed as arising from two different directions: digitalisation of non-digital
businesses increases the size of the digital industry and local venture funds capitals
digitalise the domestic economy.
In terms of the role of technology venture capital and the outsourcing
business, despite the statistical analysis from Table 5.1 indicating the unpromising
linkage between the funds and the outsourcing business when compared with the
digital content business, outsourcing still attracts significant local technology
venture capital, as evidenced in fieldwork findings and several reports. There are a
few cases that suggest two major routes by which the pioneers of outsourcing firms
entered at the very beginning: the technocratic Viet Kieu, especially those from the
USA with an empirical network extending from Silicon Valley; and local firms with
international links to traditional international donors, such as Japan. Than Trong
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Phuc, DFJ-Vinacapital manager director who is also a Viet Kieu with an industrial
connection to Silicon Valley, displays support for upgrading local outsourcing
companies towards a larger scale. In interview, Than Tround Phuc mentioned that
despite the trend of many local outsourcing pioneers turning to the higher-skilled
business of innovation, the domestic outsourcing sector still has a huge opportunity
to grow to a larger scale on the international market. This refers to the India-Plus-
One model:
I don’t know what Thailand has, but one thing that Vietnam has is software
outsourcing…and the software outsourcing is set up by Viet Kieu who come back to set
up software outsourcing so that piece is going nicely. It’s not where India is, it’s not
where it needs to be yet. But it’s going and my goal is to help it becomes an India-Plus-
One, for companies world-wide. India-Plus-One means if you don’t go to India where
else you go to get software done? So India-Plus-One means Vietnam. (Interview with
author, Tran Trong Phuc, 2010).
The India-Plus-One model (IPO) mentioned by Tran Trong Phuc is novel in
the business word. IPO is risk diversification strategies for the demand sites and
marketing strategies for the supply sites (Enderwick 2011: 85). The model came
from India as a famous investment destination with a relatively cheap labour cost for
multinational companies in outsourcing businesses. However relying solely on India
as a production site is risky, in addition to increasing labour costs in India. This has
resulted in MNC investment in other sites with lower labour costs in nearby
locations, with popular choices being Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam
(Enderwick 2011: 85-88; HSBC 2008). As many can tell, the India-Plus-One model
operates on the same principles as the China-Plus-One, just specifically for
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outsourcing business. Furthermore, in order to technologically upgrade in the scale
of production, another competitive advantage that Vietnam offers is its cheap skilled
labour in this business. There was no single set of comparative international
statistics on labour costs in the IT industry. Therefore, I compared the average
annual wages of IT workers in USD between Vietnam and the USA in 2010.
In Vietnam, IT occupations (covering those who are employed in hardware,
software and digital content) receive 4,073 USD per year on average (MIC 2001:
27). In comparison, workers in IT occupations in the USA (under the category of
computer and mathematical occupations) earn 77,230 USD per year on average
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, the USA 2010).
However, it has to be noted that even though the statistics mentioned here
derive from the same type of occupation – computer and related – the jobs in
Vietnam are not as advanced. There are many more research and scientists jobs
included in the U.S. statistics. However, the comparative statistics are still worth
mentioning here as they show the cost incentives that Vietnam’s IT industry can
offer and that make Vietnam industrially competitive, especially in the global IT
outsourcing business.
Nonetheless, having a cooperative state that works together with financial
resources from domestic technology venture capital is not always a guarantee of a
successful technology-upgrading story. The cooperative state has its limitations.
5.3.3 Limitations of the Cooperative State
The proposed cooperative state has certain limits. These limitations are highly
political, involving the intentions of the state behinds its cooperative involvement
with outsourcing business. The limitation arises from the interplay between two
main factors: firstly, the political ideology that appears in the state’s control over
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finance; and secondly, the domestic market domination by giant outsourcing firms
that prospered from the foundation of the cooperative state (these firms are often the
pioneers of Vietnam’s IT entrepreneurial class). These limitations of the
cooperative state are also a sign of counter-developmentalism in which – in this
context – the state’s cooperative developmentalism undermines the long-term
development of the domestic software outsourcing business.
This counter-developmentalism of the cooperative state is captured in the
case study of a technology-upgrading in scale approach of a Vietnamese-based IT
outsourcing consortium: ITCon. ITCon emerged under pressure caused by the
success of FPT. In other words, FPT as an industrial champion served the purpose of
industrial promotion at the threshold of the global market. Later on this posed
difficulties for domestic outsourcing companies who wished to grow their
businesses further after an international introductory phase. It was the size of market
share that FPT acquired at that time that acted as a barrier to the growth of other
small outsourcing firms. ITCon grew out of the realisation by several Vietnamese IT
outsourcing firms that their inability to secure large contracts from foreign
customers was inhibiting their ability to grow their businesses. IC1 (interview with
author, IC1, 2010) ITCon’s chief financial officer, stated during an interview that a
number of the members and potential members of ITCon had started their business
at about the same time as FPT, the largest IT outsourcing firm in Vietnam; however,
at time of interview FPT had over around 1,500 software engineers it could offer to
its foreign customers whereas almost all other Vietnamese IT outsourcing firms had
far fewer, somewhere between 50 to 350 engineers. This discrepancy enabled FPT
to secure the lion’s share of the software outsourcing business with large foreign
corporations. One of the reasons for the growth of FPT and the relative stagnation of
the other local IT outsourcing firms was that FPT had, from the beginning, other
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sources of revenue, including a dominant position in the mobile phone distribution
market. These other revenue sources allowed FPT to hire software engineers without
having to immediately place them on contract. FPT was then able to approach
foreign customers with a large pool of qualified engineers.
In contrast, most of the other local IT outsourcing firms had been unable to
hire a large number of engineers without the assurance of placing them on contracts,
as they did not have revenue from other sources to cushion cash flow hits.
Therefore, these firms’ revenues and professional staffs grew and shrank with the
rise and fall of business on hand, leaving the large contract market to FPT alone,
with just a few exceptions (e.g. TMAs and Global Cybersoft). These smaller firms
then saw that by merging with a number of their local counterparts, they could reach
the necessary critical mass of approximately 1500 software engineers to compete for
these larger contracts (interview with author, IC1, 2010). However, merging the
other non-FPT firms together created some challenges. First of all, the main aim of
the ITCon consortium was that it was to integrate and merge Vietnamese software
outsourcing and regional telecom systems and then take the merged company public
on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HoSE). To do so required a sufficient level of
revenue and profits to qualify as an initial public offering on HoSE. A decision was
made to invite a number of foreign telecom solutions providers into the ITCon
consortium. These companies were based in South Korea, Malaysia and China,
according to IC1.
This was the force behind the formation of ITCon, which can be seen in the
context of a technology-upgrading as a collective approach to upgrade the scale of
outsourcing firms’ technological capacities. Nonetheless, the cooperative state has
limitations. The limit appears to be due to the monetary regulations which act as a
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huge policy hurdle for the technological upgrade in scale of Vietnam’s outsourcing
business.
The ITCon capital controls case can be explained as part of the state’s
centralised financial structure. As an important foundation of the transition from a
planned to market economy, Vietnam’s financial sector has undergone reform since
1988. Lying at the heart of the financial sector the banking system. Vietnam had
adopted the banking system based on the command economy ideology, in which the
main engine of the economy is state-owned enterprises. Thus, and in contrast to the
market economy, financial resources – which were mainly state budgeted – were
allocated to state activities through the state-owned enterprises rather than other
forms of business or via the market’s needs for profits (Nguyen Dinh Tai 1995: 3-4).
The initial phase in reform resulted in the on-going transformation of the
monobanking system into a two-tiered banking system.24 The second phase of
reform came after 1990, with the establishment of a banking system that was more
market oriented, including non-state joint-stock banks, joint-venture banks and the
local presence of foreign banks (Nguyen-Xuan Nghia 2005: 200).
Despite undergoing reforms toward a market economy with a positive
growth rate of the banking sector, the financial system in Vietnam is still largely
characterised as far from market-oriented. 25 Secondary analyses on this topic can
combine with this research’s findings about the impacts of Vietnam’s financial
system on the development of the domestic IT industry. First of all, not only the case
24 The two-tiered banking system consists of the first State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), with primary responsibility
for central banking both on a daily-banking basis and for the plan to reform the financial sector. The second tier
of this system is four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) (Kovsted, Rand, and Trap 2005: 79, Nguyen-
Xuan Nghia 2005: 200, Ratliff 2008: 36).
25 A few reports suggest the growth rate was a result of the reforms. Nguyen-Xuan Nghia (2005: 200) reports
the doubling rate of total bank deposits as a share of GDP during the period of 1990-2000, continuing with 20
per cent annually growth rate of the sector during the period of 2001-2008 (Ratliff 2008: 37).
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of ITCon, but also in the development of a domestic digital content industry, e-
commerce has faced difficulty in growing locally due to the reason that Vietnam is
still considered a cash-based society. Cash is commonly kept in households rather
than securely deposited at the banks; having a bank account is not common, and
neither is the use of credit cards as a means for exchange (interview with author,
Than Trong Phuc, 2010; Ratliff 2008: 37). The paucity of credit cards in Vietnam is
a serious obstacle to the development of e-transactions. Tran Ngoc Ca (2005)
characterises the impact of the Vietnamese state and its industrial policy mechanism
on the development of the domestic e-commerce as being contradictory. For Tran
Ngoc Ca, supportive interventions from the state come in the form of the state trying
to manage economic elements rather than creating a beneficial e-commerce
environment; thus the state’s role in e-commerce development is characterised
through its controlling industrial policies as a restrictive rather a supportive state
(2005: 75). This issue has pushed this research to further investigates how the lack
of a restrictive financial legal framework and an e-transaction platform affect and
determine the way that a domestic virtual economy grows and connects to the global
one. Tran Ngoc Ca’s analytical account also supports the proposed concept of
counter-developmentalism, when the state appears to strongly support a particular
economic trajectory, but not necessarily always in a cooperative way with finance.
Secondly, the lack of formal commercially oriented funds in the NIS
highlights the performance of other formal financial sources in the NIS. Fieldwork
evidence suggests a more visible industry funded role for technology venture capital
as a formal source of funding for the IT industry compare to others. However, the
interests of technology venture capital do not always cover all domestic financial
demands for conducting technology-upgrading processes, as in the case of ITCon.
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Lastly, the growth of Vietnamese IT firms at a global level is obstructed by
the restrictions upon local banking. In spite of long-term sectoral reform into a
market-oriented base, there are still strong residues of state-control in the banking
system which restrict financial mobilisation in favour of business operations, as in
the case of ITCon. Investigating further (by hiring an investment bank and law
firms) ITCon found that, if they were to make an overseas investment, they would
have to keep the investment under the equivalent of USD 300,000. Investments up
to this amount only require the approval of the Ministry of Planning and Investment
and the State Bank of Vietnam. Any investments above and beyond that amount
would require multiple ministry approvals and so very few if any had been applied
for or granted, said IC1. The problem with capital mobility is a two-way dilemma;
firstly to take money out of the country, then to bring money back. Vietnamese
multinationals are required by law to repatriate any profits made overseas back to
Vietnam every 6 months. Even though the law allows businesses to extend such
repatriation up to a year or 18 months, it is still very hard to do business and let it
grow under such conditions, IC1 argues. Ratliff (2008: 37) explains ITCon’s
experience of this as international specialists in an account in which he divides the
reform into two characteristics: international standards legislation and traditional
communist implementation which retains the traditional practices of Vietnam’s
financial system despite reform.
Eventually ITCon ceased to exist as Vietnam’s financial structure, with a
high degree of state control, greatly limited the cooperative state with regards to
technology-upgrading approaches for the domestic outsourcing businesses. Even
though the state can be very cooperative, as seen by the way the representatives of
Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) listened attentively to ITCon’s
lobbyists arguing its case in the forums they sponsored, IC1 told me they generally
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received sympathetic responses but no assurances of action.26 Carroll summed up
ITCon’s experience that MIC is certainly an important ministry in the development
of the domestic IT industry, but decisions regarding the acquisitions and ownership
structure of ITCon were beyond the MIC’s control. In summary, the way of doing
business in Vietnam did not create a sufficiently smooth capital flow to ITCon. Even
though the government did not give the consortium a big ‘no’, ITCon started to lose
momentum, and sadly ultimately became non-viable.
The case study of ITCon in conjunction with the secondary literature
discussion of Vietnam’s financial structures and their contradictions were reviewed
in this section to outline the counter-developmental traces behind the front of the
Vietnamese state’s cooperative developmentalism.
5.3.4 The Return of the Viet Kieu
One natural characteristic of outsourcing businesses is the international connection
of human resources through particular production lines. The legacy of the Vietnam
War fits well with the nature of outsourcing businesses regarding human resources
because it builds on an already established international connection: the IT Viet
Kieu.
Outsourcing firms owned by Viet Kieu did not go through the same route as
the firms behind the establishment of VINASA in terms of finding work from the
external market, yet they have the same cooperative state on their side. Despite the
brain-drain issue that Vietnam has faced, remittances from Viet Kieu have been
welcomed by the state as a source of economic and intellectual advantage. The
‘bring the Viet back home’ motto, together with the global IT connections of the
26 These were forums where MIC listened to the concerns and problems of the software industry (Interview
with author, IC1, 2010).
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Viet Kieu all over the world (especially those who have been embedded in the US
IT industry) fit well with the state’s aspirations for the country’s industrialisation
and modernisation, hence obtaining the Vietnamese state’s intercession since the
very early stage of the domestic IT industrial building in a cooperative way.
TMA Solutions (TMAs) is a good example of this. TMAs started from an
outsourcing business with a good connection with the west. Established in 1997,
when Nguyen Huu Le returned to Vietnam after having been educated and working
overseas, he returned with some job offers from North American companies
(interview with author, Nguyen Huu Le, 2010). TMAs is fully privately owned, but
often cooperates with the state as an IT expert as well as representing the local
outsourcing industry at the international level in various capacities. TMAs nowadays
is not only the pioneer and one of the most internationally well-known of Vietnam’s
outsourcing firms, it has also commenced R&D activities since 2010 (interview with
author, Nguyen Huu Le, 2010).
If the industrial prosperity of FPT shines in a collective manner through
VINASA, TMAs’ success shines through the Ho Chi Minh City Computer
Association (HCA). Tuan Phi Ahn, a Director of HCA, mentioned that TMA is a
case study for HCA to promote international business practices in global IT
outsourcing (personal communication, Tuan Phi Anh, 2011). Le refers to this set of
skills as a ‘soft skill’ (personal communication, Nguyen Huu Le, 2010). This
strongly echoes the ‘select-a-champion’ method that once drove the East Asian
developmental state, with the difference that the champion is not just being
promoted by the state but also by an industrial consortium.
Another collective industrial agency for the Viet Kieu with IT occupations to
connect the domestic outsourcing business with the global market (apart from purely
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having Viet Kieu return home and establish IT firms) is an out-sourcing portal. Tim
Vo worked for the company MacAfee from its U.S. site. Vo is one of those Viet
Kieu who try to promote their homeland in their current state of residence. He
created the ‘Vietnam Outsourcing Portal’ which offers comprehensive details about
Vietnam’s outsourcing businesses.27 Prior to the construction of this site, Vo paid a
visit to Vietnam to have a closer look at the industry himself, and he had a chance to
meet with government officials as well as other local firms – some of which he
already knew from this circle of work in the USA- to discuss the idea of his portal
(interview with author, Tim Vo, 2010).
The ‘select champions method’ has not yet completely died, despite the
argument that the volatile nature of product life in the IT industry no longer allows
the approach to be practicable. This argument has proved to be very valid especially
in the IT industry; however, there is an exception. Considering sector-specific
characteristics, the ‘select champions’ method works well with Vietnam’s
outsourcing sector at its infant stage. The cooperative role of the Vietnamese state
mirrors the method in Vietnam’s outsourcing industry. Even though the state does
not select the champion directly, by being cooperative the state indirectly picks
winners in terms of those with whom the state particularly chooses to cooperate. The
case studies in this chapter that support this argument are VINASA as the state’s
‘little helper,’ and the Viet Kieu. The limitations/challenges at the beginning of the
industry’s foundation and establishment restrict the local demand for work while the
number of suppliers exceeds demand: hence seeking out external demand is
essential. This is especially the case with the type of business that will bring higher
profits than having local clients, since they get paid in a strong foreign currency.
27 For more details visit http://www.vietnamoutsourcing.org/
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To sum up this section, Vietnam’s outsourcing business has been a
fundamental constitutive element not only in the structure of Vietnam’s IT industry,
but also domestic local IT industry consortiums: This means the outsourcing
business has a lot of power in the policy lobby and financial support. Such a
backdrop determines the path along which technology-upgrading processes of
Vietnam’s outsourcing business progress.
5.4. Conclusion
This chapter offers an analysis of the cooperative state, which is the state that
arose from the perpendicular technology-upgrading approach in Vietnam’s
outsourcing industry. The outsourcing industry consists of many pioneer businesses
that started at the very beginning of Vietnam’s IT industry. Because it is well-
established the outsourcing business has gained some connections with the state and,
consequently, was given access to decision-making procedures, in the form of
helping the state to draft Directive 58. Outsourcing entrepreneurs also continue to
cooperate with the state in the implementation of Directive 58 and give feedback to
the state. This cooperation between the outsourcing entrepreneurs and the
government of Vietnam exemplifies the cooperative characteristics of the
Vietnamese state economic developmentalism in the IT industry.
In terms of the technology-upgrading approach of software outsourcing
business discussed in this chapter, the model was conceptualised from the inward
direction taken by technological upgrade in Vietnam’s software outsourcing
business. In more detail, the process of upgrade started from global software
business inwardly came into Vietnam’s software outsourcing industry like a
perpendicular shape. The technological opportunity and essential knowledge for
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technological upgrade started to flow from the global software market into
Vietnam’s software outsourcing business without having any solid base in Vietnam.
The reason for this is that at the time Vietnam’s IT entrepreneurial pioneers sought
global outsourcing demand, there were few traces of domestic software demand and
the domestic IT industry was at the liquid stage, the direction of technological
upgrade in this model is in a perpendicular way from the global market into
Vietnam’s local IT industry. The connection with the global IT market through
software outsourcing business acted as an arrow helping Vietnam’s IT entrepreneurs
to break the barriers of minimal domestic IT demands, and got connected with
global sources of demand and skill suppliers to upgrade the skill of local workers.
This is the first step, where knowledge and essential skills started to accumulate, that
enabled technological upgrade to happen in Vietnam’s outsourcing sector. Against
this backdrop, technological upgrading in this chapter is conceptualised as a
perpendicular model.
There is no specific technical feature of IT that shapes the cooperative state
in the outsourcing business. Nonetheless, this does not mean the cooperative state
worked independently from the hierarchy of newly emerged information
technologies; this is because the outsourcing industry is not dependent upon
particular technologies; in other words, the outsourcing business is not a technology-
production industry but it is a technology-servicing business, even though the
services are provided for technology-production purposes.
The outsourcing business in Vietnam has many elements that qualify them to
be core artefacts in the hierarchy of emerging information technologies. The human
resources model of the business is employee-centric, the distribution and
monetisation is by-distributors-for-users with a strong dependence on formal capital
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accumulation, and the economic competitiveness of the industry is more
straightforwardly obvious and is recognised by many economic performers as well
as the state. Moreover, the knowledge employed for technological upgrade in the
business is private-owned, thus the consumer relation between the business and
users is in the black-box mode.
The technologies involved in Vietnam’s outsourcing business are also
perceived by the state to be core artefacts. One of the main reasons for this is that the
nature of the outsourcing business requires institutional support from the state. For
example, institutionalisation is required in the form of a trade agreement between
Vietnam and its outsourcing partners that allows Vietnam to do business with them,
or an adjustment of the state’s monetary rules to comply with international monetary
practices so as to allow the payment for outsourcing jobs to be paid to Vietnamese
citizens.
The Vietnamese state retains its cooperative developmentalism with regard
to the sector’s broad scope of technological upgrading. Nonetheless, when it comes
to the sector’s technological upgrading in scale, the cooperative state proves to have
the structure of a counter-developmental state that dwells behind the disguise of a
cooperative state. This disguised counter-developmentalism occurs when the
cooperative state appears to pose a huge limitation to the domestic outsourcing
business when it comes to the stage of technology upgrade in scale in this business.
The limitation is deeply embedded in the state’s monetary structure, which works to
undermine the technology-upgrading processes of outsourcing firms.
Now we shall turn our attentions to the next research findings, concerning
the technocratic state and Cloud Computing technology.
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Chapter 6
The Cloud, the iDragon, and the Technocratic State
6.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses a top-down model of technology upgrading used for Cloud
Computing (Figure 4.1: Four Models of Technology-Upgrading Process). The
Vietnamese state’s roles associated with this model are characterised as being
technocratic, so the technocratic state is characterised through the Vietnamese
state’s R&D activities in Cloud Computing. The state is technocratic because it
conducts R&D activities by itself through a newly established industrial research
institution known as the National Institute of Software and Digital Content Industry
(NISCI). NISCI acts as the state’s IT industrial researcher and conducts R&D
activities in response to the needs of Vietnam’s local software and digital content
industry. NISCI is the state’s first R&D institution that is industrially oriented.
Cloud Computing was selected by NISCI for two reasons, as revealed by
NISCI staff in interviews. The first reason is technological: that Cloud Computing is
an up and coming technology in the global technology market. Because the Cloud
can be tailored according to users’ requirements, Cloud technology transforms
users’ computing experiences by giving them a utility technology, which is a
technology that is highly user-oriented. Moreover, the Cloud is a technology that
reduces visible computing infrastructures in many respects. For example, a Cloud’s
database service can allow users to input information into the Cloud and then the
database can be configured from the Cloud side with minimal physical installation
from the user side. This also means Cloud providers, not the state, can centralise
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data management of the Cloud users, which has raised concerns with the
Vietnamese state. This concern is mirrored in NISCI’s second reason for its
technological choice of Cloud computing: the Cloud decentralises the state’s control
over the management of national information. These two reasons together mean that
the state works in a technocratic manner and is conducting R&D activities to make
the state a Cloud provider in Vietnam.
NISCI’s Cloud services are a result of a top-down approach of technological
upgrading. For NISCI, innovations in Cloud Computing are conducted through
highly institutionalised knowledge and modes of innovation. This means the Cloud
falls into the core category in the hierarchy of emerging information technologies.
Being in a core category, along with the two reasons mentioned in the previous
paragraph, means the Cloud is considered by the state to be more prestigious than
those technologies from peripheral categories.
This chapter will commence with a short introduction of Cloud Computing,
which contains some technical details for non-IT professional readers. The chapter
then will examine the local situation of Cloud Computing in Vietnam. In the third
section, the chapter will examine the relation between the top-down model of the
technology-upgrading process of the Cloud and the characterisation of the
Vietnamese state as technocratic. Additionally, the chapter will discuss the interplay
between the social shaping of technology and the technological shaping of society.
6.2 What is the Cloud? A Short Introduction
Cloud Computing is a new way to deliver and consume computing
experiences across several aspects (including server, data storage, and software
services such as configuration, backing up, and updating) that can be managed from
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the service-provider side (the Cloud), rather than from the client side, as has been
the conventional practice. Most IT workers and IT-related scholars inharmoniously
define this with the term ‘Cloud Computing’ (Kuyucu 2011: 1; Weinhardt et al.
2009: 36; Buyya et al. 2009: 4) but there is some contention over what the term
actually defines. There are several explanations for this contention in terminology:
Vaquero (2009: 50) posits that Cloud Computing is composed of a handful of
already existing technologies which makes it hard to define, while Kuyucu (2011:1)
notes that contention around the concept of Cloud computing implies unexplored
areas for further researching opportunities that have been raised by the Cloud.
Kushida et al. (2011: 211) suggests that disagreement over the definition arises from
the overmarketing of firms that include other non-Cloud Computing services.
However, this chapter does not propose any further definition or attempt to contest
the meaning of Cloud Computing. The most commonly accepted definition of the
Cloud is provided here just in order to portray the playing field in which high-tech
policies, economic competitiveness and the technology-upgrading approach interact
for the development and adoption of the Cloud. IT technologies are moving at an
incredible pace and only time will tell which facets can be included in the most up-
to-date definition; therefore technologies that are not counted as the Cloud today
might be a significant feature of Cloud technology in the future.
The definitions of Cloud Computing provided by the U.S. National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) and IBM Corporate appear to be solid for two
reasons. In the first case, NIST is the R&D unit providing technological standards
under the Department of Commerce of the U.S., which is the home of many global
Cloud Players. In the second case, IBM is working closely with Vietnam’s R&D
agency to develop Vietnam’s public Cloud Computing and the corporation also has
its Cloud Centre locally in Vietnam. In other words, NISCI emphasizes the technical
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details of the Cloud, while IBM emphasises the impact of the Cloud. For NIST
(2011: 2):
Cloud Computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. network, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction.
IBM puts forward the following:
Cloud computing is a new model of consuming and delivering IT and business services.
It enables users to get what they need, as they need it - from advanced analytic and
business applications to IT infrastructure and platform services, including virtual servers
and storage”. The chapter will discuss the novel technical points and economy of Cloud
Computing based on these two definitions. (IBM (n.d.)).
The novelty of the Cloud is that it makes the computing experience more
virtual, and this is a central reason why Cloud Computing has been referred to as a
transformative technology (Yoo 2011: 17). So far there are three types of Cloud
service models: Software-as-a-Service (SaaS); Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS); and
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). Cloud users can now enjoy new software without
having it installed on the company’s PCs. This means that if something goes wrong
with the software or it needs to be updated, there is no need for engineers to come in
and perform those tasks on a company’s PCs, as these can be done from the Cloud
providers’ side. Another popular use of the Cloud is as a server to store data: with
Cloud Computing, the server is no longer operated at a local level on users’
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machines because the server now is on the Cloud. The Cloud provider carries out all
the computing required and delivers the server service to the Cloud users.
Furthermore, the Cloud is a made-to-order technology that can be tailored to meet
the size and capacity requirements to suit any individual user. This helps small
enterprises to reduce unnecessary computing spending costs and makes the Cloud
more affordable than traditional company computing. Perhaps the most crucial
aspect that makes Cloud Computing such a phenomenon is that, unlike other
traditional forms of computing, the Cloud users only require simple computing skills
to be able to employ cloud computing, as everything is carried out by the Cloud
provider.
Cloud computing has been named a key information technology for the years
2010 - 2011 by some academics (Luftman and Zaden 2011), but when did Cloud
Computing originate? Many learned about the Cloud for the first time back in 2006
when the commercial website Amazon publicised their famous Amazon Elastic
Computing Cloud (EC2).28 However, it is hard to tell when exactly Cloud
Computing first emerged mainly because of its nature as a resultant technology
employing a mixture of various existing technologies, such as the Web (Reese 2009,
cited in Roux 2011: 110). An account given by Kushida et al. 2011 confirms this
point:
Cloud Computing was not invented by any one architect - person or company. Today’s
Cloud offering emerged from the infrastructures created by the major providers for their
core business. (2011: 224).
28 The beta version
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Here it is made clear that Cloud Computing is a sort of enabling technology,
the type of technology which many might refer to as an incremental IT innovation
that arises from putting together different aspects of technologies.
6.3 Vietnam’s Cloud Computing Panorama
This section aims to examine the broad picture of the local Cloud situation in
Vietnam. It will map out key Cloud providers in Vietnam. This, in turn, will enable
relationships to come to light between global and local Cloud providers regarding
Cloud knowledge procurement, spillovers and technological aid (or a partnership).
By identifying the key actors in this business, the local Cloud market gap can be
described. This gap has led the state of Vietnam to be a technocratic state in a case
of inventing the Cloud.
Tracing back the very first point where the Cloud was adopted locally in
Vietnam is easier than pinpointing the first adoption on the Cloud-user side. Since
the nature of Cloud Computing is less geographically specific than traditional
computing (Kushida et al. 2011: 213) and since it is a package of several existing
technologies that are put together, it is hard to specify the exact time when
Vietnam's Cloud users first emerged. However, there are some sources that inform
us that Vietnam employed Cloud technology at the same time as the rest of the
world, if we consider the establishment of the two major local Cloud providers: the
iDragon project and IBM Cloud Lab. The idea of forming iDragon was initiated
back in 2006 (interview with author, RD3, 2010), which is the same year that
Amazon Elastic Cloud (EC2) launched its beta version. iDragon was officially
founded in 2008, the same year that IBM established its Cloud Lab in Vietnam, with
the lab officially opened in 2010.
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Not much needs to be said about a well-known and much familiar Cloud
provider like IBM; indeed, a description of IBM as a Cloud provider is beyond the
scope of this thesis, which focuses on Vietnam; however; iDragon needs further
explanation. iDragon is a Cloud project falling under the responsibility of the
National Institute of Software and Digital Content Industry (NISCI). NISCI is one of
thirteen units in the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC). NISCI
was established in 2007, under the Prime Minister’s Decision number No.
901/2007/QD-TTg, and became operational in 2008. The institute is authorised to be
a higher skilled software and digital content research and development body.29
NISCI acts as a government mechanism to enable the growing domestic software
and digital content industry to move up the IT value chain to be at a more advanced
technological level. These responsibilities are to be carried out via research and the
implementation of projects. Such projects are subject to increasing demands for
improving the local software and digital content industry (Vietnamnet 28 October
2008).
Vietnam’s domestic IT market appears to be a potential Cloud technology
market niche for the global Cloud providers, both in terms of being an unexploited
market and having great potential for on-going market growth. This opportunity
arises from several factors. First of all, Vietnam’s economy is a large-scale
developing IT adopter. High scores on two indicators of IT adoption – the Internet
and telecommunication penetration rates - have enabled Vietnam to have a large
pool of IT devices ready and available for adopting the Cloud. In addition, Vietnam
29 According to one of the Vietnamese government medias, Vietnamnet online newspaper, the duties of NISCI
are penned down as ‘[It will] carry out research projects and participate in the development and implementation
of strategies, policies, and developmental projects for highly-skilled personnel in the IT and communications
industries, and the development and transfer of technology in the production of software and other digital
products, as well as supplying a range of industry-relevant services.’ (Vietnamnet 28 October 2008).
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has impressive recent IT-adoption statistics with a total number of 126 million
telephone subscribers and around 3.7 million Internet broadband subscribers (MIC
2011a). Additionally other circumstantial factors make Vietnam stand out regionally
among its neighbours, such as cheap labour, political stability and an impressive on-
going rate of IT expenditure. For example, the IDC predicted an annual growth rate
of IT expenditure in Vietnam from 17.0 per cent in 2010 to 24.9p in 2011 (IDC
2011). There are other financial benefits in Vietnam that include lower costs for IT
infrastructure and state privileges for the IT industry, such as tax exemptions.
Kshetri (2010: 54) suggests that one of the reasons why global Cloud players such as
IBM are attracted to the developing world is because the latter can offer a cheaper
hosting service.
Furthermore, Vietnam has already established a foundation technology for
Cloud Computing to adopt. Cloud Computing can also be understood as a modern
version of a data centre technology; therefore, as Vietnam has an existing presence
within the data centre business sector, the investment of foreign companies in local
Cloud Computing has a higher chance of widespread adoption and less risk of
rejection by the local economy. There was definitely some established Vietnamese
demand regarding data centre and computing prior to the arrival of Cloud
Computing. IDC (2011) names a few of the leading local data centre providers, such
as Vinadata, Lacviet, Matboao, Viettel and FPT.
IBM states on their site that their Cloud Labs are located in every region
around the world, with the UK representing Europe, Silicon Valley the USA and
Brazil South America. Vietnam seems to be the only emerging South East Asian site
in terms of IT development compared with other advanced nations in the region
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such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. However, the factors above explain why
Vietnam was unsurprisingly chosen to be one of IBM’s ten global Cloud Labs.
With regards to relations between NISCI and other Cloud providers in
Vietnam, such relations mainly come in two distinguishable forms: a cooperative
and a competitive form. While the latter is discussed in this section, the former one
will be outlined later in the following Section 6.4: The Vietnamese Developmental
State as an IT Researcher. Domestic market competition between the state’s Cloud
provider, NISCI, and other local private Cloud providers is examined in the course
of their service models, as their competition can emerge from the same or different
models of Cloud services locally. Before going ahead with this discussion, it needs
to be noted that the information used for analyses in this chapter is from available
sources outside Vietnam at the time of writing. As the development of Cloud
Computing is fast moving, these sources might quickly be superseded. The
information used is limited to that made available to the public by online news
reports, online journals and online government documents. With careful selection
from trustworthy sources, and cross-examination, these pieces of information are
sufficient to provide an overview of Vietnam’s domestic cloud situation as the basis
for an analysis of competitive relations between the state and other private Cloud
providers.
To start the discussion with NISCI, NISCI’s Cloud activities are in the
technological area of a platform-as-a-service model (PaaS). Under NISCI, iDragon’s
Cloud solution is referred to as an ‘iDragon Cloud Platform’ which acts as an
enabling platform for Cloud users to connect to the Cloud (the data centre). The
platform comes on top of middleware –the Cloud PC or the Cloud Box (Hoang Le-
Minh 2011). The originality of the iDragon Cloud Platform comes from the
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disadvantages of other commonly used Cloud platforms such as Web2.0 and Virtual
Desktops (Le Minh 2011).
Regarding another major Cloud provider, IBM Corporate, the company has
its global Cloud Lab and a ‘High Performance on Demand Solutions’ presence
locally in Vietnam. The Cloud Lab was originally established back in 2008 under a
different title: the Cloud Computing Center. As IBM covers most areas of the Cloud
business (IaaS, PaaS and SaaS) and deployment models (public, private and hybrid),
the Cloud Lab is there in Vietnam to build a market based on Cloud demands
nationally. This foundation is built by consulting local business and government
with the aim of building an understanding of Cloud technology, as well as
developing Cloud solutions and planning to fit specific local demands (Tran Viet
Huan, interviewed by Strukhoff 2010).
There are also other Cloud providers in Vietnam. The research pays less
attention to them in contrast with IBM for several reasons. IBM is one of the global
pioneer Cloud providers, and therefore the presence of its Cloud Lab in Vietnam has
implications beyond the economic; IBM keeps Cloud-technology development in
Vietnam up-to-date with global developments. Additionally IBM’s Cloud Lab acts
as the state’s technology partner, as well as the state’s technology competitor, which
underlines this chapter’s analytical theme of the state as an IT researcher.
Furthermore, other local Cloud providers are mostly at an earlier stage of their
service development than IBM and NISCI. For example, IDC (2011) says that the
local giant IT company, FPT is still in its infancy in terms of developing Cloud
technology. It is also early days for both Microsoft’s Cloud in Vietnam which was
initiated at the end of 2011 jointly with FPT (DTiNews April 18, 2011) and Intel,
whose Cloud focus will be rolled out during 2012-2017 (2011).
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At this early stage, there are already a number of local Cloud adopters both
in the public and private sectors, for example, Vietnam Technology and
Telecommunications Joint Stock Company (VNTT) and Quang Trung Software
City. Both are IBM PaaS clients. Others are the clients of NISCI, such as the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) which has adopted a
Cloud solution along with other technology to handle the national disaster warning
system (MONRE 2011), and other local enterprises such as the Software Business
Incubator (SBT), Tan Binh Hotel and Vietnam National University (IDC 2011), who
can all be considered early local Cloud adopters.
6.4 The Vietnamese Developmental State as an IT Researcher
The case of Cloud development by iDragon under its parent organization, NISCI,
provides a case study of the state’s roles in IT research and innovation. With regard
to iDragon, the state does not intervene in high-tech industrial development by
exercising its intervention through its conventional impetuses such as regulations,
financial measures or other measures that encourage the technology procurement
and technology incubation of the domestic firms. Rather, the state directly integrates
as a researcher itself to nurture the domestic technological capacities of the nation.
As a researcher, the state is thus involved at a very early stage of technology
development: researching basic problems in science and technology; selecting
certain pieces of technology to work on; acquiring the necessary knowledge and
skills for the R&D process of selected projects, then obtaining funding and
equipment; followed by technology implementation and testing and eventually
diffusion.
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However, the establishment of the NISCI is not the first time in Vietnam’s
history that the Vietnamese state has intervened in technology development. I use
the term technology development instead of high-tech industrial development
because the former gives a broader sense of technology development for any
purpose rather than only an economic one. Prior to NISCI, there were other
institutions that expressed the IT researcher characteristic of the Vietnamese state.
The reason that the technocratic characteristic is captured in the workings of NISCI
is because, unlike any other previous state R&D institution, NISCI illustrates the
changing direction of Vietnam’s public R&D agencies from being state-oriented to
industry-oriented. With this point, this research further argues against the usual
portrait of the state’s R&D activities in Vietnam as a classic ‘Ivory Tower’ situation,
where the state fails to diffuse any research and innovation out of the laboratories to
society, as this caricature is only partly true. The diffusion of the state’s R&D
activities might appear to come from an ivory tower, but not because the state fails
to push the R&D outcomes to be adopted in society. Rather, the state’s R&D
agencies are set to carry out research for the state’s administration in various
industries, and thus technology diffusions happened at the state level rather than the
societal level. Accordingly, the whole experience of the state’s R&D activities is
unconnected to technological needs arising from society.
The argument can be further examined through a comparative-institutional
analysis of NISCI and the state’s traditional IT R&D entity: the Institute of
Information Technology (IOIT). On a timeline, IOIT should be placed before NISCI
to illustrate changing Vietnamese state R&D orientations over time. IOIT was
established in 1976 as part of the Vietnamese Academy of Science and Technology
(VAST). Over three and a half decades, IOIT has proved its position as a R&D
entity serving the state’s science and technology requirements. Having said that,
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however, the thesis does not suggest that IOIT as an R&D agency was set up solely
by the state and only for the state. IOIT’s R&D activities involved the state and
other actors. The same can be said for NISCI: no matter how much the institute is
industry-oriented and established for responding to growing demands of the
domestic digital content and software industry, at certain stages of NISCI’s R&D
activities there will always be an orientation towards the state’s science and
technology requirements. Nevertheless the two institutes illustrate a difference in the
approaches towards upgrading IT capacity employed by the state as a researcher. At
this point, the chapter posits its second argument that amongst the diversity of the
two institutes’ IT-upgrading approaches, there is a profound resemblance of
adherence to technological nationalism in both mentioned approaches, especially in
terms of the state’s choice of technology.
The research views IOIT as an impetus for ‘technologising’ the Vietnamese
state. The research uses the term ‘technologise’ to refer to four main R&D activities
carried out by IOIT at the state level: the implementation and application of any
algorithms for the state’s requirements; the state’s computerisation; its policy and
strategy consultations and its provision of IT studies through the national
educational sector. Furthermore, the research captures the IT researcher role of the
state through IOIT from three perspectives grounded in evidence: its functions; the
relations between its R&D directions and its achievements in terms of application
projects; and its administrative structure. IOIT functions as Vietnam’s primary R&D
entity that specialises in IT at two functional levels: the theoretical and application
levels. At the theoretical level, IOIT researches theoretical aspects of natural science
that comprise IT, such as informatics and mathematics; this includes learning
through international cooperation, then diffusing the knowledge gained through
IOIT’s roles of consultation and training. Regarding the application level, which is
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more industry related, IOIT also functions to research and develop IT applications
for the state’s bodies to deploy them in order to solve certain problems, management
issues and other requirements. Apart from the implementation and application of
state-level IT projects, IOIT also commercialises its R&D applications through
several channels such as IT implementation through an outsourcing contract with
Japan, the establishment of a NetNam Company in order to commercialise IOIT’s
inventions in small PCs and assistance to the state in promoting Internet adoption
(IOIT 2010). From these functions, it is reasonably clear that IOIT is a state
technological initiative with priorities to focus on building the state’s science and
technology capacities for the state’s administration as well as to increase the state’s
share of science and technology in the economy.
Moving on to the second analytical point concerning the relation between
IOIT’s R&D directions and its achievements, during the five-year period of 2006-
2010, IOIT focused on the theoretical aspects of key technologies and IT
applications for systems and management at the state level. IOIT underlines that the
institute’s R&D activities are concentrated in five areas: informatics; networking;
the theoretical foundation of IT; automation and control; and system and
management. This last direction is coordinated with achievements in what IOIT
refers to as ‘typical application projects’. These projects typically involve the
computerisation process and the implementation of information systems in the
state’s bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Education
and Training. Moving onto another of IOIT’s achievements, software as a main IT
product, strongly implies the idea of nationalisation, as IOIT’s common software
achievements are concentrated among localised versions of software such as
Vietnamese character recognition, and Vietnamese text-to-speech software.
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Regarding the final analytical point about IOIT’s place in the governmental
administrative structure as one of the institutes under VAST, IOIT has clearly been
passed down VAST’s main functions aiming at being the state’s leading science and
technology, both in terms of studying natural science for responding to the state’s
science and technology trajectory and consulting with the state for strategic planning
and policy making (VAST 2012). This inheritance is not a new issue in this
discussion. Nevertheless, analysing IOIT’s administrative structure will shed some
light on the route that IOIT has been taking to technologise the state as claimed,
despite having both state and non-state involvement. The relationship between the
state, IOIT, and the domestic IT industry is depicted through the interaction between
IOIT and a line of related ministries with regard to technology development,
including the MIC. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), which
controls the country’s science and technology trajectory as well as the government’s
science and technologies activities, steers the direction of IOIT’s R&D. The institute
plans its R&D activities accordingly. As has been emphasised throughout this
section in relation to IOIT’s functions, which mainly are state-orientated with some
minor industry-level projects, the institute interacts with the domestic IT industry by
giving advice from its expertise in IT to the MIC (Interview with author, RD1,
2010). At this point it can be seen that IOIT does not subject itself directly to the
dynamics of the domestic IT industry, but positions itself as an advisory body to the
Ministry who monitors the industry instead.
In contrast with IOIT, the establishment of NISCI was intended to focus
more heavily on industrial dynamics, as it was being managed directly by the MIC.
As mentioned earlier, the NISCI was set up to be a higher-skilled R&D agency
responding to the growing demand from the domestic software and digital content
industry, so the institute has more flexibility in its administrative structure than the
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IOIT. Instead of researching basic problems in informatics and within an ample
scope of research direction similar to IOIT, NISCI’s projects pinpoint specific pieces
of software and digital content technology. NISCI represents the Vietnamese state
as a researcher in three important aspects: obtaining foreign advanced knowledge
and skills; then processing the obtained knowledge and skills and, lastly, transferring
the processed knowledge and skills at a societal level.
In terms of obtaining foreign advanced knowledge and skills, NISCI obtains
them mainly from industrial experts at a global level in order to upgrade its
researchers’ technological capacities. It was reported back in 2008, at the time when
NISCI was first established, that NISCI first trained and transferred knowledge and
skills specifically about digital document imaging and digital information security
(such as wireless network security and digital information copyright security) from
foreign specialists in these areas within the US-based LaserFiche Company and the
Japan-based Trinity Security Systems Incorporated (T-SS) respectively (Tuoi Tre 31
October 2008). Obtaining this knowledge and skill from industry experts benefited
NISCI: it gained more than just the essence of the technology, as the experience of a
veteran of the global commercial industry regarding a specific piece of technology
was also transferred to NISCI.
The second step after obtaining the desired technological knowledge and
skills is to process them into different forms. NISCI offers to transfer the processed
knowledge and skills at three different levels: training, consultancy and
commercialising the end-users’ products or services to both domestic economy and
government bodies (Tuoi Tre 31 October 2008). Furthermore, as NISCI obtains
knowledge under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), after the knowledge is
processed by NISCI in association with its foreign partners, NISCI is a copyright
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holder as well as the foreign partners (MIC 2011b). This demonstrates that the
processed knowledge and skills by NISCI are transferred to both global and local
markets.
In order to be more specific here about relations between NISCI and Cloud
Computing, iDragon will be examined in more detail. iDragon is NISCI’s internal
project of researching and developing innovations in Cloud technology. The idea of
forming iDragon was initiated back in 2006, when Dr. Hoang Le-Ming, the director
of NISCI, approached RD3, who worked at that time in a private IT company in Ho
Chi Minh City, with the idea of researching Cloud Computing (interview with
author, RD3, 2010). They then submitted the research proposal on Cloud Computing
to the MIC. The iDragon project officially began two years later in 2008.
In order to obtain an essential set of knowledge and skills (for innovating
Cloud technology), iDragon would first need to have Cloud-related tangible and
intangible assets. With regard to the tangible assets, in the case of iDragon this
translates to Cloud-related infrastructure. As part of the MIC, NISCI received R&D
resources from MIC only in terms of the basic infrastructure, such as servers and
PCs. Additionally, more advanced and specific infrastructure came from foreign
partners. For example, a Cloud laboratory for testing a data centre was partially
supported by IBM. It was reported that IBM first became the Vietnamese
government’s Cloud Computing consultant prior to its local launch of the Cloud
Centre (Trang Anh November 27, 2010). Back in 2008, IBM with MOST
established locally the Vietnam Information for Science and Technology Advance
Innovation Portal (VIP). Even though the VIP did not specify only Cloud
Computing, the portal was based on Cloud technology which illustrates clearly the
position of Cloud technology in global technology trends at the time. The second
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collaboration between IBM and the Vietnamese government was directly within an
R&D unit of NISCI in 2010, when IBM assisted NISCI to construct the institute’s
Cloud Laboratory using IBM products and expertise in this area.
It is clear, then, that IBM provides iDragon with both tangible and intangible
assets to innovate in Cloud Computing. iDragon gains both infrastructure (the
laboratory) and the knowledge (IBM’s expertise in Cloud Computing) from IBM in
one instance. The same applies to financial support from foreign partners that come
with a string of knowledge and skill transfer and the commercial benefits of end-
user innovation attached. Considering financial support, iDragon and its foreign
partners are tied in a commercial way. As the iDragon is financed through a
Business Cooperated Contract (BCC) (interview with author, RD3, RD4, and RD5,
2010) and a MoU (MIC 2011b), the financiers at the knowledge and skills acquiring
stage will become co-opted copyright holders at the processed knowledge and skills
transfer stage. In an interview with iDragon’s senior position, RD3, he explained
how the Japanese partners benefit from collaborating with iDragon through a
geographical division of the final innovation's ownership. With the BCC, the
Japanese partners hold ownership in Japan, while NISCI has ownership to distribute
its Cloud solution in Vietnam’s market.30 This coincides with a report from MIC that
T-SS is a co-opted copyright holder of the coreless computer technology researched
and developed by NISC. With regard to this, NISCI acts as a mechanism to innovate
incrementally by taking inputs from its workforce and foreign partners. NISCI as an
institutional machine processes inputs using infrastructure and specific knowledge
provided externally, building upon the scientific and engineering knowledge of
30 Interestingly, there is the same market niche for iDragon's Cloud solution in Japan and Vietnam, considering
the fact that Vietnam is far behind Japan in many aspects of IT readiness.
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NISCI’s staff. The outcomes of this process are innovations that are
commercialized by both NICSI and its foreign partners.
This practice exemplifies how less technologically-advanced economy, such
as Vietnam, can manage to keep itself connected and up to date with global
technology trends, a global technology market and global technology financial
sources. It can also be seen that a mobilisation of cross-country financial sources
enables an economy that is catching up technologically to learn how to research and
develop cutting-edge and parallel technology through the global market, even if it
has limited domestic technology-financing sources to invest. Discussing Vietnam’s
domestic investment related to R&D circumstances which is still relatively rare,
RD3 outlined how difficult it was to resource a domestic financial investment for a
premier innovation institute such as NISCI:
RD3: [...] I think it's very difficult to cooperate from NISCI with the IT companies, very
difficult. Because you can't see how much income (profits) you can get. But you see, if
you have (the) ready product. […] And in Ho Chi Minh City they don't care a lot about
R&D, they would like to have a (finished) product.
Uer-Aree: (you mean) It's quick money, and you have many Viet Kieu return to Saigon
that are ready to take all the clients from the Silicon Valley here. And that is the purpose
of their work they are just there to test...to outsource
RD3, RD4, RD5: [nod in agreement] (Group interview with author: RD3, RD4, and
RD5 2010).
Furthermore, the cooperation through a BCC is suggestive of a technical
alteration in the state apparatus that creates technological change in the context of
Vietnam’s industrial policies. Through this contract, NISCI is automatically subject
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to the dynamics of the international and domestic IT market. The Japanese partners
would not invest in the iDragon if there was no market for the final products in
Japan. Moreover, conducting research on a novelty technology that is an expansion
of the notion of Cloud Computing technology is a market non-monopoly approach
in itself which is a new step forward in the Vietnamese R&D institutional context.
Additionally, a BCC is clearly a commercial approach to financing innovations.
Against the background of all of the discussions so far, the research asserts that
NISCI, as a state initiative, is clearly more flexible and has a greater level of
freedom than IOIT, based on its place within the state administrative structure, in
terms of finance and the laboratory.
This analytic institutional comparison between IOIT and NISCI has verified
the research arguments on the transformation of the Vietnamese state’s role as a
researcher from a state orientation towards an industrial orientation.
6.5 Debating the Chicken or the Egg? Evaluating the Cloud or the
Dragon?
According to the discussions so far in this chapter, the advancement of Cloud
Computing and the emergence of iDragon pose two significant questions for the
discourse on the state’s roles in high-tech development, specifically in the
technology-upgrading process: whether the roles of the state are shaped by the
advancement of technology (instrumentative) or the advancement of technology is
determined by the roles of the state (substantive).
Beginning this section with these two opposed perspectives is like viewing
technology from two different angles and as much as such a debate does not seem to
be realistic, it is a useful heuristic device. It does not seem to be realistic because we
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have advanced technologically to a point where we are used to the presence of
technologies in ubiquitous and pervasive ways. This blurs the line between the
active and passive interplay between technological advancement and the state’s
roles, especially in technology-developing economies. However, the questions are
realistic because in reality the roles of the state and the evolutionary advancement of
technology do interact in just such a diametrically opposed manner, just in different
phases, contexts and stages along the lines of technological change.
Additionally, depicting things using such polarised opposites helps to ground
the analysis in this section in two ways. First of all, the questions reflect a
conventional polarity-theme characterising how relations between the state and
high-tech industrial development are studied systematically. Industrial scholars have
analysed the experiences of historically technologically backward economies (both
in general or sector-specific senses) - particularly the East Asian Newly
Industrialised Countries - who managed to transform out of such backwardness
through the role of the active state, such as in the concept of the developmental state,
and its younger sibling, the neo-developmental state, and achieve recognition by the
global community for their success. Analysing industrial-technology development in
such a manner is looking only in one direction. Even though sectoral analysis exists
that advocates that the relationship between the state and technological development
is sector-specific, there is considerably more analysis of the state’s characteristics
and its apparatuses that shape different paths in technological achievement rather
than vice versa. In opposition to the view that the state has a determinant role in hi-
tech industrial development, the study of science and technology policy focuses on
the crucial implications posed by new types of technology, or by the further
advancement of already existing technologies that require reconsideration from
policy makers. Good examples of this body of work include those from whom this
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thesis has drawn earlier in this chapter in relation to Cloud technology (for example
Yoo 2011 and Kushida 2011).
This reflection on the conventional polarity characterising this field maps out
a gap that can be bridged in the study of state-industrial development relations. This
chapter argues that the state’s roles and the advancement of information technology
are reciprocal, to be given the same importance. Information technology is advanced
by a knowledge- advancement driven strategy on the one hand (a common example
of this is the evolutionary development of the computer and computer machines) and
by a socio-cultural driven strategy on the other hand (there are plenty of examples
for this, such as the case of Amazon’s EC2). Furthermore, this chapter contends that,
based on fieldwork findings, the technology upgrading carried out by the
Vietnamese state acted in both a technology-instrumental way, at the very first stage
when the Cloud was initially being recognised by the state for technology-
production purposes; and in a technology-substantial way, later on at a technology-
diffusion stage after the iDragon’s Cloud platform was implemented.
In relation to the Cloud as an instrumental technology for the Vietnamese
state, the gradual developmental process of the Cloud along with its increasing
global popularity was free of the Vietnamese state’s social influence. Even though
the Cloud had already been adopted locally by Vietnam’s domestic firms prior to the
announcement of iDragon, this did not contribute to the advancement of the Cloud
as a technology itself. The crucial point is that when NISCI first realised the
potential technological changes posed by Cloud technology, it was well aware of the
Cloud’s technological impact as well as possible socio-cultural and political
implications for Vietnam. All of these implications had later on shaped NISCI’s
decision to select the Cloud as its technology of choice. As NISCI is the state’s
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apparatus, its technological choice is also the Vietnamese state’s choice. At this
stage, the influences from the Cloud technology’s features determined the state’s
choice of technology in a deterministic way.
Nevertheless, I do not in any way put forward an argument based on
technological determinism to cover all the processes involved in technology
development. The point I am trying to communicate is rather how the features of
Cloud Computing were instrumental when the Vietnamese state first recognised its
determinant tendency. This is just one of the starting points in Vietnam’s IT
industrial development history where the notion of technological determinism is
applicable; however, Mackenzie and Wajcman et al. (1999) offer a series of
arguments about and evidence on how social contexts shape both the adoption and
the emergence of technologies. In one of their editorial works, Kline and Pinch
(1999), question whether applying the logic of technological determinism to the
state’s first recognition of the political disadvantages coming as a package with the
advancement of Cloud Computing oversimplifies or overlooks the logic of socio-
cultural influences in such circumstances. As Kline and Pinch posit, the identities of
social groups are arguably significant in an analysis of technology-society relations
(1999: 114). Following on from this, the identities of the Vietnamese state create the
diversity in the recognition of Cloud Computing’s potential exclusive only to
Vietnam’s social and political contexts, which are not necessarily valid in other,
different social and political contexts. This can be considered an application of
technological substantivism rather than technological determinism, as I have
claimed.
While I value Kline and Pinch’s suggestion, I want to emphasise that paying
attention to this point (when the state was attentive to the political and economic
- 188 -
impact of Cloud Computing in a determinist way) highlights the contrast between
the two theoretical thoughts underlining the different phases of the Vietnamese
state’s Cloud invention. After the state recognised Cloud Computing, it intervened
in technological developments according to the notion of technological
substantivism. iDragon - which is a reflection of the Vietnamese state as an IT
researcher – has moved on from being influenced by Cloud technology towards
being an influence itself on further advancement of the Cloud technology’s features
by inserting more technological knowledge, the state’s identities and political values
into the process of research and development for iDragon’s innovation: the Cloud
Platform. Once the Cloud is in the iDragon’s R&D processes, it is no longer merely
an instrumentality. Along its R&D processes the Cloud has entered a larger
technological conversation: substantivism. Through the iDragon, the state as an
industrial innovator has localised Cloud Computing with great potential political
implications: the Cloud as a means to control and as an expression of technological
nationalism. Vietnam’s state-Cloud adoption is no longer viewed as ‘the
development of Cloud technology that determines the state’s roles in Vietnam’s
technology-upgrading process’, but is transitioning into ‘the state’s roles that
determine the development of Cloud technology in Vietnam’s technology-upgrading
process’.
In fact most imported technologies are to be localised, not only the Cloud.
Localisation has to be stressed more with technologies that are initially developed
with the embedding of a specific culture or socio-economic contents once they
arrived at the new locations, or are set up to target a different market with a different
culture and socio-economic contents. Vietnam is a society with strong IT
consumption, especially over the last decade which I term the period of the ‘initial
technological localisation phase’. This is due to some characteristics of the decade
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when the level of innovation was very minimal and most IT spending was on the
primary adoption of IT at the implementation stage or as an enabling technology,
such as the configuration of database systems in local enterprises.
This paragraph will explain how the Vietnamese state employs the Cloud as
a means of control and an expression of technological nationalism. There are many
reasons why Cloud Computing has been chosen to be the Vietnamese state's
technology of choice. Firstly, there is the outstanding rate of growth of the software
and the digital content industry; secondly, there is the global trend of currently
important information technologies (especially as a transformative technology for
the developing world); and, thirdly, as Vietnam is one of the emerging hubs for the
global outsourcing business, there is a need for local firms to offer an outsourcing
service with an enabling technology compatible with the rest of the global market.
Therefore, Cloud Computing is an inevitable, compulsory technological tendency
for high-technology industrial development in Vietnam, which partly relies on other
countries' technological circumstances due to its outsourcing business. This means
that even if the Cloud was not selected as a government technology of choice, the
local IT enterprises, especially those in the outsourcing sector, would eventually be
compelled to adopt the practice of Cloud Computing without the government's
persuasion. Nonetheless, there is another major concern that perhaps offers a
legitimate explanation of the government’s technological push: the security and data
privacy issues.
Cloud Computing appears on the list of the government’s high technology
priorities.31 It comes in seventh place on a national list of high technology priorities
for development investment. The first eleven entries, out of forty-six entries on the
31 Prime Minister’s Decision No. 49/2010/QD-TTg ‘Approving the list of high technologies prioritized for
development investment and the list of high-tech production eligible for development promotion.’
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list, are from IT industries. It was stated clearly on the list that all the prioritised
technologies are selected in accordance with the trajectory of socio-economic
development, and defence and security requirements. Cloud Computing is obviously
important for both. The Cloud can be used as a powerful implementation tool in the
defence industry, however; this does not pose a new issue to be discussed since any
security-related technologies can be used for defence purposes. Additionally, the
economy of Cloud Computing adds a great security issue to its unique advantages as
an information technology. With Cloud technology, the providers compute
everything and delivery it to the users to consume. This means Cloud providers have
full access to information and data storage live on the Cloud. This is the reason that
has led NISCI to research and develop its Cloud solution. RD3, remarked during an
interview:
[…]if you have important information on the Google Information Cloud, Google can
see your information. It’s not fair and it’s not good, so Vietnam will have to build Cloud
Computing. But you know Vietnamese companies now cannot do it by themselves.
(Interview with author, RD3, 2010)
The great advantages of Cloud Computing therefore come with a great
dilemma for data security and protection. As the Cloud virtualises data storage and
dismisses the conventional way of localising the data at the end-user side, this opens
up a new gap for the regulation and implementation of new practices in data security
and protection. This also stirs up a sense of nationalism in the Vietnamese state, who
as much as they want to keep up with international technology trends by developing
a parallel technology, strongly wish to prevent its national data - especially
governmental data - being stored by and accessible to other Cloud providers, who
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are mostly at this time foreign companies. Cloud technology as a government
technology of choice evidentially illustrates a public technological push motivated
by technological nationalism as a mechanism to rein in the fast growing high-tech
economy, as well as to assist an economic area where the government feels insecure
about losing control. This validates the idea of a deeply embedded state exercising
control and using the role of the state to shape a market economy. As information
technology becomes more virtual - in general, not solely in relation to Cloud
technology - it diffuses and merges with society even in non-technological areas, in
as much as it involves unskilled technological workers who constantly redefine the
dynamics of the domestic IT industry both as producers and consumers. This is a
two-way dependence, now that such non-technological areas and unskilled
technological workers determine the new form of the economy. The state’s role in
this industry has been minimised. The Vietnamese state has tried to adjust to its
enabling role in this industry to create some flexibility that will allow the industry to
acquire new knowledge and obtain financial resources, as in the case of the iDragon
project. However, there are also areas where the government prefers to take control
and take on a jeopardising role that distorts the true dynamic of the industry and its
consumers, the society. The nature of knowledge and skills for mastering IT
technology are moving toward more and more tacit characteristics which are
embedding outside of institutional settings, out of the state’s view and come with
non-technological characters. This leads to an expansion in sub-sectors with a virtual
character as never before. Not only do sub-sectors of the IT industry become more
virtual, but as the case of Cloud Computing demonstrates, the provision and
consumption of IT can also be virtual. These signs show that innovations in the IT
industry increasingly engage with those who are unskilled and non-institutionalised.
This strongly contests conventional accounts of technology-industrial policy in
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various aspects, such as the state’s technological choice, the pattern of technology
learning and the domestic technology market’s ethical environment (for example the
security issue in the case of Cloud Computing’s development in Vietnam that
prompted technological nationalism in an economy that tried to catch up
technologically).
It remains to consider the issue of the state’s technocracy, an important topic
in the discussion of instrumentalist and substantivist technology. Feenberg posts a
thought-provoking question about technology-politics relations: whether to view
technology as a subdivision of politics in the substantive way where an advancement
of technology is politically driven, or to consider politics as a subdivision of
technology in the instrumental way, with the notion of technocracy playing a key
role (1999: 2). On technocracy in Vietnam, there are two main aspects to be
outlined. The first aspect to be discussed is doubt about a socialist state becoming a
technocratic state. To define the term here, ‘technocracy’ is typically the
replacement of public opinion on certain technical decisions with views or decisions
from an appointed technical expert. Vietnam as a single party state ruled by the
communist party is nowhere close to being a state that makes a decision based on
democratic procedures. However, and regardless of its polity, Vietnam has a hybrid
economy - the socialist-market economy, with a mixture of private and state owned
enterprises. If the domestic IT industry is taken separately from IT as a whole in
Vietnam, it can be seen that the IT industry is largely private, while the IT industry
remains state owned. For example, in the telecommunication market, the company
that owns the majority of market shares in terms of fixed telephone and Internet
services is a state-owned company, the Vietnam Post and Telecommunication Group
(VNPT) with 73 per cent and 72 per cent of market shares respectively (MIC 2011a:
51, 107). This point will be returned to later on to discuss in more detail the degree
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of state control despite decentralisation. Therefore, Vietnam’s domestic IT industry
does have some degree of free market: for example, the leading IT enterprises are
privately owned such as FPT software, JSC, TMAs, CSC Vietnam, and Vina Corp
(V.N.G) (MIC 2011a: 111-115). The number of private players suggests that the IT
industry has a certain degree of freedom from the central state. Such freedom leads
to the question of the extent to which the Vietnamese state is technocratic in IT
industrial development.
In order to make the Vietnamese technocratic state discussable, there are
several characteristics of Vietnam’s IT industry that need to be compared with the
conventional concept of technocracy beforehand. The state holds supreme power
over the domestic IT industry, which can be considered ‘public’ in the case of Cloud
technology. Combining these features with an actor discussed in detail in this
chapter, NISCI, we can bring together all the components required to identify the
Vietnamese state as technocratic. As NISCI is the state’s institute that functions to
carry out higher skilled activities to improve the local software and digital content
industry, NISCI’s technology of choice should be one that represents the ‘public’s’
demands for technology. However, much of the evidence (from the national
technology list and from the original fieldwork for this thesis) shows that Cloud
Computing was selected because of foreseeable and unavoidable global technology
trends, and for security reasons rather than being demanded by the domestic
software and digital content industry. There is no obvious evidence that the domestic
industry has required the Cloud. One might argue against this point that NISCI
functioned to improve the domestic software and digital content industry; therefore
choosing the most cutting-edge technology is logical and legitimates NISCI’s
functional efficiency without the consent of the ‘public’. However, the Cloud being
the ‘next big thing’ does not necessarily translate into its being a key technology that
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improves the domestic market; indeed, the improvement might not be effective for
the majority of the local market. This is the reason why technology is
environmentally specific to a certain degree, as no matter how impressively
advanced and useful the piece is, if a particular society is not ready to adopt the
technology and adapt to a new technical practice that comes with it as a package,
then the technology will be redundant. Having said that, however, this chapter does
not suggest that the transformation of the state to be an industrial researcher and an
innovator is unconstructive. The point of criticism rather falls on an institutional
issue that misinterprets its own objectives, as in the case of NISCI. In addition the
Cloud Platform appears to be more ‘local-go-global’ rather than vice versa,
considering the knowledge that was required from NISCI’s foreign partners and the
assimilation of an end-user product through the BCC with the Japanese partner.
Again, this outcome does not match the objectives and institutional mission of
NISCI. In conclusion the Vietnamese state’s choice for its technology push in high-
skilled research and development level was determined by the opinion of a set of
technical experts - NISCI - rather than the ‘public opinion’ of the domestic industry,
given NISCI’s original responsibilities. Thus, regardless of the polity being a single-
party state, the characteristics of the Vietnamese state are captured by concept of
‘technocracy’, considering its choice of technology in one of Vietnam’s national
technology-upgrading approaches.
Given that Cloud technology is chosen to be the state technological choice
not purely due to technological consideration but also from nationalist and political
concerns, the domestic market might not be ready for the change brought in by the
Cloud. This matter, after all, comes out during the diffusion process of Cloud
technology, which calls for an extra push for the wide adoption of the Cloud in the
domestic market. A few reports highlight this issue. For example, the need to
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persuade domestic network providers and digital content providers to employ the
Cloud model for providing their services was addressed during the Chief
Information Officer (CIO) conference in 2011 (Buu Dien Octerber 11, 2011). The
IDC have also suggested that domestic Cloud adoption requires great attention from
the government and services providers to encourage domestic IT users to adopt the
Cloud, rather than just relying on Cloud investment from the Cloud providers (IDC
2011). Furthermore, since there was no mass domestic demand for the Cloud, there
was also no legal ground to regulate Cloud adoption in the country. The government
of Vietnam is still at the early stages of debating this issue, as reported by the
government media portal, the Vietnamnet online newspaper. Opinion among
domestic leading Cloud providers and Cloud users on the legal issues related to the
domestic development of Cloud Computing is divided (Buu Dien 9 September
2011). A few stakeholders fear that the specific regulation of the Cloud will impede
the economy of the Cloud and might create an unfriendly environment for small
Cloud players in the economy, while many others are still sceptical about the
implementation of Cloud technology in the public sector and thus demand guidance
from the government (Buu Dien 9 September 2011).
The impact of Cloud Computing in a developing economy such as Vietnam
has also received a great deal of attention from scholars whose works are on the
developmental aspects of Cloud Computing, like Greengard (2010) and Kshetri
(2010). Both these authors posit that Cloud Computing will be a powerful tool to
bridge the digital divide between developed and developing nations. This is due to
the simple fact that Cloud Computing eliminates the requirement of a physical IT
infrastructure. In more detail, even though the Cloud still requires a massive
infrastructure in order for the Cloud services to be operated, this massive
infrastructure is not always the one that Cloud users have to own. This means that
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economies with a less advanced IT infrastructure to start with can now skip over all
the procedures required for constructing their IT infrastructure by just simply being
in the position of a Cloud client. As a Cloud client, developing economies now have
as equal access to the virtual Cloud infrastructure as advanced economies do
(Greengard 2010: 18; Kshetri 2010: 47). This, again, suggests an advance that is
becoming a new characteristic of IT, which clearly and automatically involves
developing countries in new approaches that bring in domestic technological
change.
Transforming from a physical infrastructure-based economy to an
infrastructure-less one is unquestionably a part of IT moving forward to a more and
more virtual reality. The two different economies surely call for different means of
technology procurement. Vietnam has experienced both of them in different phases
of its high-tech development and in different sectors; for example, the arrival of the
Intel chip assembly and testing facility, and the arrival of the IBM Cloud Lab which
both officially opened in 2010. Some may object to the comparison of the two, as
they are definitely different sectors of the IT industry: Intel’s plant is for the
hardware sector, and IBM’s lab is for the digital content sector; however, the two
represent the transformation point in IT development from an infrastructure-based
one increasingly to a (physical) infrastructure-less one. Furthermore, this
transformation grounds the chapter’s arguments by shedding some light on the new
evolutionary traits of IT advancement. Therefore, despite being from different
sectors, the two examples combined provide a concrete example of how the relation
between the technology-changing characteristics of IT and technology-procurement
works, and are compatible with the chapter’s arguments.
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With regard to the arrival of Intel’s facility, this investment, without doubt,
raises Vietnam’s IT profile globally. This is especially so in light of the well-known
case of Intel in Taiwan, which helped it catch up technologically to such an extent
that Taiwan is now at the global IT frontier. However, the investment of Intel in
Vietnam is mostly based on the country being a sizeable hub of cheap labour.
Vietnam can use Intel to upgrade the country’s technological capacity in terms of
high-tech infrastructure; local education improvement; increasing demand for local
technological suppliers, which increases market competition; and increasing
numbers of technology exports.
The case of the technology-upgrading approach that gradually builds up from
the foreign direct investment of global technology players, as in the case of Intel’s
assembly and testing facility, is similar to that of the outsourcing business. In both of
these examples, the country is modernised and industrialised based on cheap
technical and technological skilled labour. While the inward foreign investment of
Intel into Vietnam consists of a physical facility present locally and the export of the
final material products out of the location of production, the outsourcing business of
Vietnam is connected with the global market through the advancement of the IT
infrastructure in order to send out the final service product. However, this type of
technology-upgrading path is not always compatible with the new emerging genre of
technologies. The case of iDragon speaks cogently to this point.
While the discussion about how the technologically backward nations will
benefit from the Cloud is properly contextualized in terms of IT infrastructure
equality with the technologically-advanced nations, the economic and socio-
technical implications of the Cloud’s diffusion for changes in the conventional
approach of data management in the context of technologically less advanced
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economies have not yet been discussed. Since the Cloud reduces the number of
physical servers, it reduces the need for technical workers at server administration
levels. Even though this issue is an important phenomenon, it is beyond the scope of
this thesis; in any case, Cloud adoption in Vietnam is still at a stage where it is too
early to investigate such changes in the relationships between Cloud computing
facilities and labour.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter offers an analysis of the technocratic state, which is how the state
worked in regard to a top-down technology-upgrading approach with Cloud
Computing technology. The Vietnamese state upgraded the nation’s technological
capacities by undertaking industrial IT research and conducting R&D activities in
order to develop local Cloud technology, instead of leaving it to the local IT firms to
do it by themselves. This is novel in the Vietnamese economic context, as the state’s
R&D activities have often been characterised as being state-oriented projects that
respond primarily to the state’s needs rather than industrial needs.
In terms of the top-down model of technology-upgrading in Cloud
Computing as discussed in this chapter, this model was conceptualised from the
characteristics of the direction of the three stages where technological upgrade by
NISCI were processed. In this model the invention, innovation, and diffusion of
iDragon occurred step by step, by ranking from a smaller group of technological
producers to a bigger group of technological consumers. As discussed earlier, the
Cloud was a product of already existing computing technologies, and therefore it is
hard to pinpoint who exactly invented the Cloud. However in the context of
iDragon, in the model’s invention stage the design’s specifications were consulted
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by NISCI’s Japanese partners who acted as an inventor in this case. Then the
iDragon’s design’s specifications were passed down to NISCI to innovate a Cloud
platform out of such specifications. Lastly the final product of this technological
upgrading process was pushed down to be consumed by Vietnam’s IT industry in
the diffusional stage of the model. In other words, the model is also top-down with
regard to the direction where the state’s technological push occurred, considering
that the Cloud was the Vietnamese state’s technological choice that was selected for
upgrading the technological capacity of the domestic IT industry. Against this
backdrop, technological upgrading in this chapter is conceptualised as a top-down
model.
Cloud Computing in Vietnam has many elements that qualify it to be a core
artefact in the hierarchy of emerging information technologies. The human resources
model of Cloud Computing is employee-centric, the distribution and monetisation is
by-distributors-for-users with a strong dependence on formal capital accumulation
and many economic performers and the state recognise the Cloud’s importance for
economic competitiveness. Moreover, the knowledge employed for technology-
upgrading in the Cloud is privately owned, thus the relationship between consumers
and the state’s Cloud provider is in the black-box mode. More specifically, the
Vietnamese state’s concern over information surveillance control in regards to
Cloud technology shifted the position of the Cloud in the hierarchy of technologies
from being peripheral due to lack of visibility back to being in the core category.
The shift from producer-oriented to user-oriented computing in Cloud
Computing has created a new set of conditions for how data security and privacy
should be handled. This is mainly due to the fact that all data stored in the Cloud is
accessible for configuration purposes from the Cloud provider side. On the other
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hand, this means that certain clandestine information at the state level can be
accessed by Cloud providers who have mainly resided outside state control. The
Vietnamese state desired to take a technocratic surveillance role and did so by
recreating itself as one of the Cloud players. As such, it developed a parallel
technology alongside the global Cloud players instead of using other conventional
interventions to take control of this situation. With this motive, iDragon thus
emerged and the state was institutionalised as a technocratic state that is an
innovator as well as a data holder itself. Importantly, the thesis does not suggest that
Cloud Computing in Vietnam was by any means the sole state technology of choice
that the state selected to allay its national security concerns. Cloud Computing is
obviously a powerful IT trend with clear economic benefits. Nonetheless, the
conspicuous security concern should not be dismissed as an influential motivation
for this state’s technology push. With the state’s security concern, there is also room
for the state’s counter-developmentalism as the state still injects some level of
control over the choice of industrial technology. As the nature of Cloud Computing
decentralises the state’s control over national information, the state used its
technocratic role to upgrade the technology used in the Cloud as this would justify
the state’s role back in the management of national information.
Now we shall turn our attentions to the next research findings: the App
economy and the irrelevant state.
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Chapter 7
The App Economy and the Irrelevant State
7.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses a bottom-up technology-upgrading approach for the App
Economy (Figure 4.1: Four Models of Technology-Upgrading Process). The
Vietnamese state’s role in this model is characterised as being irrelevant. The
Vietnamese state is irrelevant due to the state failing to benefit from the public-
owned–knowledge, which is also non-institutionalised knowledge, used in the
innovation of mobile phone application technology. Generally speaking, the
essential knowledge for software development can be classified by ownership type
into two categories: publicly-owned knowledge and privately-owned knowledge.
These two categories should not be confused with Ernst and Lundvall’s knowledge
taxonomy (1977) that was mentioned in Chapter 3: Literature Review, as the
knowledge taxonomy of Ernst and Lundvall emphasises different kinds of
knowledge (know-what, know-why, know-how and know-who), while the
dichotomy of publicly- and privately-owned knowledge emphasises that different
sources of knowledge help determine whether the role of the state is irrelevant or
relevant. These two sources of knowledge appear in the software industry as non-
proprietary software (software developed from publicly-owned knowledge which is
non-institutionalised knowledge) and proprietary software (software developed from
privately-owned knowledge which is institutionalised knowledge).
This chapter examines the irrelevance of the state in a situation in which a
domestic firm utilised a bottom-up model of technology-upgrading in the App
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economy for the Android mobile phone operating system. This model of
technological upgrading was conducted using publicly-owned knowledge which
came in a form of non-proprietary software as a final product. This non-proprietary
software is implemented using highly non-institutionalised types of knowledge and
modes of innovation. Considering publicly-owned knowledge (as a source of
knowledge for technological upgrade) and non-proprietary software (as a final
product of technological upgrade) in the context of the hierarchy of emerging
information technologies, both publicly-owned knowledge and non-proprietary
software fall into the peripheral category of the hierarchy. This explains the state’s
irrelevant role in the App economy, as the state views non-proprietary software
merely as cost-saving software that provides Vietnam with an alternative to high-
priced, copyright-protected proprietary software. For this reason, the state fails to
realise the technology-upgrading potential of this type of peripheral artefact in its
industrial policy.
This chapter begins with a short introduction to the App economy. Next, the
chapter examines the different types of knowledge commoditisation that make
publicly-owned and privately-owned knowledge distinctively different. Finally, this
chapter characterises the irrelevant state in association with the bottom-up model of
technology-upgrading in the App economy.
7.1.1 A Short Introduction to the World of the App
The chapter’s case study was derived from the App economy for the Android mobile
phone operating system. Nonetheless, the chapter’s analysis focuses mainly on the
App economy, rather than being an analytical account of the technological
progression of the Android system. The majority of both the Android system and the
App economy have been developed based on uncommodified knowledge, at least in
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terms of their philosophy. The Android is a Linux-based mobile phone operating
system acquired later by Google. The different functions for Android can be
obtained by purchasing free downloads, either permanently or for a certain limited
time as a trial, through the Android Market Place – which acts as a collective
venture for Android users to browse and purchase/free download applications for the
Android. This market place is a part of the App economy particularly useful for
mobile smart phone applications. The market rival of the Android, and contender for
its market share, is Apple Inc. and its App store, that has been developed primarily
on commoditised knowledge.
The App economy’s profitability cannot be directly calculated, like with the
Android’s market place. The Android system is a highly creative technological
product that is included as part of the formal economy, while its application market
place is seen as a part of the informal economy full of amateur or volunteer
developers, or an additional service and small revenue source for both professional,
amateur, and voluntarily or paid developers. The different treatment of the two
aspects of Android may have something to do with how their non-proprietary
revenue is monetised – in other words, how their productivity is measured. The
Android operating system is owned by a big corporation in the IT industry, Google
Inc., despite the fact that the Android was developed upon an open source principle.
It was originally Linux-based and still mainly is, whereas Google earns its revenues
on Android from several channels. The most obvious revenues to the public are the
defaulting of Android users to the Google search engine, the selling of
advertisements and the leasing of its market place to App developers to display their
applications. The revenues of these are well-documented in Google’s revenues,
while the revenues of App production cannot be calculated directly. For example,
sales taxes on Apps vary by where the developer is based, and their employment
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status – employee or freelance. Thus it is hard to estimate accurate tax incomes from
this information. Furthermore, there are also loopholes in the legislation on tax
declaration, such as sales though virtual money which is not real money but royalty
credits, as in the case of Microsoft points. I am not going to go into greater detail on
this as it is out of the scope of the research; however, these issues are mentioned
here to illustrate how difficult it is to measure the App economy’s profitability.
Difficulties in finding an accurate measurement of productivity in the App
economy are not uncommon in the IT world, regardless of the intellectual property
types. There are wider debates on whether IT adoption directly increases the amount
of firms’ profitability. For the wider debate on this topic, see Carr’s (2004) coverage
of the debates on the relation between IT and business values.
There is surely more than one explanation for why productivity cannot be
calculated. The thesis’s analysis, based on the fieldwork, demonstrates that policy
makers do not always recognise a great share of the productivity of knowledge
goods, when they are commoditized through a non-IPR regime. The measurement of
productivity in knowledge goods has not encompassed technologies outside of the
IPR protection regime and thus does not represent the true value created by the
emergent knowledge-based economy. Actually, the true value created from
knowledge goods is hard to capture comprehensively; however, this does not mean
that the increasing value of the knowledge economy is immeasurable. One solution,
as mentioned in Chapter 4: Technological Upgrade and Research Tool of Analysis,
is to measure value though a comparison between a newly-produced value and the
originally-created value of a certain unit of production and so illustrate three defined
value-added features: innovation, the increasing value of products or services and
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the expansion into new economic areas. Innovation for its own sake implies an
increase in technological knowledge and skills, even if it does not find a market.
7.2. Knowledge Commoditisation for IT Industrial Production
There are two well-developed dominant schemes of knowledge and information
exchange in the software industry. The first scheme captures values created from
knowledge development and exchanges in market transactions through a
commoditization process; it is referred to here as a private ownership scheme.
Another scheme captures the value created through a non-commoditization process
of such knowledge, which is referred to here as a public ownership scheme. In terms
of software as a specific sector, proprietary software is the dominant product of the
private ownership scheme, while free software and open source software are the
dominant products of the public ownership scheme.
7.2.1 The Private Ownership Scheme
In this scheme, the market value of knowledge and information used for producing
software and digitally related works in market transactions is captured through a
commodification process whereby prices are assigned through the knowledge and
information used in the production.
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4: Technological Upgrade and Research
Tool of Analysis, on the hierarchy of emerging information technologies, knowledge
and information naturally belong to the public commons as they are non-rival,
unlike material possessions, in that multiple consumptions cannot diminish their
quantity and quality. However, this nature makes it impossible to extract a price out
of such knowledge and information, and to make them into private property that can
be privately owned. However, IPR advocates manage to overcome this nature by
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creating three ways to extract a price from knowledge, transforming it from a
knowledge commons into privately-owned intellectual property. There are three
common approaches to commoditise such knowledge within the software realm:
patent, trademark and copyright. With these three approaches, intellectual properties
are created and assigned to impose scarcity for a set time period.
Historically, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) started to
consider software as intellectual property back in the 1970s and thus needed some
provisions for an international standard on the protection of computer programs,
establishing a mechanism to do so called a sui generis system (WIPO (n.d.)). By that
time source code sharing had already been established as a conventional practice in
software engineering for over a decade.32 For example, source code sharing was a
common practice among the software engineers engaged in the famous MIT hacker
culture in the 1960s.33 It was also in the 1960s that the software industry started to
be distinct from the hardware industry.34 However, a sui generis system had no
legislation for enforcement, which led the WIPO to consider other mechanisms to
handle this issue. Accordingly the WIPO created a mechanism whereby copyright
protection could be applied to computer programs.35 By the 1990s, the WIPO had
proposed two provisional bodies of law – which the WIPO called ‘soft law’: the
32 Source code is a set of computer commands to operate software, which is written in a programming language
(Buckmand and Gay 2002: 3)
33 The term ‘computer hackers’ during that time referred to those who enjoyed programming regardless of
whether it was a profession or hobby (Stallman 2002: 17) The same term nowadays has a completely different
meaning as it is associated with an illegal act of accessing someone’s source codes or any digital information
without the owners’ permission.
34 In practice, there are some historical events suggesting the distinction between the two industries. One of
these is the infamous court case ‘The United States v. IBM’ which took place from the second half of 1960s
until 1982 (May 2005). IBM had bundled software and related services with its computer machines for
customers. The courts considered this to be an act of monopoly which violated antitrust law. As a result, IBM
separated the software business from its hardware business.
35 The crude version of computer program components are: object code (code in binary form – one and zero);
source code (code computer language that is understandable by humans); and documents (WIPO (n.d.)).
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Computer Programs Directive of the European Community (1991) and the more
international proposal, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right
(TRIPS), which was agreed in 1994 and came into effect in 1995 (WIPO (n.d.)).
TRIPS is a multilateral agreement overseen by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to provide a standard provision for the protection of intellectual property in
seven combined forms altogether.36 There are three types of IP protection available
in the software industry from these seven forms according to TRIPS: copyright,
patent and trademarks. TRIPS considers software as a form of literary work under
the scope of the Berne convention (1971) (WIPO (n.d)).
This means that TRIPS considers that the way ideas are expressed in
software is of the same type as the way ideas are expressed in language in literary
works, and this is the basis underlining copyright in the software industry where
copyright is an IP protection for forms in which ideas in software are expressed. The
ideas in software are also protected by the patent system. May (2008: 80) suggests
that out of the three, patents are the core means by which the market value of
information technology innovations is commoditised. This is a strong point as
patents are designed to protect the ideas behind the software, while many people can
have the same idea but find different ways to express that idea. Notably, out of these
three, trademark, which is a protection for names or symbolic identities in relation
with particular software as the software’s market identity, seems to receive the least
criticism that it is against the nature of software engineering from public ownership
advocates.
36 As stated on the WTO’s website, protection afforded by TRIPS covers seven areas: namely copyright and
related rights; trademark; geographical indications; industrial designs; patents; the layout-design of integrated
circuits; and undisclosed information (WTO (n.d.)).
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TRIPS is heavy criticised as having been influenced by giant software
corporations and business consortiums in the U.S. It was substantially criticised for
being an instrument of MNC influence in the TRIPs negotiation round and for
offering little to developing countries who are in a position of being software
importers and who pay high prices for IPR-protected software (Sell 2003: 96; May
2006: 128-129) .
TRIPS is referred to by the WIPO as ‘soft law’ because it has no
enforcement at the international level. Nonetheless, TRIPS uses the WTO
membership conditions to passively coerce countries that would like to join the
WTO to have their national legislation and other mechanisms on intellectual
property protections strengthened to meet the standard of TRIPS. Countries that
want to join the WTO must alter their national legislation to meet TRIPS’ standards.
As such, TRIPS as soft law attached to WTO membership conditions attracts
criticism that this type of passive enforcement is unfair to developing countries.
Such countries who wish to join the WTO face tremendous pressure, even though
intellectual property protections contained in TRIPS have already been criticised
for, at times, hindering individual innovation because firms own the IPR rather than
individual innovators (May 2005).
In terms of software-sector specific critiques, the IP protection provided by
TRIPS is the starting point for consequent complexities in the dynamics of
development in the software industry. One of the main rationales claimed by IP
protection advocates is that TRIPS will protect innovation in the IT industry by
moving knowledge-based creation away from its natural origins as a public common
good to private property. If knowledge-based creations are left within their original
public realm where they are freely accessed and consumed, then inventors will not
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be rewarded financially for their hard work and creativity. The argument follows
that this would discourage people from driving forward the advancement of already
existent technological entities. This is the same rationale underlining the design of
IP protections in other industries. There are three consequent complexities due to
this rationale: the increase in the price of software though temporary monopoly, the
incompatibility of the design of the IPR mechanism with the nature of software
production and debates over whether the design of IP protection serves its purpose
of protecting and fuelling innovation. These three complexities have been
thoroughly analysed by advocates of public ownership, who argue that their scheme
tackles these complexities more sustainably than private ownership schemes.
I am not going into greater detail on the complexities of the design of IP
protection, as this is beyond the research’s focus. However, a short introduction to
this has underlined circumstances where IP protection takes place as well as its
relations with the emergence of public ownership schemes as an alternative design
to capture value created from knowledge in the software industry.
7.2.2 The Public Ownership Scheme
The opposite approach to commoditising knowledge in the software industry
is the non-privatization of software as a knowledge good in the IT industry. Non-
privatized software had long been a traditional practice of software development in
the form of source code sharing prior to the emergence of the official software
industry in the US, and of course existed before the term proprietary software, which
is the result of an IP protection regime for privatized software. The birth of
proprietary software had automatically constituted the birth of free software. Those
engaged in the conventional practice of source code sharing, had to seek a way to
prevent knowledge being privatized into proprietary software, which restricts users
- 210 -
from the further distribution of software, including source code sharing. This was
the beginning of the emergence of free software. One of the free software developers
in the 1980s who managed to develop a socio-economic agenda of free software,
which constitutes non-privatized software in the present, is Richard Stallman, a
founder of the Free Software Foundation. The Free Software Foundation was
established in 1985 but was initiated back in 1984 as free software under the name
GNU, which stands for GNU’s Not Unix. Stallman’s main intentions for the GNU
project, including both the GNU system and GNU software, were to provide the
public with alternative software that provided the users with the freedom to further
redistribute it.
The public ownership scheme is going to be examined based mainly on
Stallman’s views, as he is an originator of the public ownership scheme which later
branched out into many less clear sub theories. Therefore, to avoid confusion, it is
best to stick to the original philosophy of the public ownership scheme.
The philosophy behind GNU disagrees with the assignment of private
ownership over software and other computer systems (such as operating systems)
and seeks to keep the ownership of these technologies, including their further
developments, in the public realm. Stallman believes that this will benefit the public
as users as well as software developers by limiting the ability of big corporations,
which prioritize business profits over the advancement of software and over users’
freedom over their purchased software, to promote the privatization of knowledge
through the political system. As he explains:
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[…] The existence of software inevitably raises the question of how decisions about its
use should be made. […] who should decide whether this is done the individuals
involved? Or another party, called the owner.
Software developers typically consider these questions on the assumption that the
criterion for the answer is to maximize developers’ profits. The political power of
business has led to the government adoption of both this criterion and the answer
proposed by the developers: that the program has an owner, typically a corporation
associated with its development. (Stallman 2002a: 121).
As such, Stallman defines types of freedom associated with the Free
Software project. Stallman is very clear about what he means by being free; the
‘free software’ refers to users’ freedom to further distributes the software, not
‘costless’ in terms of price. This means that free software is not always available to
the public free of cost. The cost is left to be decided by the individual users, as
Stallman puts forward: ‘The free software philosophy rejects a specific widespread
business practice, but it is not against business. When businesses respect the users’
freedom, we wish them success’ (Stallman 2002b: 24). In greater detail, software
fits Stallman’s free software definition when users have the freedom to use, modify
or redistribute the original copies, or further distribute modified versions of the
software for any purpose and at any price (including remaining costless) (2002b:
20). There are two core issues involved in free software: first of all the users will
need to have freedom to access the original software’s source codes; and second
the users’ freedom, as with the original copy of the software, remains the same for
the modified version of the software.
Making software and source codes sharable and modifiable means that free
software is subject to being developed and maintained only through their users, who
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are also their further developers and who communicate with each other. This leads
later to a great number of emergent communities in relation to free software for
various purposes, such as: to provide technical support for particular free software;
to act as a forum for trouble shooting, questioning and answering technical or social
issues in association with the software and to provide further updates of the
software. Against this backdrop, these communities also act as a meeting point for
free software users, as well as a pool of technical and technological knowledge of
software and software-related technologies. The development of the kernel for the
GNU project was finally finished as a complete operating system in 1992 (2002b:
28) through the availability of another free software project, the Linux kernel. Even
though the GNU project is a combination of the GNU system and the Linux kernel
(2002b:28), as time has progressed the economic basis and philosophies of the two
have not stayed the same. Stemming from the original free software philosophy
initiated by Stallman, there are other types of software distribution that have roots in
the philosophy of free software nowadays, such as ‘open-source software’ and ‘free
and open source software’. All of them have different economic, social and political
implications and thus are used for different technical (and social and political)
purposes rather than technological ones, as is going to be examined in the following
section.
7.2.2.1 The Economy of Free Software
Stallman disagrees with the economic advantage argument of private software
ownership: that the society will benefit more in terms of technological advantage if
software is privately owned. The argument for private software ownership is based
on the logic that once software is privately owned, its distribution is not costless and
the owners will be rewarded for their creation. When the owners are well rewarded,
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it is argued, they simply will create more other types of further software
developments and society will benefit from the greater availability of variety and
further advancement of software. Stallman points out the hole in this argument. He
posits that while the economic rewards of privately-owned software might
encourage the owners to create more or better versions of the software, this software
is still not what the users (the society) need or want (2002d: 49). This comes back to
the main philosophy of free software: that the users should have freedom to use,
distribute, redistribute and modify the software according to their needs or personal
preferences. As such, the economy of free software is based on these types of
software users’ freedoms.
The three mechanisms previously mentioned through which the ownership
right of privately-owned software is exercised- copyright, patent and trademark -
must be discussed to understand the economy of free software. To begin with,
Stallman does not disagree with the copyright concept in general. He believes that
the concept might work well in a certain economic sector, as in the case of the
printing industry which is the origin of the copyright system for business practice,
but it is unsuitable for some sectors, including software (2002d: 47). The system has
a tremendous effect on the future of free software as people can assign a copyright
over the free software or the further development of it. This means that the free
software developers might not retain freedom over software to whose development
they have contributed if someone turns it (or part of it) into proprietary software. In
order to deal with this paradox, Stallman introduces a copyleft system, which is a
system that has often been mistaken for an anti-copyright system, in the form of a
General Public License (GPL). Stallman explains that the copyleft system is
rendered from copyright laws but used for the purpose of keeping free software
always free. Copyleft is a mechanism for forbidding the assignment of private
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ownership to free software, its further development and other software that has at the
least some free software in it (Lessig 2002: 12).37
With regard to the patent system, the economy of open source software is
constituted more by a desire for a competitive and technological advantage over
proprietary software than the free software economy. This characteristic is reflected
clearly in the issue of patents for the free software proponents; as Stallman tells us,
the reason behind keeping free software patent free (even though it means in
particular areas that features of free software will be in a less advantageous position
than proprietary software) is to retain the key values of the free software scheme in
maintaining its users’ freedom rather than to try always be in a position of
technological superiority to proprietary software (Stallman 2002b: 30). Free
software advocates object to the patent system in general, but not to copyrights and
trademarks, because the patent is a type of monopoly practice and provides fewer
benefits to society as a whole. Even worse, the patenting mechanism, which gives a
temporary monopoly over ideas and the use of such ideas to some who first invent a
product for that patent, is against the fundamental purpose of writing software.
Stallman puts this point nicely:
[…] in computer science, [repetitive source codes is] the most obvious way to
generalize anything. You did it once, so now you can do it any number of times, you
can make a sub routine. (2002a: 103).
37 A technical term for this is any software that can be counted as derivative work of free software’s derivative
work (2002).
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According to this, society would benefit if subroutines were widely shared
among programmers, which is an idea opposed to the patent system.
If a trademark is the commercial identity of a piece of software, free
software, according to Stallman, presents its identity more philosophically than
legally: free software, free society. The software’s operating system, GNU, asks
clearly on its official site (www.gnu.org) that its developers not apply any
trademarks on GNU software and documents and this is to be set as a standard for
further development to follow (GNU: (n.d.)). Despite the belief that GNU does not
need trademarks, the trademark system does have a huge impact on further progress
according to the free software philosophy. One of these advancements which
underlines the escalation of the irrelevant state is the ambiguity between the
distinction of free and open source software, including the issues surrounding
trademark registration.
As the economic mechanisms of free software are based upon the
philosophy of software freedom rather than financial benefits, free software
developers earn their living through various channels such as selling related services
and charging fees for selling copies of the software; however, these are software-
related financial channels. There are also knowledge-related financial channels
involved in the development of free software, such as teaching the technical
knowledge used for free software development or advances in technological
knowledge obtained from the development of free software. The chapter’s case
study, the IVC company, is an example of the latter case: when the company
upgrades their technological capacities into an innovation by acquiring the essential
knowledge from another rendition of free software, open source software, as will be
examined in greater detail later on. The philosophy of free software has more
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recently given rise to the emergence of open source software, which is not the same
as free software, but rather is developed on a competitive advantage of having the
source code accessible, either on a full or limited basis.
7.2.2.2 The Economy of Open Source Software
Open source software has its origins in the free software movement. During the
1990s, a few software developers started to doubt the commercial viability of free
software, and started to use a new term, as well as a new practice, called open source
software. The open source movement became a separate entity from the original free
software movement officially in 1998, when it was established as an official
community under the trademark, Open Source Initiative (OSI).
The OSI acts as a committee body providing a standard definition for open
source software. According to the OSI, open source software means more than just
making software source code accessible. From the official definition, making the
source code accessible and also enabling it to be used and modified, and further
redistributed lies at the heart of open source software (OSI: (n.d.)).38 The committee
board of OSI is the body that approves open source licenses using the criteria of the
open source definition, and this license is the main economic mechanism which
illustrates the boundary line drawn between open source and free software.
To examine this point in greater detail to avoid any confusion between open
source software and free software, an open source license is compared to one of the
free software licenses, GPL. While the open source license complies with its
definition, a variant of which states that further distributions of open source software
do not have to remain as open source (definition no. 9 ‘License Must Not Restrict
38 For full details on the open source definition, please refer to Appendix C
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Other Software’ (OSI: (n.d.))), GPL is an expression of copyleft’s will to retain
further distributions of free software as free software. This has a huge implication in
terms of business practice, as further developments of open source software can be
transformed into proprietary software and thus it is more popular in the business
world than free software, since free software will always remain free.
To sum up, the difference between free software and open source software is
that free source software can be modified by users, but the modifier cannot receive
intellectual property rights for the modification; in contrast, with open source
software, the modifier can receive intellectual property rights on the modification,
although the original open source software remains available for other users to
modify. Despite its impact on business practice, open source software is often
confused with free software because of its various names and uses in business. This
confusion provides the backdrop explaining why non-proprietary software is seen by
many (including the irrelevant state) as a peripheral technology in the hierarchy of
emerging information technologies.
7.2.2.3 The Economy of Free and Open source Software
Apart from open source software, there is also another type of software that was
developed based on the philosophy of free software: free and open source software
(FOSS). As the name implies, this type of software is a combination of free
software and open source software. Such a combination is done for social purposes
rather than technical purposes. FOSS is a term that grew up in the context of
development studies, rather than computer science and business studies. There is no
clear record of when this term was first introduced, but it has been commonly used
by international economic organisations in the development field, mostly referring
to both free software and open source software as a costless type of software, an
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alternative to proprietary software and a means for developing countries to deal with
software piracy. These factors amount to a perceived economy of FOSS which
would be more precisely called a developmental economy of FOSS. May (2006:
131) puts this point well:
Despite the philosophical differences between free software […] and open source […],
like the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
and a number of non-government organisations (NGOs) many people in Africa use the
combination phrase free and open source software, or FOSS, to encapsulate the
distinctiveness of non-proprietary approaches to software development and deployment.
The heavy influence of the developmental economy of FOSS, which
underlies the Vietnamese state’s roles in nurturing the adoption of free software and
open source software for IT industrial development, has actually given rise to the
irrelevant state proposed here, particularly in the process of technological upgrading,
as examined in the following section.
7.3 Characterising the Irrelevant State
The irrelevant state is one of the features of the counter-developmental state
proposed in this thesis as characterising the Vietnamese state. In the irrelevant state,
the state’s industrial intervention in developing technological skills and capacities to
upgrade Vietnam’s domestic technological production is irrelevant. This irrelevancy
arises when the interventions become disconnected from achieving the
developmental target because the state and society incorrectly perceive the potential
of emergent technologies, incorrectly viewing some as inferior.
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The Vietnamese state’s perception of the unequal prospects among
technologies is the main reason causing the irrelevant characteristic of the state’s
role regarding open source software in the development of domestic information
technology. In relation to the proposed hierarchy of emergent information
technologies, the technological perspective that underlines the birth of the irrelevant
state is the application of an IP protocol which determines that open source software
is only a peripheral technology (why this is viewed as peripheral will be discussed
later on in Section 7.3.2: Policy Analysis). Furthermore, in particular the chapter
argues that despite the similar technological capacity between proprietary and
free/open source software, the two dominant principles in the philosophy of software
are unevenly socially constituted in the proposed hierarchy of emergent information
technologies. This unevenness has led to the divergence of the Vietnamese state’s
roles between the two in technology-upgrading approaches.
Both primary and secondary sources demonstrate how the state’s role in
regard to the promotion of open source software for industrial usage is irrelevant in
Vietnam. With regard to primary sources, the fieldwork research enabled a close
examination of the relation between the Vietnamese state’s industrial intervention
and the domestic technology-upgrading approach based on the procurement of
knowledge from an open source community. Supportive evidence came from a
domestic software company based in Ho Chi Minh City, IVC, along with other
actors in Vietnam’s domestic IT industry, such as technological venture capitalists.
In addition to this, secondary sources of evidence derived from archived documents
and local media accounts were used to analyse government activities in the
promotion of aspects of high-tech industry related to the chapter’s case study.
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7.3.1 The Innovation Story of IVC
The adoption of technological learning from an open source code community for hi-
tech industrial usage is rooted in Vietnam’s local IT industry and very much
associated with the domestic technology-upgrading process. The chapter’s case
study, IVC, is an example of this. The company has upgraded its IT capacities from
being an implementer in an outsourcing business to becoming an innovator in the
App economy by using an online open source code community for technological
learning for the purpose of radical innovation.
The company’s background is that IVC is a local subsidiary in Vietnam of a
Japanese mother company, the ISB Corporation.39 IVC is an offshore and
outsourcing unit for software development for ISB. From the Japanese mother
company’s point of view, IVC takes advantage of Vietnam’s cheap, skilled IT
workforce.
Since its establishment in Ho Chi Minh City in 2003, IVC has become one of
the main outsourcing companies employing young IT graduates and IT workers in
Vietnam. This is a successful company that has no connection with the Viet Kieu
(Vietnamese overseas), unlike other commonly found outsourcing companies in
Vietnam (as discussed in Chapter 5: Software Outsourcing and the Cooperative
State). Rather, the company is a beneficial establishment developed from the long
bilateral trade connection between Japan and Vietnam.40 Since its establishment,
IVC has expanded into areas of the company's specialty across various areas of the
IT market, such as working with various operating platforms, experience in a variety
39 For more details visit http://www.isb.co.jp/
40 More details about the relation between Vietnam’s outsourcing business and Vietnam’s trade partners and
donors was discussed in Chapter 5: Software Outsourcing and the Cooperative State.
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of database technologies and designing language. Despite the success of the
company and its good reputation, IVC faced a tremendous challenge regarding the
heavy demands of the work from Japan. Relying on an external IT market’s
demands as well as the Japanese parent company’s decision making power meant
that IVC found it difficult to come out of the shadow of ISB, its own mother
company in Japan. This limited its economic benefits and technological capacity.
Regardless of IVC’s original technological area of business, the company
more recently has been involved in the technology-upgrading process as an
innovator. The company has shifted between both businesses and levels of
technological skill within the IT industry, moving from implementing outsourcing to
innovating mobile phone applications. It obtained all the necessary skills and
knowledge to do so mainly from an open source-code community, which is located
outside the reach of the state’s industrial development mechanisms. This is the first
indication of the irrelevant state.
Originally, IVC was a start-up only for outsourcing, specialising in the
technological areas oriented around the telecommunications industry. However, the
company’s technological specification was changed in 2009 due to the economic
downturn that hit the worldwide economy. The amount of work supplied from
external markets such as Japan was decreasing. The drastic decrease in outsourcing
work demands from Japan’s ISB put the managing board of IVC under pressure to
keep up with their pre-recession level of income. Meanwhile the widespread
adoption of an open source mobile phone operating system, the Android, in the
Vietnamese telecommunication market appeared to be a growing market opportunity
that was resisting the recession. This trend was viewed by IVC’s senior leader, ILF2,
as a great opportunity to escape the recession trap as well as to upgrade IVC’s
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technological skills. With his status as an IT industry veteran with 11 years of
experience in Vietnam’s IT industry, ILF2 had the idea to turn the crisis into a
sustainable opportunity by upgrading the company’s technological ability to
innovate. IVC was able to take advantage of the fast-growing domestic
telecommunications industry because it learned to innovate using external
knowledge available at a minimum cost from an online open source code
community: The Open Embedded Software Foundation (OESF).41
The OESF is an extensive international platform, as it is a free of charge
source of technical knowledge, that was initiated in Japan in order to gather people
together who had the same interest in the development of an Android-based
embedded system in the hope that the result of working together through this
platform would eventually standardise the adoption and further development of the
Android system across various devices and market environments. To this end, the
OESF provides everything from the system architecture to functions through forums
for problem solving and sharing know-how, downloadable parts of previous
developments and even a business plan. All these features make OESF a good
source of learning for first-time innovators or for anyone who wants to get involved
in R&D activities for the very first time. ILF2 recognised this as a source of know-
how to-innovate; however, the first problem was how to convince the Japanese
mother company to grant permission to let IVC get started with R&D activities
when the purpose of IVC’s establishment was just to be another outsourcing hub for
the Japanese mother company. Furthermore, the financial benefits of an R&D
investment take longer to return after it has been invested. ILF2 explained:
41 For more details visit http://www.oesf.biz/
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ILF2: […] Because you know the outsourcing, they can get the money from…
Uer-Aree: Very Quickly?
ILF2: (nodding) outsourcing but for R&D they have to wait for a long time and maybe
no profits so the first investment is not a big amount, and the second year we have to
persuade them to invest more. (interview with author, ILF2, 2011).
Nonetheless, the promise of getting IVC’s technological capacity improved, to
benefit the outsourcing business of the company at a minimal cost, was sufficient for
ISB to let IVC make an endeavour:
I made a plan with some students and numbers and persuaded them. I analysed the
situation of the company […] at first I have to persuade them […] about the dependency
of IVC to ISB Japan. Because if ISB dies, IVC will die too, so we have to reduce the
dependency. That why we have to do R&D, so that is the way I persuaded. (interview
with author, ILF2, 2011).
After obtaining official permission to conduct R&D activities from ISB, IVC
had to focus on R&D processes with a minimum budget allowance. IVC started its
R&D project without a budget from the ISB. The support from ISB for IVC’s R&D
activities came in the form of permission for IVC to use its engineers (ILF2 told me
that the number was two engineers) and computing facilities (which started with an
Android machine and two PCs). With just these input resources for IVC, innovations
were only possible given the availability of free software and open source software
that came with a great deal of online community support, such as the OESF, where
cutting edge and up-to-date knowledge as well as innovation methodology were
presented; prompt, quick responses were given to questions asked by other
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members; access was provided to customers’ point of views and a platform was
maintained to share experience and customers’ feedback. Using all of these
features, ILF2’s small team finally upgraded the company’s technological capacity
two years later in 2011 when the company released its innovation, the Android
printing framework that more recently has developed into an application called
‘StarPrint’.42 With the open source software community as a starting point for R&D
activities, IVC nowadays encompasses further R&D activities tailoring R&D to
customers’ requirements.43
With its move into R&D, IVC is one of the small domestic firms that is
successful in technology upgrading in different business areas within the same
industry. It upgraded into this area by using technological learning from a
knowledge source that has not been commoditised for private ownership. The
Android system’s source code is accessible to public and it has an open platform for
technological sharing among the open source software community. The Vietnamese
developmental state has nothing to do with IVC’s achievements. In other words, the
state’s industrial development roles were irrelevant when dealing with publicly-
owned technological knowledge for the domestic technology-upgrading process.
Despite the promise of such publicly-owned technological knowledge that is
available to be explored in the open source code communities, the case study of IVC
unfortunately indicates that the state’s industrial development roles, which can be
expressed in terms of related policies and activities, are irrelevant in this instance.
When asked about the relation between IVC’s technological upgrade and
42 For more details see http://www.isb-vietnam.com/index.php/en/products/252-starprint.html
43 For more details see http://www.isb-vietnam.com/index.php/ivc-industry-sectors/97-research-
development.html
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government policy, ILF2 could not provide any specific details from his experience
with IVC’s R&D activities:
ILF2: Actually the government has some kind of special policy for R&D. I’m not clear,
but there are some policies.
ILF2: You are not clear because your company hasn’t benefited anything from [those
policies?].
ILF2: No, we don’t have! (interview with author, ILF2, 2011).
In the interview, ILF2 was not asked directly about government policies
regarding open source software, but his company R&D activities were all focused
upon open source software, thus his statements also indirectly account for the
interplay between the Vietnamese government’s industrial policy and open source
software.
The state’s mechanisms for industrial development neglect open source
software because they treat open source software and its knowledge communities as
merely a cost-saving alternative to proprietary software. This argument is also
applicable to the technological production of open source software: the state sees
open source software and its communities as initially offering a product for selling
product-related services rather than seeing open source software and its communities
as a source of technological learning for innovation. As a result of this perception,
the state of Vietnam has become irrelevant in this type of technological-upgrading
process based on the open source/free software approach.
In addition to the experience of IVC’s innovation without the state,
uncovered during my fieldwork, there is also supporting evidence from policy
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analysis. The analysis of government policies shows that the policies aiming to
nurture the domestic IT industry in relation to open source software focus on
adopting it as an alternative to proprietary software to reduce costs rather than
providing incentives for nurturing open source based innovation. This is not to say
that the irrelevant state completely fails to support the use of open source software to
foster domestic technological capacities among IT firms; however, it seems that, for
the time being, the latter mission comes second in comparison with the first one, the
adoption of open source software. There are, to date, three industrial policies
directly targeting the development of open source software for the sake of
modernising and industrialising Vietnam by 2020. The main open source software
policy was introduced in 2004: ‘The overall project on application and development
of open source software in Vietnam from 2004- 2008 (Decision No. 235/QD-TTg)’.
This was followed by another two specific, detailed documents on the adoption of
open source software products within state agencies and organisations, that were
introduced in 2007 and 2009: ‘Promulgating the list of open source software
products which meet the use requirements of state agencies and organisations
(Decision No. 08/2007/QD-BTTTT)’ and ‘Promulgating a list of open source
software products qualified for use by state agencies and organisations (Circular No.
41/2009/TT-BTTTT)’ respectively.44
7.3.2 Policy Analysis
Out of the three policies, Decision No. 235/QD-TTg, which is the first one to be
introduced, is the only one with details on how open source software should be
pursued in the context of domestic information technology development, which does
44 The actual texts of Decision No. 235/QD-TTg, Decision No. 08/2007/QD-BTTTT and Circular No.
41/2009/TT-BTTTT are in Appendix D
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not cover only the case of the IT industry, but also domestic information technology
consumption. The other two policies, Decision No. 08/2007/QD-BTTTT and
Circular No. 41/2009/TT-BTTTT, address specific details of open source software
products that are going to be used in state agencies and organisations such as
OpenOffice.org and Unikey.
There are three agendas for open source software development in Vietnam
which create the irrelevant role of the state as the three agendas do not provide a
mechanism to support open source community based products outside the state’s
realm. The three agendas encompass three areas: firstly, the adoption of open source
software within the state’s structure in the cause of saving money; secondly, as a
method to reduce the amount of pirated software, thus strengthening copyright
protection; and finally, the commoditisation of open source software in Vietnam in
a state-centric way. 45
The main criticisms against these three agendas in relation to the irrelevant
state are that they do not support an actual dynamic of innovation that could be
constituted from knowledge embedded within an open source community. The open
source community is community centric and highly integrated in an informal setting
rather than state-centric in a formal setting, which is central to the three above-
mentioned open source related policies.
Nonetheless, it needs to be made clear before moving on to further
discussion that the irrelevant state concept is not a critique of the Vietnamese state’s
45 The policy’s objectives are as follows: ‘1. To accelerate the application and development of open source
software, thus contributing to the protection of copyright and reduction of software procurement expenses. And
promoting the development of the information technology industry in general and Vietnam’s software industry
in particular. 2. To build up the contingent of technicians who are qualified for and master technologies, and
promote their creativity in the application and development of open source software. 3. To create a number of
special information technology (IT) products suitable to the domestic application conditions and demands and
based on open source software.’ For more please refer to Appendix C (1).
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industrial involvement as a non-industrially oriented one. The proposed irrelevant
state characteristics derive from the state’s industrial trajectory being implemented
in a top-down direction involving industry in a very state-centric way, rather than it
not being industrially oriented. The state’s strategies for implementing the use of
open source software for the development of the local IT industry do not respond
directly to the needs of domestic IT firms who have already embedded themselves in
the online open-source community. Rather, the state’s strategies have been to try to
formalise the open source community locally within the state’s realm. This is clearly
shown in the establishment of the Vietnam Free and Open source Software
Association (VFOSSA) at the end of 2011 under the umbrella of the Vietnam
Association for Information Processing (VAIP). VFOSSA’s main purposes are to
initiate an open source community locally in Vietnam and to commercialise open
source products domestically in affiliation with the state.
VFOSSA’s chair, Dr. Nguyen Hong Quang, is a veteran in open source
software as he has been active in the global open source movement since 1996 and
initiated the establishment of the community locally in Vietnam from 2000 onward (
Vietnam e-Government Symposium (n.d.)), through the NukeViet community which
is a community on the technologies of the Content Management System (a set of
computer programs for editing and publishing contents). In addition to community
building, VFOSSA also affiliates with many local open source software companies,
many of which are connected with the state to name but a few VINADES, JSC.
which is part of VAIP and the first open source joint-stock company that bases its
technological upgrading on a local open source community like NukeViet
(VINADES, JSC : 2012), and CngTT&NDS, which is a project of the National
Institute of Software and Digital Content Industry (NISCI). These are examples of
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state strategies within the field of open source software, which are largely irrelevant
in supporting firms which are embedded in global open source communities, as in
the case of IVC. The absence of state mechanisms in this regard worries Dr. Quang,
as he expressed his concerns that the state will need to provide a legal framework for
local open source firms to be able to make money. Quoted in the government media
portal, the VietnamNet Newspaper, Dr. Quang said:
In the world, open source software can live well not on the licenses, but on the services.
However, in Vietnam, there has been no regulation on the norms of INT services in
general and open source software in particular[…] As a result, there is no basis for open
source software firms to define and collect service fees […] Firms have to dodge the
laws through different ways in order to survive. (VietnamNet 25 February 2012).
Further evidence supporting Dr. Quang’s concerns is the exclusion of
technology developed based on a philosophy of open source products from the main
policy detailing what types of support the state of Vietnam is willing to provide, as
in Decision No: 19/2001/QD-TTg (Government of Vietnam 2001).46 This decision
does not act as an impediment to the use of open source knowledge for technological
upgrading processes, as it does not specifically exclude the development of open
source software for R&D activities: it just does not specifically support it. When
looking into further details of the policy, there are three types of government support
offered in this policy: taxation, capital for enterprise and land rental. There is
nothing that can be applied as government support if the knowledge concerned
ultimately originated from open source communities. With regard to the incentive of
46 The text of policy Decision No: 19/2001/QD-TTg is in Appendix E
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land rental to IT firms, the state provides half-price land rental for selected firms
during the infant period of the project’s execution (Government of Vietnam: 2001).
This does not help firms that have already established and expanded their
technological capacity into a different business type, as in the case of IVC.
The last critique of Decision No. 19/2001/QD-TTg’s open source exclusions
is that the unit of measurement in the policy is the type of computer products rather
than the ownership’s type of knowledge procurement for IT production. This may
explain why it emerged in the fieldwork that this policy had become irrelevant to
IVC’s technology-upgrading process. For example, the policy states that the
supporting capital provided by the state is aimed to support firms with their
expenses in the investment of technological production and related matters:
When there arises the need to invest in building production establishments, the
enterprise may borrow the State’s development investment credits from the
Development Assistance Fund for a period of not more than 10 years for each separate
loan. The capital-borrowing enterprise shall not have to mortgage its assets, but must
not assign its assets before it has repaid all its debts (both principal and interest) for
each loan.
As the investment in open source based technological production is mostly
free of cost and is embedded in human resources, this policy becomes irrelevant
since it is aimed at computer products not content:
The enterprise directly producing computers shall be allocated a full per cent of the
normal working capital, the deficit shall be covered with the State’s development
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investment credit loans from the Development Assistance Fund corresponding to a
production cycle.
In addition, the state needs to approve the project, which implies that the
project has to be in the formal sector:
The enterprise shall be supported with the State budget capital source reserves for
scientific and technical research in research and development projects after the project
is approved.
The final method by which the state attempts to promote open source is by
pushing to replace proprietary software by open source software within its own
agency and organisations. This movement from the state aims to promote open
source software by starting with the state and moving outwards towards society. By
doing so, the state not only aims to familiarise local software users with the adoption
of open source software, but also to familiarise local software developers with
technological features for developing open source software. All of this is done for
the cause of IT industrial development, as already mentioned throughout this
chapter, and to promote the state’s intention to reduce the amount of software
piracy. However, the latter intention is against the free and open source philosophy,
as the state’s push for open source software over proprietary software takes the
freedom of choice away from software users. This criticism of the Vietnamese
state’s roles in IT industrial development has been voiced in the media, and among
free and open source software advocates.
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Some interesting examples here include ‘The Attack of the Operating
System Site’ and ‘ZDNet’, sites registered outside Vietnam where technical people
voiced their concerns from a technological point of view, of how Vietnam’s polity
has gone too far by mandating the replacement of proprietary software with open
source software across the government bodies. This mandate takes away software
users’ freedom of choice over software consumption, as well as mistaking the
technological benefits of open source software (OS ATTACK: 2009; Blankenhorn:
2009). One example criticism is:
[…] when we talk about open source in the developing world. Mandate open source?
Force everyone to use Linux? That's...that's...communist! Can they do that? Yes, they
can. If, like Vietnam, they're communist to begin with. Actually you don't have to be
communist to do what Vietnam has done. (Blankenhorn: 2009).
Another example comes from the ‘The Attack of the Operating System Site’:
Many people have criticised Vietnam for this radical implementation of open source
software and even calling it “communist”. But really is it communism or actually
doing the correct and moral thing. (OS ATTACK: 2009).
However, the criticisms on these two sites further raises the thought-
provoking implication that the Vietnamese government’s mandate on this matter
may not benefit the country over the long-term and may not benefit the image of
open source software.
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7.4 Conclusion
This chapter offered an analysis of the irrelevant state, which is the characteristic of
the state that arose from the bottom-up technology-upgrading approach in the
Android’s application technology. The chapter’s case study is a domestic IT firm
that conducted R&D activities with the use of non-proprietary software that is
available to the public via online open-source software sites, where users can exploit
knowledge on the site at a minimum cost (free or almost free of charge). As such,
these R&D activities have high economic competitiveness potential, as they are
produced with a minimum investment cost with regards to the cost of knowledge
acquisition for R&D activities. Nevertheless, the irrelevant state fails to utilise such
sources of economic competitiveness in its related industrial policies. In other
words, the state’s industrial developmental instruments are irrelevant, as the failure
to capture the non-cost-related potential of publicly-owned knowledge, which is
expressed through the production of non-proprietary software.
In terms of the bottom-up model of technology-upgrading of the Android’s
application technology discussed in this chapter, this model was conceptualised
from how essential knowledge of Android’s application technology were gathered to
be used for technological upgrading. Considering that IVC obtained essential
knowledge from publicly-owned sources which were non-institutionalised,
technological knowledge in this model thus has a character of being ubiquitously
embedded within different segments of society. IVC grounded this public-owned
knowledge up into its more institutionalised technology-upgrading process to
innovate the company’s Android application. Against this backdrop, technological
upgrading in this chapter is conceptualised as a bottom-up model.
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Android’s mobile application technology in Vietnam has many elements that
qualify them to be peripheral artefacts in the hierarchy of emerging information
technologies. The human resources model of the App economy is people-centric.
The innovation model is a ubiquitous model, with a process of improvement that
opens up to amateur developers (from Table 4.2, this refers to ‘from technical hype
to technical reality’). Innovations in the App economy are heavily dependent on
informal capital accumulation, thus the App’s economic competitiveness is less
obvious and less recognised by other economic performers and the state. Moreover,
IPRs Protocol of the knowledge employed for technology-upgrading in the App is
publicly owned.
A degree of counter-developmentalism also emerged from the state’s lack of
understanding of the economic development potential of non-proprietary software.
The irrelevant state is well behind the curve of the technological trend; the evidence
used in this chapter suggests that the Vietnamese state viewed non-proprietary
software mainly as a cost saving software alternative to pricey proprietary software
that is bound with a package of intellectual property right issues. Even though being
cost-saving is one of the potential benefits of non-proprietary software, it is not the
only one. With regards to economic competitiveness, non-proprietary software can
offer increasingly shared publicly-owned knowledge and the upskilling of the online
community, who are behind the construction of non-proprietary software.
Now we shall turn our attention to the next research findings: the counter-
developmental state and online games.
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Chapter 8
Online games, the Virtual Economy, the Counter-Developmental
State and Forward Trends
8.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses a multi-layered model of technological upgrade in the context
of online games and the emergence of virtual economies in massively multiplayer
online role-playing games (MMORPGs) (Figure 4.1: Four Models of Technology-
Upgrading Process). The Vietnamese state’s role in this model is characterised as
being counter-developmental. The state is counter-developmental because it fails to
recognise the economic benefits of technological upgrade that come from the
emergence of a virtual economy. On the top of this failure to recognise these
benefits, the counter-developmental state has also cracked down on many activities
in online games (including their consumption) and all activities related to the virtual
economy, as the counter-developmental state views these as a form of ‘social evil’.
In more specific detail, the state considers the consumption of online games
and related activities (especially the MMORPGs) to be a ‘social evil’ based
primarily on a moral panic in society.47 This moral panic exists especially among
generations of Vietnamese who are older than most gamers and is not empirically
47 According to the government of Vietnam, online games are ‘games played on the Internet with the interaction
between players and servers of enterprises providing online game services, and among players.’ (Government of
Vietnam: 2006). However, the government of Vietnam limits the scope of online games through the state’s
management (2006) by focusing mainly on multiplayer online games: ‘Online games defined in this Circular are
massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs), including massively multiplayer online role-playing games
(MMOPRGs) and casual games.’ (2006). This chapter demonstrates that the state is counter-developmental
regarding the type of online game referred to collectively as MMORPGs.
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well-founded: to date no systematic study has confirmed the relationship between
online games and the negative effects reflected in the moral panic. While excessive
consumption of everything, including online games, is likely to have negative
effects, the most effective way to solve the problem is to deal with the problem of
overconsumption rather than to try to control online games.
The multi-layered model of technological upgrade through online games is
conducted by its consumers, who are gamers. Online gamers play to obtain certain
virtual gains such as digital coins, items, passing game levels and obtaining special
powers for game avatars. These virtual gains are the game’s artificial scarcities,
which gamers seek to overcome. Gamers technologically upgrade to be traders in
the virtual economy when they exchange virtual gains with other gamers for
economic benefits. These trading activities in the virtual economy are often referred
to as ‘gold farming’, and the gamers who conduct such activities are called ‘gold
farmers’. This type of technological upgrade is multi-layered because the virtual
economy, which is an outcome of the technology-upgrading processes, is tightly
connected to its origins in online games.
The consumption of online games leads gamers who are not online game
developers to produce goods in the virtual economy. The characteristics of this
virtual economy match those of peripheral artefacts in the hierarchy of emerging
information technologies. The knowledge and mode of innovation in this type of
technological upgrade are not only non-institutionalised, but also blur the distinction
between production and consumption, and between skilled and non-skilled workers.
Because the Vietnamese state perceives the activities in this virtual economy to be
not just peripheral artefacts but even ‘social evils’, the state’s economic
developmental role in this type of technology-upgrading process is counter-
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developmental and Vietnam risks falling behind the curve of the technological
trends in this virtual economy.
This chapter starts first with an introduction to the online games industry in
Vietnam. Second, the chapter examines the different roles of online games in
Vietnam: online games as technological hero versus online games as a ‘social evil’.
Finally, the chapter will characterise the counter-developmental state through its
attitude towards technology-upgrading processes in online games.
8.2 Introducing Vietnam’s Online Games Industry
In 2009, the government of Vietnam first published an official statistics report, The
White Book on Vietnam ICT 2009, on the development of Vietnam’s IT Industry.
The Minister of Information and Communications, Dr. Le Doan Hop, stated that
obtaining accurate statistics on Vietnam’s IT industry is extremely difficult because
the industry is growing quickly and very highly socially networked (MIC 2009 : 5).
This statement indicates the challenges in obtaining official and trustworthy
statistics on Vietnam’s online games industry, although some related statistics
provide an indication of the growth and economic contributions of that industry.
In this section, the growth and economic contribution of Vietnam’s online
games industry will be viewed through the lens of sector revenue within the context
of a digital content industry.
In order to outline the economic benefits of online gaming in the IT industry,
the online games sector is merged with the video games sector, and is referred here
as computer game. This is due to the advancement of the video games distribution
model that increasingly become more digital, thus also creating a share in the online
game industry as well (Marchand and Henning-Thurau 2013: 152).
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The economic impacts of computer games contribute to many sub-sectors of
the IT industry, as the value chain of the game industry encompasses all the three
sub-sectors of the IT industry (OECD 2005: 17). For example, computer games
sector involved the hardware sector with regard to the production of their game
consoles and platforms (2005: 17), the software sector with regard to the production
of their middleware (2005: 19), and the digital content sector with regard to their
digital online features such as online gamer accounts known as an ‘online pass’
(Marchand and Henning-Thurau 2013: 152).
Statistically, Marchand and Henning-Thurau (2013) provide a clear picture
of the economic benefits of the computer game industry by comparing the game
industrial revenues with several entertainment industries. In 2012, the global
revenues for game hardware and software were around 67 billon US dollars, with an
extra 14.8 billion US dollars from virtual economic revenue, and together the
revenue of the game industry came five time higher than the global music revenues
in 2011 which standed at an estimate of 16.5 billion US dollars, and also came close
to the movie industry revenue in 2011 which stood at 69.4 billion US dollars (2013:
141). These numbers lead Marchand and Henning-Thurau to draw a conclusion that
the computer game industry has moved from being a niche industry to a highly
competitive one (2013: 141).
8.2.1 Industrial Revenue
The government of Vietnam has officially divided its domestic IT industry
into three sectors: the hardware, software and digital content industries. Online
games form a major business that contributes to the growth of digital content: major
leading enterprises in digital content mention online games as a focus. Accordingly,
the material on the digital content industry in the aforementioned official report
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(MIC 2009: 83; MIC 2010: 37) may be helpful for understanding the online games
industry.
Table 8.1 Revenues of Vietnam’s IT Industry in Three Sub-Sectors, Year 2008 and
2009 (Million USD)
IT Industry’s Sub-
Sectors
2008 2009
Growth Rate of
2009 (%)
Hardware 4,100 4,627 12.85
Software 680 850 25.00
Digital Content 440 690 56.81
Total Revenue 5,220 6,167 18.14
Source: Vietnam Information and Communication Technology White Book 2010 (MIC 2010)
According to Table 8.1, digital content accounted for the smallest share in
the whole Vietnamese IT industry; however; it possessed the highest growth rate out
of the three industries. Digital content was still relatively new to Vietnam and the
industry could grow substantially before reaching the saturation point, possibly
becoming the biggest part of the Vietnamese IT industry.
8.2.2 Industrial Wages
Table 8.2 Numbers of Workers, Revenue and Wage per Worker in the Vietnamese
IT industry, Year 2008 and 2009
IT
Industry’s
Sub-
Sectors
Number of
Workers (Person)
Revenue per Worker
(USD/Person/Year)
Wage per Worker
(USD/Person/Year)
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Hardware 110,000 121,300 37,200 38,145 1,440 1,809
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IT
Industry’s
Sub-
Sectors
Number of
Workers (Person)
Revenue per Worker
(USD/Person/Year)
Wage per Worker
(USD/Person/Year)
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Software 57,000 64,000 12,000 13,281 3,600 4,250
Digital
Content
33,000 41,000 13,300 16,829 2,820 3,505
Source: Vietnam Information and Communication Technology White Book 2010 (MIC 2010)
Table 8.2 illustrates the numbers and wages of employees in Vietnam’s IT
industry, and implies the levels of manpower required in the three industries. The
hardware sector is the biggest contributor to domestic IT industry revenue. This can
be explained by the fact that Vietnam’s competitive advantage is in cheap
manufacturing labour.48
Despite generating the biggest overall revenue out of the three sectors,
hardware workers earn the least. There are two interpretations of such wage
differentials. Firstly, in digital content work is much more reasonably paid in
Vietnam. Secondly, the higher wages of digital content workers may indicate the
higher level of skilled work in this sector, as the statistics from the ‘Wage per
Worker’ section of Table 8.2 suggest the positive impact of digital content workers
on economic development. Despite being the smallest industry in terms of number
of workers, digital content workers brought in the second highest wage per head and
individually earned almost twice as much as hardware sector workers. Although
these statistics do not break the digital content sector data down, other sources can
fill this gap and provide a broad picture of online games’ role in the digital content
industry.
48 For more detail on cheap IT-skilled labour as a source of Vietnam’s competitiveness, see the thesis’s Chapter
5: Software outsourcing and the cooperative state.
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8.2.3 Online Games Market Revenue
Table 8.3 Vietnam Online Games Market Revenue (Million USD)
Online
Games Revenue
2007 2008 2009
33 67 109
Source: Forbes Asia Magazine (Fannin 2010)
Table 8.3 shows the market revenue of online games in Vietnam. These numbers are
crude as, after all, these are still market estimates; nevertheless, they provide a
picture of how much online games contribute to the digital content industry. Online
games in Vietnam provided 15 per cent and 16 per cent of total digital content
market revenue in 2008 and 2009 respectively.49 Vietnam’s emerging online games
industry is young and small but powerful in the sense that its economic contributions
go beyond the online games business. This industry also generates other types of
digital content and services, for example, social networking sites and blogs, so its
economic benefits in terms of technological products go beyond the online games
themselves. Additionally, online games also generate economic benefits in terms of
the high-tech infrastructure that enables local technological consumption in
Vietnam, as will be examined in the next section.
8.3 Online games as a Technology Hero and as a Social Evil
8.3.1 Online games as a Technology Hero
To observe the evolution of MMORPGs in Vietnam, the Vinagame Joint Stock
Company (now renamed the VNG Corporation, thus hereafter VNG) is employed as
a case study. VNG was founded by five hard-core gamers back in 2004 (VNG
49 These figures were calculated from statistics on the digital content sector revenues as presented in Table 8.1,
and the online games revenue as presented in Table 8.3.
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2011), who started their business only by licensing and localising imported
MMORPGs from China. In 2005 VNG introduced the first MMPORG in Vietnam,
The Swordsman online (Vietnamese name Vo Lam Truyen Ky). The game was
developed by a Chinese software company, but VNG had a monopoly as its only
distributor in Vietnam (VNG 2011). The company started out in the least innovative
area, merely customising the online game for the local conditions, which is the
smallest possible move from non-innovation to innovation. However, the company
later on added areas that nurtured innovation by increasing Internet usage in
Vietnam.
Despite starting out only as a licensed local distributor, VNG has thrived in
recent years. In 2008, government official statistics showed that VNG’s market
revenue was 41.0 million USD (Government of Vietnam 2009: 83). Table 8.3 on
Vietnam’s online games market revenue makes clear the importance of VNG to
Vietnam’s online games market. The company’s revenue constitutes 61 per cent of
the total online games revenue in that year, and thus VNG is a valid case to
represent the impact of the online games business upon Vietnam’s domestic
technological development.
Games companies have not only generated prosperity through online games
but also improved the conditions for innovation in Vietnam. The online games
industry has created favourable conditions for the development of the IT
infrastructure. The online games business could not have started if Vietnam did not
have a decent broad-band Internet service, but the online games industry has driven
this technological development further. The MMORPGs are consumed notably
though Internet rooms across Vietnam (Tuo, Wang and Chen 06August 2010) and
their popularity has also increased the number of Internet rooms across Vietnam
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(personal communication, Le Hong Minh, 2010). This has increased the rate of
Vietnam’s Internet penetration. During the interview with Le Hong Minh, one of
VNG’s founders and now chairman and chief executive, he mentioned that in 2004
when the company first started, there were about 5,000 Internet rooms in Vietnam.
By 2009, there were about 30,000 Internet rooms (personal communication, Le
Hong Minh, 2010). He narrates:
[..] we believed VNG play a very crucial role in terms of Internet growth in
Vietnam. Online game became a killer application to attract young people to get
into the Internet – and stimulate the growth of Internet rooms (public places to
access Internet). Internet rooms are crucial in developing countries and without
these public places, China and Vietnam could not have 25%+ Internet
penetration. Many other developing countries have lower Internet penetration
due to the lack of Internet rooms. Online game is where these Internet rooms are
making money and enabling them to expand/invest and attract more people
opening up new Internet rooms. (personal communication with author, Le Hong
Minh).
The pace of penetration has been skyrocketing, according to the HCMC
Computer Association (Internet World Stats site 2010). The association states that
the percentage of growth of Internet penetration in Vietnam surpassed the global
usage percentage in 2006. Vietnam’s Internet penetration rate was 16 per cent of the
population, while the global rate was 15.7 per cent of the population (2010). Even
though there are other factors that affect the growth rate of internet penetration, this
should not conceal the role of online games. Moreover, it was reported by a market
research company, Pearl Research, that Vietnamese online gamers spent on average
around 31 USD per month in Internet rooms, a claim that matches the author’s
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observation during fieldwork in Internet rooms in several provinces in Vietnam (Ho
Chi Minh City, Hanoi, Mui Ne, Da Lat, and Can Tho) (Personal observations 2010;
Tuo, Wang and Chen 06August 2010). The rate of Internet penetration can be taken
as an indicator of better Internet technology in Vietnam than previously and a
growing opportunity for digital commerce that is more accessible given the rate of
Internet penetration.
In terms of technological consumption, MMORPGs are consumed mainly by
Vietnamese youth, who form the majority of the Vietnamese population. Vietnam is
a country with a remarkably young population: among the population of 90,549,390
people, 27.8 years is the median age (Central Intelligence Agency 2011).
Furthermore, the young Vietnamese population is a valuable human resource that
contributes greatly to Vietnam’s new economy, as 70 per cent of population is of
working age (age 15-64 years old), with a high rate of literacy at 90.3 per cent of the
population. Considering these numbers together, it is undeniable that the country is
comprised of a great number of skilled workers, who are young and taking
advantage of their country’s rapidly growing economy (2011). In relation to the
development of the country’s IT industry, the large pool of young and skilled
workers is often combined with a willingness to work hard for a fraction of the
wages of many international IT workers, such as those in China and India (Oxford
Analytica 2010).
Online games in Vietnam have also pushed youth over technological
boundaries, by connecting them together though virtual communities that emerged
alongside the popularity of online games (Tuyen 2010: 185-190). The successes of
VNG are not limited only to Vietnam. To date, VNG has also penetrated overseas
markets, representing the technological capacity of Vietnamese IT engineers in a
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global market. In 2012, VNG launched its online game, Sky Garden, in the Chinese
online game market. Three months later Sky Garden was granted ‘the best game
overseas award’ (VNG (n.d.)).
The role of online games as a ‘technology hero’ can be examined in greater
detail in the areas of middleware technology and bandwidth capacity development.
However, this chapter focuses mainly on the interplay between the desire of the
Vietnamese state to develop the domestic IT industry and its desire to control the
dynamic of one of the most vibrant IT sectors, online games. The chapter now
moves on to the social challenges that online games in Vietnam have been facing.
8.3.2 Online games as Social Evils and the Government Reaction
The Vietnamese government often portrays online games as having major
disadvantages, based on public outcry and negative press stories rather than
systematic research. Based on anecdotal evidence, the media has blamed online
games for problems including children seeing illicit images, juvenile crime, school
violence, school truancy and severe addiction among youth (Thanh 21 May 2010;
SGGP 16 December 2010; Vietnamnet 01 July 2011; GamePolitics 09 December
2010). These accusations are highly contentious since they may reflect the moral
panic of older non-gamers worried about the younger generation rather than the
negative effects of such games. Despite the lack of systematic, sound evidence
linking online games with the negative effects claimed by media, the government
has expressed concerns about the effects of online games on youth though several
channels: constantly expressing concerns though government media such as the
news site Vietnamenet, coordinating with local government to forbid online games
that are considered to contain violent scenes (SGGP 16 December 2010) and
- 246 -
coordinating with games provider not to provide services in any Internet rooms
located near educational institutions (2010).
The government of Vietnam has implemented several restrictions related to
online games activities at different levels, both in banning game playing activities
and limiting game content. The earliest concerns regarding online games date back
to the time when the online games business in Vietnam started. In 2007, the Ministry
of Information and Communications issued Circular 60 specifying time restriction
rules for online game playing (PV 16 November 2007). Under Circular 60, game
providers have to put a limit on playing time that varies by each game. For example,
very few games can be played continuously for three hours or five hours. The most
difficult part of this restriction was implementing it effectively (2007). The most
recent and controversial restriction saw the government shift pressure from online
game providers to Internet service providers (ISPs). From March 2011 ISPs were
requested by the Ministry of Information and Communications to restrict access to
online games from 10.00pm to 08.00am. Failure to adhere to these regulations
results in businesses being shut down.
The government’s crackdowns on online games and related activities have
been conducted on somewhat groundless evidence. Most justifications given for the
crackdown are based on public outcries and moral panic as expressed through media
which are mostly owned by the Vietnamese state. This moral panic is well explained
by the notion of ‘social evils’ in Vietnam, which the state has historically associated
with certain economic phenomena.
The term ‘social evils’ expresses a conflict between old and new values in
Vietnam. The definitions of what are old and new are not systematic, but what is old
is what is considered to reflect traditional Vietnamese values (McNally 2003: 114).
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Online games are not the first socio-economic activity to be branded as a social evil
in Vietnam. The Vietnamese government has similarly classified many other
activities as social evils in the past including foreign-style advertising and Western
music (Higgs 2003: 84-85; McNally 2003: 114), pornography (Soucy 2003: 129),
prostitution and drugs, the latter of which have been blamed as a cause of another
social evil, HIV, in Vietnam (McNally 2003: 113). While most of these proclaimed
social evils seemed to result from economic liberalisation, they also are political as
well as social or economic issues. McNally reflects this point: ‘Vietnam continues to
be controlled by a one-party state that often remains intolerant of freedom and
difference, and ambivalent towards change.’(2003: 113).
8.4 Characterising the Counter-Developmental State from Online
Games and its Technology-Upgrading Process
Technological upgrade in an online games industry can be done in many
technological areas that determine the quality of the games, such as with real-time
technology or middleware technologies.50 Technological upgrade for these two types
of technologies comes in various forms and serves various purposes. These
purposes include increasing the effectiveness or skills needed to implement currently
used technology. These are a few examples of how technological upgrade can occur
in the online games sector; nonetheless, the research pays attention to other types of
technological upgrade that are not focussed on the technology used in providing
online games. Rather, this chapter appears examines the technological upgrade that
occurs in the form of the emergence of a new economy out of the consumption of
50 In brief, real time technology is the technology or technologies which enable interactions between players
concurrently, and middleware technology is a type of software technology that connects online game
applications with the computer’s operating systems.
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online games. This new economy lives within the economy of online games, from
which it arose.
There are two major phenomena that characterise the new economy, which
are also results of technological upgrade. First of all, the new economy is also a new
line of production that does not yield common upgrades in a line of production,
(such as an upgrade to produce additional services or additional applications that are
provided by the same producers to the same users or in short, an upgrade to a line of
production by producers for users). Rather, technological upgrading in online games
is a case of an upgrade in a line of production by users for users. Secondly, such
upgrading in a line of production is not in order to support the technological capacity
used in the original economy, but rather to exploit artificial scarcities that are
produced while the original economy is consumed.
This is a new type of IT economy called a virtual economy, one based on
transactions involving the scarce digital commodities that are produced during the
consumption of the digital economy (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 2011: 6). In other
words, the virtual economy exists inside the consumption process of the digital
economy.
8.4.1 From Online Gamers to Gold Farmers: A Technology-Upgrading
Approach in a Leisure Digital Economy
In the world of digital technologies, gold farming is an economic phenomenon in
which people derive income from playing online games. MMORPG gamers become
gold farmers when they play games not just for entertainment but for economic gain,
for example, when they trade the virtual gains that they earn as they play the games.
The aforementioned virtual gains can range from an avatar, through to platinum
items or an avatar’s capacities, levels of game achievement and numbers of
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challenges unlocked. Trading a few of these virtual gains involves the trade of a
game account.
The demands of the gold farming business arise from the default setting of
game challenges. The entertainment value of games is subject to the abilities of each
gamer to overcome different types of challenges that she has to face throughout the
game. In the world of MMORPGS, these challenges can vary greatly. For example,
gamers play their MMORPGs though an avatar. Commonly, the avatars’ characters
and abilities are defined and constrained through default settings; for example, a
particular avatar might come with an ability to fight faster but with less power than
other types of avatars. Furthermore, the levels of the MMORPGs are also set so that
gamers have to overcome challenges in the game to progress. For example, winning
a fight with monsters in a game allows a gamer to obtain virtual items which will
unlock the next levels of the game later on. Another example is when gamers gain
virtual items by completing default achievements. The gamers then exchange these
virtual items with an in-game merchant for coins or special avatar abilities. These
game challenges in the form of different types of constraints lead to the creation of
‘virtual scarcities’. These scarcities also create a market niche for gamers who have
more time than money to play the games to overcome these challenges, then sell
their accounts or virtual items to other players who have more money but less time
(Heeks 2008: 19). This constitutes the gold farming business. 51
These virtual gains derived from playing MMORPGs can be traded directly
from a gold farmer to other gamers, or traded in a collective manner when the gold
farmers get together and sell their virtual gains though other institutions, such as a
middle man who does the marketing and advertising in the MMORPGs for other
51 Of course, the details and characteristics of the gold farming business vary from game to game. However,
despite such variations, the nature of gold farming has the common, shared characteristics described above.
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gold farmers. Trading through a middle man is an in-game method to do gold
farming; however, it is not the only method to organise the trade transactions of gold
farming. For example, gold farming businesses retail their business though gold
farming websites, such as MyMMOShop.com that sells gold for the War of
Worldcraft game, or selling virtual gains on online auction sites or in game
forums.52
The payments for these virtual gains, which are essential to the gold farming
phenomenon, can be digitalised both in terms of trading venues and trading
currency. The trading venues have to be involved, as these virtual items only exist in
the digital world; however, the trade agreement and items transfers could occur
online and the payment be made in person. Castronova (2001: 30-31) refers to this
as a trade in a virtual world and a payment in the real world society.53 It has also
been reported that there are other types of payments used in the trade of gold
farming, such as an exchange of the virtual items of other digital goods in which
both sides of the trade agree on values, or other methods of compensation.
Since, as Heeks notes, gold farmers are those who have more time than
money, and their clients are those who have more money than time (2008: 19), it
makes sense that gold farmers are in a lower socio-economic position than their
clients. In terms of global chain analysis, many of these gold farmers are from
developing countries such as Vietnam and China (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 2011:
xi). As such, people who have more time than money can be understood as people
who are from a less technological advanced society or situation than their clients. In
52 The third party gold farming sites have major problems concerning their reliability. A small number are
known in game forums for conducting fraud after gaining the trust of the gamers. These sites have then closed
down. Some have been forced to close by official game distributors.
53 The methods of payment are one of the aspects of gold farming that has created a public outcry. Sites for
exchanging such payments can have a poor reputation and the media often report security concerns in relation to
the youth who play games.
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this case, the emergence of gold farming presents not only the emergence of
entrepreneurial opportunities but also technological opportunities for people in less
technological advanced circumstances to become part of a technological production
chain.
How these Vietnamese gold farmers get paid is still largely shrouded in
myth. It is very difficult to pinpoint exact numbers of gold farmers in Vietnam or
how much they earn out of this business. Most information about the Vietnamese
gold farmers comes from discussions from game forums (MMOSITE 7 August
2008) and media reports (BBC 22 August 2008; BBC 8 April 2011). Research about
gold farming is at an infant stage and unfocused since it is a grey area of economic
activity. As such, measuring and understanding how Vietnamese gold farmers earn
from their farms and their net values in this global chain of gold farming are
uncharted waters.
Moreover, many view gold farming as a grey area economy, so most
analytical research accounts are based on media reports, the researchers’ own in-
game experiences and online observations. This limits the scope of the research to a
few aspects of gold farming such as the organisation of gold farming in terms of its
in-game organisation and global value chain production, the industrial sociology of
gold farmers and gold farming as part of the virtual economy (Castronova 2001;
Heeks 2008; Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 2011; and Keegan et. al 2011).
However in characterising the counter-developmental state in high-tech
economic development, gold farming will be examined in the scholarly context of a
virtual economy, one of the newest phenomena of techno-economic evolutionary
progress within information technology.
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8.4.2 The Virtual Economy and Beyond
Gold farming, which Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist refer to as a third party online games
service (2011: 7-8), is an increasingly popular economic activity forming part of the
virtual economy, but it is not the only one. Since the beginning of the 21st century,
more and more diverse virtual economic activities have come to be known such as
microwork including crowdsourcing, cherry blossoming and user-created virtual
goods production (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 2011: 7-8). Microwork and cherry
blossoming are economic activities that use human effort to conduct small digital
tasks that computers cannot do, for example, to recognise user-uploaded pictures
that match a description, a microwork task. ‘Cherry blossoming’ involves clicking a
‘like’ button on a new Facebook page to improve how it is perceived (2011: 7-8) to
achieve marketing tasks for products that have a Facebook page. User-created
virtual goods production is an economic activity in which IT workers produce
virtual commodities for virtual environments, such as Second Life (2011: 7-8).54
There are some similarities between the four types of virtual economies. The third
party games service and the user-created virtual goods echo each other very closely;
however, there is a major difference between the two. While the third party online
games service is a virtual production to overcome digital scarcities, the user-created
virtual goods are a virtual production to overcome virtual scarcities. Furthermore,
not all four types of virtual economy are meant to overcome artificial scarcities. This
is a distinction, for example, between microwork and cherry blossoming. While both
of the two use human effort to accomplish small digital tasks that computers cannot
do, or can only do with higher cost and more time than by human efforts, microwork
54 Second Life is a virtual world where people can live, as they would do in real life, through an avatar. Second
Life is a huge virtual community that is famous for its online chat community, and its huge virtual market place
for its users to produce and trade their virtual goods, such as designing and selling avatars’ clothes.
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is not a type of work to overcome virtual scarcity, as is the case of cherry
blossoming (2001: 7-8).
However, when comparing gold farming businesses with other types of the
virtual economy, the gold farming business appears to be in a less formal economic
sector than the others. Gold farming businesses have been closed down or are illegal
in many countries; thus they often are found as an underground market activity and
not just in Vietnam. The economic formality of gold farming is constrained largely
because gold farming services degrade and disturb the original challenge setting of
the MMORPGs (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 2011: xi; Castronova 2001: 28). Gold
farmers produce their commodities by playing the MMORPGs, and then trade them
outside of the original games where the commodities were produced. Most game
distributors disapprove of gamers engaging in gold farming economic transactions
outside of the official MMORPGs. A few games distributors regard gold farming as
an activity that violates the original copyright of the MMORPGs. From this
perspective all of the accounts, avatars and items of the games are the MMORPGs’
intellectual property, despite the fees and the time that the gamers spend.
The size of the virtual economy is promising. Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist
(2011: xi) state that gross revenues from third party online games services were
around 3.0 billion USD in 2009. Beyond the impressive figures, it enables
technological entrepreneurship for less developed economies as they enter the global
production of this virtual economy, which has potential implications for
development. Many less technologically advanced economies have become a
substantial part of the virtual economy, such as Vietnam and China in the gold
farming business and India and Kenya in the microwork business (2011: xi).
Unfortunately, the future of such entrepreneurial opportunity appears to be
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endangered since authorities and official game distributors seek to remove virtual
economic workers from the production chains. Gold farming remains profitable
because the design of games constantly creates demand to overcome digital
scarcities that are part of the games’ challenges. In response, MMORPGs
distributors have come up with strategies to fill the gamers’ demand for gold
farming. For example, NeverWinter, a MMORPG, offers its own official gold
farming service. This is an attempt by the game distributor to combat the unofficial
gold farming business that flourishes around games. Additionally, Vietnamese
authorities have clamped down on gold farming, reducing the entrepreneurial
opportunities for the workers who have thrived as part of the knowledge economy
and overcome their socio-technological constraints.
Furthermore, if we consider how information technologies have evolved
since the birth of the commercial computing machine, we can see that the virtual
economy is part of how information technologies evolve within economic
mechanisms. Generally speaking, at the beginning of the computer industry, when
the term IT was used rather than the term IT when referring to the computer
industry, the hardware sector occupied most of the market share. At the time,
hardware was initially a computing technology. Then as time and technologies
progressed, hardware – while remained a computing technology - became a utility
technology that enabled the production of software. This process was also repeated
with software. After originally starting off as a computing technology only, it
became a utility technology which enabled the production of the digital economy
and is now subservient to the on-going economic life of the digital economy. The
digital economy was only a computing technology (which is now often referred to as
an information technology), but has now turned itself into a utility technology that
enables the production of the virtual economy to take place. However, unlike the
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other information technologies, a big part of the virtual economy has been the casual
technological production that blurs the line between the consumption of leisure
technologies and their production. This, in turn, has also blurred the line between
technological entrepreneurial opportunities and moral panic, as well as work and
play.
8.4.3 Characterising the Counter-Developmental State from
Technological Upgrading in an Online Games Business
The counter-developmental state derives from a structural contradiction between the
state’s industrial policies on the one hand and state culture and public security
policies on the other hand. It is a characteristic form of the state that it undermines
its own economic developmental trajectory due to its objectives in other areas.
Online games is a prominent contributor to a domestic digital content industry, not
only in its industrial share but also in terms of spinoff benefits for other digital
content productions, especially in the entertainment business, as well as in terms of
technology-upgrading capacity. However, all of these competitive advantages of the
online games business do not guarantee support from the state, even though the
online games business helps the state to reach its economic goal to industrialise and
modernise Vietnam by 2020. The prosperity of the Vietnam domestic online games
business is undermined by the state’s restrictions because the state considers the
development of online games in the context of culture and social morals. This
contradiction behind the rise of the counter-developmental state is analysed in this
chapter on the basis of the main industrial policy relating to the management of
- 256 -
online games, Joint Circular No. 60/2006/TTLT-BVHTT-BBCVT-BCA
(Government of Vietnam 2006).55
The Vietnamese state’s industrial interventions in the online games business
place the technological development of online games in a socio-cultural context by
authorising the management of this sector conjointly between three ministries: the
Ministry of Culture and Information, the Ministry of Post and Telematics and the
Ministry of Public Security. In general, the Circular focuses mainly upon providing
guidelines to online games providers about how they are managed under the state’s
supervision. These guidelines evoke a sense of the state controlling and regulating
rather supporting or being cooperative. The Circular contains six topics of how to
manage online games including general provisions; provision of online games
services; responsibilities of organisations and individuals providing and using online
game services; inspection, examination, and handling of violations; organisation of
implementation; and implementation provisions. The circular mostly addresses what
businesses should not do. The first Chapter on the general provisions emphasises the
type of technological and technical activities that are governed by the Circular,
definitions of online games and their providers; prohibited games; and limits on
publishing and advertising for online games. Importantly, the first Chapter of the
Circular advocates for the state protection of domestic technology products, as long
as their content is not against Vietnam’s history and traditional cultures, by
prioritising support for games that are researched and produced domestically rather
than being imported into Vietnam (2006).
Chapter two of the Circular expresses generally the state’s requirements for
the games’ documentation and state procedures to obtain the state’s permission for
55 Appendix F of this thesis is a full policy statement
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online games’ production and the provision of services. Online games enterprises
are required to submit their applications to the Ministry of Post and Telematics and
the Ministry of Public Security for their co-ordinated approval. This can be analysed
in the way that the Ministry of Post and Telematics, and the Ministry of Public
Security are the Vietnamese state’s tools to manage online games at the approval
stage, prior to the state’s granting of permission. Nevertheless, the Ministry of
Culture and Information jointly manages online games with the first two ministries,
assuming the state’s management of online games after the games have been
approved.
Chapter three of the Circular details the types of information that online
games have to provide to the state’s management agencies after the online games
have been approved to operate in Vietnam. All the three ministries are empowered
by the state to acquire all this information. Chapter three, all required information, is
referred to as the ‘responsibilities’ of all the parties involved in an operation of
online games. This required information is a sign of the state’s control beyond
purely online games information as the online gamers’ information must also be
stored by online games’ providers, who are obliged to pass it to the state if
requested. As such the Circular states:
[a/] Request service users to supply enterprises with personal information such as
names, addresses, 10 numbers or other details necessary for identifying service users;
[…] 3. Enterprises shall have to store information on service users and supply such
information to competent state management agencies when so requested. […] To send
reports to the Culture and Information Ministry, the Post and Telematics Ministry and
the Public Security Ministry biannually or in unexpected cases, when so requested.
(2006).
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Additionally, the Circular also requires that users will be informed fully
about the rules of games, the negative effects of excessive playing, the storage of
their information, the possibility that this information could be passed to third
parties. Users are also to be informed that online game providers are not allowed to
make profits from items like in-game valuable assets: ‘Enterprises providing online
game services must neither create valuable assets in games for profit seeking
purposes nor alter information on players’ assets or value’ (2006).
The notion that state agencies managing online games can request
information from online game services on online games users suggests strongly the
proposed counter-developmental state model where the state’s economic interests
conflict with social concerns. There are high levels of social concern expressed in
association with the state’s requirements for approving online games. For example,
Chapter three of the circular expresses the state’s concerns about school truancy,
requiring online game services ‘To provide online game services at places which are
at least 200 m far from the entrance gates of schools (from pre-schools to secondary
education schools) in any locality’ (2006).
The controlling side of Vietnam’s counter-developmental state continues to
be represented in Chapter four of the Circular. This chapter express the state’s rights
to inspect and examine all involved parties and their activities as stated in the
Circular’s Article 1. These invited parties are ‘[…]enterprises providing online game
services, Internet access service providers (ISP), Internet agents and users of online
game services’ (2006). The article also expresses the state’s rights to act upon any
violations via examination and sanctions.
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The state’s control over online games activities is also expressed in Chapter
five of the Circular. This chapter states a list of responsibilities of line ministries and
the related state management agency in order to manage online games. In addition to
the three ministerial-level agencies, the provincial or municipal People’s
Committees also hold responsibility for the state’s management of online games.
The responsibilities of these agencies are stated in order to provide guidelines for
these agencies to implement the Circular. All the parties subject to the Circular, as
stated in Article 1, have a relationship with the state involving being directed,
regulated and controlled rather than one involving partnership or co-ordination. The
related online games parties coordinate with the state only in the sense that they are
obliged to provide online games and their gamers’ information as required by the
state; nevertheless, these parties do not coordinate with the state in terms of the
development of the domestic online games industry.
Chapter six, the last chapter, concerns the implementation of the circular. It
states the length of time during which the Circular becomes effective. It also states
that all parties involved in the online games business are required to report problems
to the state’s management agencies.
To sum up, the state’s management of online games as expressed in Circular
60 considers online games through the lens of negative social effects on users rather
through the provision of the sector-specific developmental roles of the state. Even
though no specific information about online games’ ill effects on users are stated in
the Circular, the Circular treats the activities and functionalities of the online games
business as something that needs to be approved, regulated and controlled by the
state. This model of the state’s view towards online games in association with a
moral panic in Vietnam has been translated into the global context of Internet safety;
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it was voiced at APEC-OECD Joint Symposium on Initiatives among Member
Economies Promoting a Safer Internet Environment for Children in 2009, where
Ngo Quang Huy, an information security expert from Vietnam Computer
Emergency Response Team: Ministry of Information and Communications,
represented online games in the context of risks to children alongside ones such as
pornography and gambling (Ngo Quang Huy 2009). Furthermore, Huy
acknowledged in his presentation that Circular 60 attempts to provide solutions to
the dangers to which children may be exposed from playing games by limiting the
time spent on games for each gamer’s account and by controlling the content of
online games, as has been explained earlier in this chapter.
Moreover, the state’s control over online activities is now moving to another
area of online games: the virtual asset. The World Bank reports that China and
Vietnam are key suppliers of online game virtual resources for the global gold
farming business (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 2011: 7). While the World Bank views
this as a virtual economy, the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Committee has asked the
prime minister to ban the trade of online game virtual assets (Tuoi Tre 13 April
2011). This raises the question whether excessive game addiction actually causes
problems or whether there is a gap in perception between gamers and non-gamers
which could result in the suppression of one of the most vibrant contemporary
economic and technology sectors, namely online games in Vietnam. Furthermore,
the grey area of gold farming may particularly affect the government of Vietnam’s
attitude towards the IT business’s virtual economic potential, even though this
potential has been recognised differently and positively by the Wold Bank.
The banning of late-night online games in Vietnam is a step further for the
intervention in Internet usage. The Vietnamese government is known for its strict
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monitoring of online activities (Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 2011: 19), and once
blocked access to the Facebook site though a DNS-level barrier (Banyan 04 January
2011). Now the government has implemented a late-night ban, which without a
doubt has created extra economic costs, especially for the ISPs that have to find
efficient ways to implement the blocking. Furthermore, the ban will always leave
further questions about its effectiveness, especially in view of the enormous size of
the Internet and the high Internet literacy of Vietnamese youth.
Furthermore, this ban calls into question the credibility of Vietnamese state’s
economic intervention. There have been concerns expressed by Chinese technology
investors about the credibility and stability of Vietnam’s technology market
especially related to the new regulations of the government of Vietnam on
controlling online games (Tuo, Wang and Chen 6 August 2010). These regulations
create uncertainty in the business environment. Alternatively they could further
affect technology transfers and spillovers from foreign technology enterprises if they
withdraw their technology investment plans from Vietnam or lose trust in their
Vietnamese partners.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter offers an analysis of the counter-developmental state, which is the state
that arose from a multi-layered technology-upgrading approach in the online games
industry. An increase in the Internet penetration rate in less technologically
advanced countries aids the advancement of digital technology, which is able to
impersonate real world environments. This results in the construction of a few lines
of production in the digital world that are non-institutionalised in many respects.
Gold farming activities are one example of technological expansions in the digital
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world that count as informal digital production. Non-institutionalised technological
production refers to the production of technologies that blur the line between the
consumption of leisure technologies and the production of such technologies, and
the line between technological producers and technological users. As a result of the
blurring of these lines, technological upgrade in online industry has resulted in an
emergence of a new form of economy – the virtual economy – that is under-
institutionalised. The unconventional characteristics of the techno-economic
activities in the gold farming business are viewed by the Vietnamese state to be a
social issue (social evils), rather than an economic one. The Vietnamese state’s
perceiving of technological products, which primarily come in the form of
technological consumption, through the lens of social problems led the state’s
economic roles to be counter-developmental in this multi-layered technology-
upgrading approach.
In terms of the technology-upgrading approach in the online games industry
discussed in this chapter, technological upgrading in this model occurred in a multi-
layered manner, considering that the invention and innovation stage were processed
within a digital economy (by the digital consumption of online gamers), but the
diffusion stage of technological upgrading in this model occurred in a virtual
economy which lingers inside the digital economy. Technological upgrade in this
model creates an overlap in the three stages of technological upgrade between the
digital sector and the virtual economy. Based on these findings, the technology-
upgrading approach in this chapter was identified as a multi-layered model.
The virtual economy in Vietnam has many elements that qualify it to be a
peripheral artefact in the hierarchy of emerging information technologies. The
human resources model of the virtual economy is people-centric, who are the main
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source of un-codified knowledge for technological production in Virtual economy.
The distribution and monetisation is by-users-for-users with a strong dependence on
informal capital accumulation, and the virtual economy’s economic competitiveness
is less obvious to many economic performers, as well as to the state. Moreover, the
knowledge employed for technological upgrade in the virtual economy is publicly
owned. Finally, the resource scarcity in the virtual economy is artificial scarcity;
with economic activities that rely on the producers in the virtual economy to make
use of already created digital content.
In this chapter, the Vietnamese state worked mostly in a counter-
developmental manner, especially when compared with the cooperative,
technocratic and irrelevant approaches from the previous chapters. The counter-
developmental state in the case of managing online gamers and their other roles as
gold farmers displays structural contradictions between the social and techno-
economic structure. The characteristics of the Vietnamese state in this chapter are
similar to the previous chapter – the irrelevant state – in the sense that in both of the
cases the state falls behind the curve in keeping up with the techno-economic
potential of IT that has already been cultivated in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the
difference between the irrelevant state with a degree of counter-developmentalism
and the counter-developmental state, as proposed in this chapter, lies in the state
understanding the required technology to a lesser degree and the state viewing the
technology as a form of social evil. This has crucial implications in terms of state
developmentalism, as it means that the prosperity of certain types of IT production
appears as ‘social evil’ to the state, thus these activities were clamped down on by
the state. By doing so, the Vietnamese state was ultimately counter-developmental,
as the way the state governs the nation’s social structure undermines the state’s own
economic development trajectory.
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Up to this point the four research’s case studies have been discussed, we
shall now turn our attention to the research’s conclusions where we will discuss how
the four case studies construct the research’s arguments and how these arguments
contribute to the wider set of literatures that are discussed on Chapter 3: Literature
Review.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1 An Introduction to the Conclusions of the Thesis
A detailed summary of how this thesis has answered the two research questions has
been provided already in Chapter 4: Technological Upgrade and Research Tool of
Analysis, in the form of an overview of the research findings. Chapter 4, Section
4.3: Technology-Upgrading Approaches: Fieldwork Evidence, summarised the
answers to research question 1, ‘How should we characterise the nature of the
technology-upgrading approaches that are employed domestically in Vietnam, and
how these approaches are processed within the context of Vietnam’s IT industry?’.
Section 4.4: Characterising Vietnam’s Counter-Developmental State answered
research question 2, ‘How to characterise the state’s roles regarding technological
upgrade in Vietnam’s IT industry, and to what extent and in which way do these
different state roles affect the domestic technology-upgrading approaches?’.
Therefore, in order to avoid repetition, this section will not recap the previous
summaries. Rather, a short synopsis is provided in this chapter, before it moves on
to discuss why the answers to the two research questions matter. This chapter will
address the significance of the research questions by concluding the arguments,
theoretical contributions, and further implications of the thesis. These are summed
up in four sections: the first three sections are conclusions derived from the
research’s empirical findings (one finding per section); and the last section consists
of the research’s implications for future work as well as its policy implications.
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Before dealing with these final four sections, we will turn briefly to discuss research
rationale and provide a summary of the thesis.
9.1.1 Research Rationale
The research was motivated by two main theoretical discourses when it began. The
first discourse is on the changing nature of industrial production. Work in this body
of literature suggests the transformation of industrial structures from mass
production, with vertical lines of production (often referred to as Fordist
production), towards post-industrial structures. The latter is often teamed with
horizontal, multi-line production, which has no single controller over the whole
process of production, as the production chain has been broken down into small
procedures. The latter is often known as post-Fordist production. This theoretical
discourse is often linked with a second discourse which motivated this research, the
theory of state industrial developmentalism. There are many sub-disciplines within
the second theoretical group and this research was specifically motivated by work
concerning how state developmentalism is associated with evolving industrial
technologies as a state’s economy moves from being the industrial to the post-
industrial.
These two discourses together create a research terrain for examining how
being a state with a highly centralised political system, like Vietnam, affects the
state’s role in the post industrialised economy. Within this terrain, I narrowed the
research scope by studying the state’s role in the specific field of technological
upgrade in Vietnam’s IT industry. Coming from these two theoretical perspectives,
the research has specifically explored what technological upgrade in Vietnam’s IT
industry looks like, considering that such an upgrade occurred amidst the
transformations of the post-industrial era (addressing research question 1).
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Furthermore, the research analysed the role of the Vietnamese state in facilitating
the technological upgrade captured in the first research question, as well as how
these state roles affect technological upgrade (addressing research question 2).
9.1.2 Research Synopsis
Summarising the answer to the first research question of how the nature of
technology-upgrading approaches employed domestically in Vietnam should be
characterised and how they are processed within the context of Vietnam’s IT
industry, the research posited that technological upgrade in Vietnam’s IT industry
after Directive 58 has not been done in the conventional ways, as represented by the
market-led model, the state-led model and the network knowledge-led model of the
literature review in Chapter 3. The reason for the unconventional nature of the
models is that the conditions facing technology production in the information age
are more complicated than the theories suggest, as we will discuss below. The
research frames technology-upgrading approaches from the fieldwork findings into
four conceptual models, representative of the four different types of technologies
available in Vietnam’s IT industry, namely: a top-down model of technological
upgrade in Cloud Computing; a perpendicular model of technological upgrade in the
local outsourcing business; a bottom-up model of technological upgrade in the App
economy; and a multi-layered model of technological upgrade in the virtual
economy. Importantly, the research found that in the latter two models there was a
large portion of non-institutionalised knowledge and modes of learning employed by
many economic actors in Vietnam’s IT industry.
Summarising the answer to the second of our research questions on how to
characterise the state’s roles regarding technological upgrade in Vietnam’s IT
industry, and the extent and ways in which these different state roles affect the
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domestic technology-upgrading approaches, the research proposed four roles of
state-developmentalism. All four roles are more or less indicative of what the
research calls a counter-developmental state. These four roles arose from the
different technologies in Vietnam’s IT industry, namely a technocratic state from the
top-down model of technological upgrade in ‘Cloud Computing’; a cooperative state
from the perpendicular model of technological upgrade in a local outsourcing
business; an irrelevant state from the bottom-up model of technological upgrade in
an App economy; and a counter-developmental state from the multi-layered model
of technological upgrade in a virtual economy.
The thesis posits three arguments, drawing from the research findings in
Chapters 5-8, to be presented in this final chapter.
1. The first argument is that the technology-upgrading approach of
Vietnam’s IT industry challenges the conventional approach to technological
upgrade. This challenge comes in the form of different approaches, processes, actors
and the types of knowledge and skills involved.
2. The second argument is that technology is not just an instrument of
the state to be used for economic development. Rather, technology is also a structure
shaping the role of the state in economic development.
3. The last argument claims that there can be more than one role for the
state in the IT industry. These varied roles happen at the same time, which can
undermine state economic developmentalism. We will refer to this phenomenon as
the ‘counter-developmental state’
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9.2 Argument 1: Technology-Upgrading Approaches in the
Information Technology Industry
The first finding in this research is that the technology-upgrading approach for the
IT industry in post-industrial economic settings has gone beyond the conventional,
institutionalised approaches that were reviewed in our literature review chapter.
In more detail, technological upgrading approaches from our research case
studies were initially set to be investigated through the lens of technology-learning
for the economic catch-up of late developing economies. As discussed in Chapter 3:
Literature Review, this lens implied three categories of technology-learning, namely
a market-led, a state-led, and an network knowledge-led model. In reality,
technological upgrades, the specific focus of our research, are more complicated and
take place beyond these technology-learning processes.
The first conventional model that was examined was the market-led model.
The case of the outsourcing business and a cooperative state, as discussed in Chapter
5: Software Outsourcing and the Cooperative State, fits well with this model. The
market-led model suggests that technological-learning is transmitted from more
technologically advanced economies to less technological advanced economies
through a neo-liberal economic regime (Kojima 2000; Saxenian 2001; Gӧrg and 
Strobl 2004). Technology-upgrading approaches in Vietnam’s outsourcing sector
were demonstrated to possess characteristics that match the descriptions from this
model. The fieldwork evidence suggests that technology-upgrading approaches in
Vietnam’s outsourcing sector have benefitted from trade liberalisation that enabled
trade and financial flows between Vietnam and countries advanced in IT, such as
Japan, which is a traditional aid donor to Vietnam, and the US, which lifted is trade
embargo on Vietnam in 1994.
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Trade liberalisation was combined with another two factors: the rise of local
IT entrepreneurs and connections to overseas Vietnamese, who are embedded in
more-advanced IT economies. These two factors have also established the flow of
global technological capital, in the form of the outsourcing business, in Vietnam.
This flow of capital later created a spillover effect in the form of labour mobility; the
skills of IT labour in the outsourcing business were upgraded and became ready to
move into a higher skill-level of IT production. The difference between the
technology-upgrading approach derived from the fieldwork and the one that was
depicted in the literature on the market-led model, is that with the outsourcing
business, the advancement in Vietnam’s IT infrastructure did not require the
presence of foreign MNCs in Vietnam. This is explained by the fragmented nature
of global IT production, which is little accounted for in the literature. This also
implies that technological upgrade though labour mobility in the outsourcing
business does not follow the exact blueprint of the spillover effects depicted in the
literatures.
The state-led model of technological learning was demonstrated by the case
of Cloud Computing and the technocratic state in Chapter 6: The Cloud, the
iDragon, and the Technocratic state. The technological upgrade led by the
Vietnamese state as it innovates Cloud Computing technologies, sits well with the
notion of national innovation system theory (NIS), which lies at the heart of this
model. Nonetheless, the state’s role in nurturing technological learning
demonstrated through the fieldwork, did not come from the state being a
domineering broker that created linkages between other actors in a national setting,
as is suggested by the literature. Technological upgrading in Cloud Computing is
state-led in that the state itself took on the innovator’s role in Cloud technologies,
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rather than acting a broker assisting other industrial innovators to conduct R&D
activities relating to Cloud technologies, as the theory suggests.
The last model of technological learning discussed in the literature review
chapter, the network knowledge-led model, was analysed through the technological
upgrading for an App economy and online games in Chapter 7: The App Economy
and the Irrelevant State, and in Chapter 8: Online games, the Virtual Economy,
Counter-Developmental State, and the Trend Forward, respectively, which
illustrated the functioning of this model. These two case studies illustrate how tacit
knowledge was mobilised into the process of technological upgrade by informal
R&D actors, such as online open-source software communities and gamers who are
involved in technological change through digital content consumption. Considering
the technology-upgrading approaches in the context of the DUI mode of innovation
of Jensen et al. (2007), the two technology-upgrading approaches discussed in
Chapters 7 and 8 (the bottom-up and multi-layered technology-upgrading
approaches respectively) sync well with the DUI mode. The DUI mode advocates
innovation that used tacit knowledge though the doing, using, and interaction mode,
which was demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8.
Despite representing technological upgrade from the network knowledge-led
model, the two case studies also present a few differences from the model.
Technological upgrade conducted by IVC in the App Economy might not move
beyond the conventional approach in terms of the approach which use the DUI mode
using network knowledge of production; however, the major difference arises from
the fact that IVC’s bottom-up approach appears to be un-connected from other
actors in its national economy. In more detail, the technology-upgrading approach
from the network knowledge-led model illustrates the connection with the state (as
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another actor in the national economy) by asking for a change in the state’s
industrial roles to become a more suitable state - a network state. Unlike the theory,
IVC’s bottom-up approach falls off the state’s industrial radar. The Vietnamese state
was not able to have any industrial role with IVC’s innovative activities, due to the
state’s misunderstanding of economic benefit from non-proprietary software.
Nonetheless, the approach of IVC’s technological upgrade by using publicly-owned
knowledge to produce non-proprietary software, was successfully conducted without
any state involvement.
With regards to the technology-upgrading approach from the case study in
Chapter 8 which was conducted by the gold farmers, this multi-layered approach
moved beyond the network knowledge-led model in terms of the mode of
technological upgrade. The multi-layered model employed the types of knowledge
and skills which match with the theory of the DUI by Jensen et al. (2007); however,
the mode of production is different from the DUI mode as technological upgrade
occurred through technological consumption, rather than technological production.
In more detail, the multi-layered technological upgrade occurred when the online
gamers play the online game (consuming the game) for economic purposes rather
than for original purposes of entertaining. Once this happens, these online gamers
have upgraded themselves to be technological producers –known as gold farmers –
as well as produced a new economy – known as the virtual economy. This mode has
made a major move beyond the theory, which posits the mode of production will be
operated by technological producers not consumers.
Furthermore, the case studies in Chapters 7 and 8 support another research
sub-argument, that as IT progresses the less institutionalised technological elements
and actors (for example bricoleurs, tinkers, amateur developers, improvisers, public-
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owned knowledge, and informal organisation of technological production) have
become more and more important sources of innovation in the IT industry. The tool
of analysis proposed in Chapter 4: Technological Upgrade and the Research Tool of
Analysis, the hierarchy of emerging information technologies, frames how the less
institutionalised technological elements and actors are ‘othered’, marginalising their
role in innovation in the IT industry.
The technology-upgrading approaches employed by NSICI, and by FPT and
TMAs to innovate Cloud technologies and software, outlined in Chapter 6: The
Cloud, the iDragon, and the Technocratic State and Chapter 7: The App Economy,
and the Irrelevant State, respectively, were conducted by using institutionalised
technological elements. In contrast, the technology-upgrading approach employed
by IVC to innovate in the App technology, outlined in Chapter 7: The App Economy
and the Irrelevant State, illustrated the rise of amateurs and tinkers who employ
publicly-owned knowledge (which is considered to be a less institutionalised type of
knowledge when compared with privately-owned knowledge) for institutionalised
technological production (at the firm level). Additionally, the technology-upgrading
approach employed by the gold farmers as discussed in Chapter 8:Online Gaming,
the Virtual Economy, the Counter-Developmental State, and Forward Trend,
illustrates the rise of improvisers in technology-upgrading approaches. Improvisers
who have fewer technical skills may actually be consumers who have turned into
producers.
Since technology-upgrading approaches in the global IT industry
increasingly involve less-institutionalised sources of technological production, this
leads to the second broad argument of our research, that information technology in
the age of the post-industrial economy should be considered as an economic
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structure as well as an economic instrument in the literature on state
developmentalism.
Having concluded that the technology-upgrading approach of Vietnam’s IT
industry challenges the conventional approach to technological upgrade in the form
of different approaches, processes, actors and the types of knowledge and skills
involved, we will move onto discussing the roles of technology as a structure, rather
than a state instrument as often is found in the study of state developmentalism. The
findings in Chapter 6: The Cloud, the iDragon, and the Technocratic State, offer an
obvious example to consider whether technocratic state roles are shaped by the
advancement of Cloud technology (instrumentative), or whether the advancement of
Cloud technology is determined by the technocratic state (substantive), which we
will discuss now.
9.3 Argument 2: Information Technology as a Structure or as an
Instrument for Economic Development
The second research findings argue that technology does not act as a black box when
it comes to interaction with economic development. This argument questions the
validity of how technologies are considered in the context of the wider literature.
Considering that the characteristics of industrialisation have been transforming, the
roles of technologies in industrialising processes have also changed accordingly.
Generally speaking, literatures on the state’s industrial/economic developmentalism
were shaped heavily by Fordist industrial structures. The use of technology for
industrialisation during this period was captured mostly as industrial engineering,
where the developments of technology were highly and formally institutionalised.
Within this industrial setting, technologies were often treated as a black box in the
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study of state developmentalism, in that technologies were treated as passive
objects, to be economically shaped by the active state. This ‘black box’ appraisal
occurred because the idea behind the classic developmental state is for the state to be
a catch-up state that was not interested in advancing technologies further, but rather
picked up older technological products for the country’s economic catching-up.
The arrival of industrial transformation from the industrial to a post-
industrial economy, often known as the information industry, heralded the beginning
of post-Fordist production. The post-industrial economy is also characterised as
including industries with high levels of information-based or knowledge-based
production, rather than heavy manufacturing-based production. Being a knowledge-
based industry also means that the use of technology for industrial production is
constantly being reconstructed and also becoming less institutionalised, as we saw in
the conclusion of argument one, presented above. We saw that technologies change
in unconventional ways with an increasing share of un-institutionalised elements of
technological production. This means that in the post-industrial economy, not only
have technologies become both a core mechanism and main product for industrial
production, but also technological production has involved informal and less
institutionalised areas that allow non-professional engineers or tinkers to be major
contributors in many parts of technological production. Technologies in this post-
industrial age have become more than an instrumentative industrial piece, but also is
a substantive force that conditions and shapes the state’s developmental roles.
Nonetheless, when relating this argument about technologies’ industrial role to the
works on state developmentalism in the post-industrial economy, recent work on the
developmental state still considers technology as a passive (instrumentative) object
even when a country has developed a more technologically intensive economy, and
has passed the catching-up period. This broad argument will be substantiated by a
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more thorough review of the literature on state developmentalism below. This
review will highlight the gaps in that literature, especially regarding the treatment of
technology as passive and ‘black-boxed’, and show how this thesis addresses those
gaps.
9.3.1 The Role of Technology in State Developmentalism Theories
To begin this discussion we shall start with the ‘classic developmental state’ model
that was coined by Johnson (1982). In this model, technological dimensions were
not taken into account when characterising the state’s role in economic
development. Johnson instead placed the state’s economic institutions at the heart of
his model. This therefore leads us to conclude that Johnson’s developmental state
model was originally not designed to be inclusive of technological dimensions, as
the model arose from the belief that economic catch-up could be achieved with
already existing technology. Furthermore, Johnson’s developmental state was
captured in the period of heavy manufacturing, when technological production was
still characterised as its competitive advantage, represented by economies of scale.
After Johnson’s initiative on the developmental state model, the subject spun
off in many directions: a few scholars like Amyx 2004 and Jayasuriya 2005 suggest
the end of the era of the developmental state (Kim 2012: 293); while scholars like
O’Riain (2004) or Evans (1995, cited in Breznitz (2007: 16)) advocate other forms
of state developmentalism, such as developmental network states, or network
polities. However, these post-developmental state models are often critiqued on their
originality. For example, Breznitz (2007: 16) posits that despite the variety in these
new models, for example the ‘flexible developmental state’, the ‘neo-developmental
state’, the ‘network polity’, the ‘developmental networked state’, or the ‘embedded
autonomy industrial bureaucracy’, they all share one thing in common in that they
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all subscribe to the idea that the state possesses one developmental role. A similar
argument is offered by Kim (2012: 294), who contends that works on the post-
developmental state model do not offer many changes from the original
developmental state model.
However, unlike Jonhson’s developmental state model, many of these works
based their arguments on the transformative characteristics of technology
developments during the transition into a post-industrial economy, whereby
technologies are both a means of production and contribute to industrial products in
both instrumentative and substantive ways. This means that there is a greater
appreciation of the technological dimensions in these ‘spin off’ models, than in the
original developmental state model. An example of such a ‘spin off’ model is that of
the developmental network state as proposed by O’Riain (2004). O’Riain accounts
for technology in the way he uses it to break down the Fordist production chain. He
explains that in the post-Fordist era less developed countries can catch up
technologically not by climbing up Fordist value chain, as in the post-Fordist era this
value chain has been broken down and is now based upon specialised production,
not mass production (2004: 224-227). As such, O’Riain illustrates his account of the
specialised production of less developed countries in international IT production, by
discussing the appearance of Indian and Chinese high-tech entrepreneurs in Silicon
Valley (2004: 226).
Johnson’s ‘classic developmental state’ which O’Riain builds upon in his
work, becomes for him a ‘developmental network state’. The ‘developmental
network state’ appears to undermine the ‘classical developmental state’ by the
nature of its IT production. The nature of IT production requires more
internationalised functions of the state, beyond the developmentalism offered by the
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developmental state model. Against this deficiency of state developmentalism,
O’Riain characterises a new form of state developmentalism from Ireland’s IT
industry from 1995-2002 (2004: 244-245). He advocates this new form as a
‘developmental network state’, where the state’s developmental structures become
highly networked to overcome the limitations of national borders, allowing the
state’s economic developmental functions to be embedded in a cross-national
institution, like the EU (2004: 205-206).
The nature of IT production, with its increasingly borderless characteristics
in O’Riain’s work, is a sign of how technological dimensions are included in a
characterisation of state developmental models. However, O’Riain still focuses
mainly on the network state developmental structures rather than going into greater
detail on how technological changes in IT interplay in a substantive way with the
state’s network structures that eventually constitute the ‘network developmental
state’.
While there is an emergence of state developmental models that describes a
state’s economic role in the post-industrial economic era, like those of O’Riain and
Breznitz, there are still contemporary advocates of the ‘classic developmental state’.
Hence, work on ‘bringing back the developmental state’ involves a greater
appreciation of technological dynamics than had done previously. An example of
work in this group is Kim (2012), which was reviewed in Chapter 3: Literature
Review.
Kim examines the relationship between the state and technological upgrade
of wireless telecommunication technology in South Korea. However, technological
features have conditioned the role of the South Korean state in Kim’s works in a
static way. To elaborate, the role of the South Korean state was shaped not by the
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specific features of the wireless telecommunication technology in Kim’s model. In
actuality, the South Korean’s wireless telecommunication technology market
conditions the role of the state in a sense of being sector-specific, which requires the
state to understand the players and the nature of knowledge accumulation in this
specific technological market.
In comparison with how technological features are considered to interplay
with the state in this thesis, Kim’s analysis still takes technology as an instrument
for the state to help, with the state aiding local wireless technology firms that were
competing with foreign firms in the South Korean market.
Having demonstrated the problems with the way state developmentalism
theories deal with technology, we will move to discuss how the thesis addresses the
shortcomings in these theories. As evident from this study, industrial technology is
both the state’s developmental instrument and a structure conditioning state
developmentalism. The research argues that newly emerging features of IT
structurally condition the motivation behind why certain types of technologies are
selected, particularly for technological upgrade by Vietnam’s local firms and
government agencies. These newly emerging features of IT also structurally
condition the approach for technology-upgrading processes for each technology in a
unique way. Specifically, we discussed how technologies are not selected for
technological upgrade due to ‘economies of scale’, even though this is a commonly
found justification in the literature of the ‘classic developmental state’. This thesis
found multiple motivations driving technological upgrades in Vietnam’s IT industry.
To start with the case of NISCI – an innovator of Vietnam’s Cloud technology – we
note that the NISCI represents the technocratic side of the state, which is driven by
its urge to follow global technological trends as well as its concern over national
- 280 -
security, as the Cloud technology decentralises the state’s central control over the
country’s information surveillance. In the case of the App economy, IVC’s upgrade
of technological production was driven by an economic downturn and the
availability as well as an accessibility of non- commoditised knowledge at a minimal
cost. With regards to the motivations behind technological upgrade in an
outsourcing business, FPT was driven by the successful connection of Vietnam’s IT
industry to the global market, and the maturing of the local software industry that
required growth in software demand from the domestic market. These changes have
led FPT to computerise other non-IT sectors by introducing innovations in software
into those sectors. Lastly, in the case of online games, online gamers have induced
technological change by transforming themselves into gold farming businesses that
are driven by an emergence of artificial scarcities. These scarcities can be overcome
by online gamers playing the game and then trading their achievements to other
players.
These various motivations illustrate one thing in common: that different
technologies lead to different motivations for firms to employ them for technology-
upgrading purposes. This idea suggests that the structural nature of technologies acts
to shape the state’s developmental roles associated with each technology. In the
examples drawn from the field work of this thesis, the four case studies illustrate
how IT structurally shapes the developmental roles of the state, as will be explained
below, starting with the first case study of an outsourcing business. The
advancement of computer technologies in general, such as Internet and real time
technologies, have made a global software outsourcing business possible even in a
once technological backward economy like Vietnam, without requiring the
existence of Vietnam’s IT industry. This advancement of computer technologies in
concurrence with the Vietnamese state’s first IT industrial policy’s failure, led the
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state to seek more help from IT entrepreneurs when establishing the second policy,
resulting in shaping the state’s industrial role to transform from being a controlling
state to a cooperative state.
With regard to the second case of Cloud Computing, the technologically advanced
nature of the Cloud has transformed major computing activities including data
management. These transformations have allowed these computing activities to be
able to be done with minimal work from customers (also without any physical
presence from the customer sides), and has decentralised the Vietnamese state’s
power over data management as well as posed a strong national security concern
regarding information technology. This structurally led the Vietnamese state to be
technocratic (as an innovator in Cloud Computing technology), in order to gain back
some control over national data management with the Cloud Computing.
In terms of the third case of the App economy, the progression in knowledge
used for non-proprietary software production which came in the form of non-
institutionalised public-ownership, structurally caused the state to fall behind the
technological curve in understanding the actual economic potential of non-
proprietary software. This led the state to be irrelevant in the case of the App
economy, that is, the state does not possess any key role.
Lastly in the case of online games, the advancement of digital technology
created a complex set of artificial scarcities. When such digital technology is
consumed, it blurred the conventional line of work and play as well as creating a by-
product known as virtual economy. The state failed to keep up with this new form of
economy, whose productions are produced by consuming digital leisure activities.
Furthermore, such technological advancement also contributed to the counter-
developmental characteristic of the Vietnamese state; the complication and unusual
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mode of technological production by consumption, led the state to associate online
gaming with the notion of social evils, and hence tried to suppress it regardless of its
economic benefits.
We shall discuss the ramifications of the state’s roles in these different
scenarios in the next section.
9.4 Argument 3: From Developmental to Counter-Developmental:
Jeopardising State’s Developmentalism
Lastly, the research findings showed that there is more than one type of state
developmentalism within the same industry: the state role differed depending on the
type of technology in question. Furthermore, state developmentalism can turn out to
be counter-developmental, indicating that the state has acted based on non-economic
interests that might interfere with state developmentalism, resulting in less than
optimum economic benefits.
This third argument contributes to the set of literature on state
developmentalism by questioning works that provide a single label to state
developmental models, as the thesis questions how just one model can be
comprehensive enough to represent all the different state roles. Referring back to the
work of O’Riain (2004) to illustrate this argument, overall his model still applies one
type of state developmentalism to explain a variety of industry sub-sectors, despite a
great effort to consider the nature of technology in his formulation of the ‘network
developmental state’.
Kim’s analysis provides an important supporting point to the argument we
are making here. Kim uses the context of the famous developmental state of South
Korea to outline the literature, which shows different views on the debates on
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whether the developmental state model has ended or is still a valid model (Kim
2012: 293-294). To this end, Kim questions the theoretical value of a discourse that
tries to classify a singular model of state developmentalism, as well as the validity of
the way the developmental model has been created. Here Kim refers to Crouch
(2005) to point out that there is more than one form of capitalism in a single national
setting. Thus, assigning a single label to the state would require a systematic and
holistic study of every role of the state in every industry in the hopes that one
structure can explain them all (2012: 294). O’Riain’s study (2004) falls into this
method of analysis; his ‘development network state’ takes the IT industry as a ‘black
box’, failing to appreciate the varied sub-sectors within it. When we acknowledge
the different sub-sectors under the very general term ‘IT industry’, we can see that
the state interacts differently with each technological industry within IT, as this
research has demonstrated in Vietnam’s IT industry.
Similar views can also be seen from Breznitz’s analyses (2007), of state roles
in the development of the IT industry in Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan. Breznitz does
not directly challenge the way that the models in the literature attribute a singular
role to the state, regarding the state’s interaction with different industrial sub-
sectors. Nonetheless, he contests the way main schools in such literatures, such as
the developmental state and a neo-developmental state, are so specific about
associating particular political and institutional structures with the success of high-
tech economic catching-up, as there are in fact multiple successful hi-tech industrial
developmental choices. Breznitz argues that different state structures and
behaviours led to different industrial developmental paths in the three countries
(2007: 191). In order to do so, Breznitz offers a few analytical domains to
demonstrate the differences in their IT industrial development, such as the state’s
actions in obtaining necessary skills and finance for R&D activities (2007: 192). In
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his analyses of these domains we can also see how the nature of specific information
technologies used in his work are considered. Breznitz considers technologies not
as a black-box; thus he highlights how technologies condition the state’s actions in
the development of IT industries.
While Breznitz appreciates that a state’s role might be different in specific
national conditions, for example the state’s role in Israel is different from the state’s
role in Ireland, he still attributes a singular role to the state within these different,
specific national conditions. The position of Breznitz is somewhat similar to the
position of our thesis, as he avoids a singular conception of state developmentalism,
recognising that different states possess different roles. However, this thesis has
gone beyond Breznitz’s account as it breaks down the IT industry into several
different technologies and finds different state roles corresponding to each
technology. These different state roles have something important to say when taken
together as each of them illustrates state counter-developmentalism in different ways
and to varying degrees.
9.4.1 Explaining Counter-Developmentalism
Building on this argument we can make a secondary claim that some of the
processes that are often understood as representative of the developmental state may
be a ‘mis-diagnosis’. In fact, these processes can be indicative of a counter-
developmental state. This happens when the state emphasises non-economic factors,
which result in less than optimal economic benefits. This claim is made by
synthesising the research findings with literature on the decline of the state’s role in
the post-industrial economy, as discussed in Chapter 3: Literature Review. We will
conclude that amidst this decline of the state’s role in the post-industrial economy,
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the Vietnamese state sought to use a developmental role in the IT industry to firm up
its position and resist decline.
An example from this chapter would be the case of the network knowledge-
led model, where we noted that many scholars of that model addressed the declining
importance of the nation state in economic development as information economy
progresses globally. This is due to two main reasons, which we discuss below.
The first reason is the increase in the employment of tacit knowledge as an
actual source for technological upgrade. This tacit knowledge is transmitted through
people’s experiences and cannot be codified, and thus is stored and shared in an
institutionalised learning environment such as learning through problem-solving in
online forums, or experiencing a shared environment (Boulanger 2005, Jendsen et
al. 2007).
The second reason leads on from Ohmae (1993), who envisaged that the
natural economic zone would be redefined in the era of post-Fordist industrial
production, with international or regional economic zones replacing national ones.
Many scholars have suggested a new role for the state in post-Fordist industry. For
example Ansell (2000) suggests that the state needs to decentralise its command
structure, while O’Riain proposes his ‘developmental network state’.
Coming from the angle of the network knowledge-led model, the proposed
counter-developmental state argues that both the increase of tacit knowledge and the
fragmentation of post-Fordist industrial production do not diminish the state’s
command role in industrial development. Rather, these two factors shape a new form
of state leadership. The case of the cooperative state, from the outsourcing example,
and the technocratic state, from the Cloud Computing case, both illustrate this
argument well and will be discussed below. What both examples show is that in
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securing its leadership position, the state concerns itself with non-economic factors
and the result was sub-optimal economic growth, with the state becoming a counter-
developmental state.
In terms of the cooperative state, the decline of the state is demonstrated in
that the state did not have enough expertise when it came to the establishment of the
local IT industry. Instead of changing its role in the economy and surrendering its
command position to other industrial experts, the Vietnamese state strategically
adopted a cooperative role which let industrial experts in the outsourcing business
take part in the drafting of industrial policy. That measure secured its command
position in the face of decline. The cooperative state, while it may seem beneficial,
is in fact indicative of the counter-developmental state as it hinders growth in the
long term, as was discussed in depth in Section 5.3.3: Limitations of the Cooperative
State.
Another example of how what looks like a developmental state turns out to
be a counter-developmental state, is the case of the technocratic state in the
development of Cloud Computing. The advancement of Cloud Computing
threatened to decentralise the state’s power over national information surveillance,
but instead of accepting a minimalised state role, the Vietnamese state, remained
committed to its information security concerns, implemented industrial R&D on
Cloud Computing, thereby again securing its role in the face of decline. This also
contradicts what the theory suggests, as Freeman (1995) posits that high security
concerns will drive the state to commit to military R&D, when in this example the
state committed to industrial R&D to justify its role in the economy. Even though
the state security concerns are not the sole reason for the Vietnamese state to commit
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to R&D in Cloud Computing,56 the technocratic state is still indicative of the
counter-developmental state as it allows non-economic factors to influence its
economic actions. Unlike the example of outsourcing and the cooperative state
discussed above, we cannot state that the technocratic state will lead to sub-optimal
growth as we do not have field work data to support that claim. The example of the
technocratic state does support our claim that the state allowed non-economic
reasons to affect its decisions on the economy.
9.5 Beyond the Counter-Developmental State
We will finish this concluding chapter by outlining further research opportunities
and policy implications. The significant originality of this research is that the
research has paid attention to the technological areas in which the state does not
claim to have economic benefits, like in the case of an App economy and the virtual
economy. By doing so, the research has captured the high degree of state counter-
developmentalism that occurs when the state falls behind technological curves. The
irrelevant state and the counter-developmental state from Chapters 7 and 8
respectively, open up further debates in relation to economic benefits,
developmental impacts, the governance of non-proprietary software, and the virtual
economy. In the tools of analysis of the thesis (the hierarchy of merging information
technologies), the case studies from Chapters 7 and 8 fall into the peripheral
categories of the hierarchy due to the technological upgrade of these two chapters
employing a high level of tacit knowledge through ‘bricolage’ rather than using
codified knowledge implemented by engineers or scientists, which is currently
56 Cloud Computing is also an up and coming global technology trend.
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considered conventional in both academic research and policy. An analysis offered
by Jensen et al. mirrors this point well:
Despite the broad acceptance of this literature, there remains a bias among scholars and
policy makers to consider innovation processes largely as aspects connected to formal
processes of R&D, especially in the science based industries (2007: 681).
As such, these issues are worth of study in their own right.
In reference to the main questions of how to characterise the nature of the
technology-upgrading approaches that are employed domestically in Vietnam’s IT
industry, and how to characterise the state’s roles regarding these captured
technology-upgrading approaches, we have found that technological upgrade in
Vietnam’s IT industry after Directive 58 has been done using four models in four
different IT technologies. These models are namely: the perpendicular model of
technological upgrade in the outsourcing business; the top-down model of
technological upgrade in Cloud Computing; the bottom-up model of technological
upgrade in App economy; and the multi-layered of technological upgrade in online
games. Furthermore, we found that there was more than one state role regarding the
four models of technological upgrade, specifically: the cooperative state for the
perpendicular model; the technocratic state for the top-up model; the irrelevant state
for the bottom-up model; and the counter-developmental state for the multi-layered
model.
In answering the main questions, we have also been able to comment on
three secondary research arguments. The first argument was that the technology-
upgrading approach of Vietnam’s IT industry challenges the conventional approach
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to technological upgrade. This challenge comes in the form of different approaches,
processes, actors and the types of knowledge and skills involved. The second
argument was that technology is not just an instrument of the state to be used for
economic development. Rather, technology is also a structure shaping the role of the
state in economic development. The last argument claimed that there can be more
than one role for the state in the IT industry. These varied roles may be performed at
the same time, and overall may actually undermine state economic
developmentalism. We referred to this phenomenon as the ‘counter-developmental
state’.
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Appendix A
Revenues of Vietnam’s IT industry
Table A.1 Revenues of Vietnam’s IT Industry by sector, 2008-2011 (Million USD)
Vietnam’s IT Industry 2008 2009 2010 2011 Growth57
Hardware Sector 4,100 4,627 5,631 11,326 101%
Software Sector 680 850 1,064 1,172 10%
Digital Content Sector 440 690 934 1165 25%
Total Revenue of IT
Industry 5,220 6,167 7,629 13,663 79%
Source: Ministry of Information and Communications (2012: 45)
57 The growth rate refers to the increase in revenue between 2010 and 2011.
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Letter of Affiliation
- 341 -
Appendix C
Open Source Software Definition
Introduction
Open source does not simply mean open access to the source code. The
distribution terms of open source software must comply with the following criteria:
1. Free Redistribution
The license shall not restrict any party from selling or giving away the
software as a component of an aggregate software distribution containing
programmes from several different sources. The license shall not require a royalty or
other fee for such sale.
2. Source Code
The programme must include source code, and must allow distribution in
source code as well as compiled form. Where some form of a product is not
distributed with source code, there must be a well-publicized means of obtaining the
source code for no more than a reasonable reproduction cost preferably,
downloading via the Internet without charge. The source code must be the preferred
form in which a programmemer would modify the programme. Deliberately
obfuscated source code is not allowed. Intermediate forms such as the output of a
pre-processor or translator are not allowed.
3. Derived Works
The license must allow modifications and derived works, and must allow
them to be distributed under the same terms as the license of the original software.
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4. Integrity of The Author's Source Code
The license may restrict source-code from being distributed in modified form
only if the license allows the distribution of "patch files" with the source code for the
purpose of modifying the programme at build time. The license must explicitly
permit distribution of software built from modified source code. The license may
require derived works to carry a different name or version number from the original
software.
5. No Discrimination Against Persons or Groups
The license must not discriminate against any person or group of persons.
6. No Discrimination Against Fields of Endeavour
The license must not restrict anyone from making use of the programme in a
specific field of endeavour. For example, it may not restrict the programme from
being used in a business, or from being used for genetic research.
7. Distribution of License
The rights attached to the programme must apply to all to whom the
programme is redistributed without the need for execution of an additional license
by those parties.
8. License Must Not Be Specific to a Product
The rights attached to the programme must not depend on the programme's
being part of a particular software distribution. If the programme is extracted from
that distribution and used or distributed within the terms of the programme's license,
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all parties to whom the programme is redistributed should have the same rights as
those that are granted in conjunction with the original software distribution.
9. License Must Not Restrict Other Software
The license must not place restrictions on other software that is distributed
along with the licensed software. For example, the license must not insist that all
other programmes distributed on the same medium must be open source software.
10. License Must Be Technology-Neutral
No provision of the license may be predicated on any individual technology
or style of interface.
Source: OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (OSI) [no date] The Open source Definition [online].
[Accessed 13 January 2013]. Available from http://opensource.org/docs/osd.
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Appendix D
Open Source Software Policies in Vietnam
D.1 Decision No.235/QD-TTg
DECISION No. 235/QD-TTg OF MARCH 2, 2004 APPROVING THE
OVERALL PROJECT ON APPLICATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF OPEN
SOURCE SOFTWARE IN VIETNAM IN THE 2004-2008 PERIOD
THE PRIME MINISTER
Pursuant to the Law on Organization of the Government of December
25, 2001;
Pursuant to the Government's Resolution No. 0712000IND-CP of June
5, 2000 on building and development of software industry in the 2000-2005
period;
Pursuant to the Prime Minister's Decision No. 81/2001/OD-TTg of May
24, 2001 approving the action programme for implementation of the Political
Bureau's Directive No. 58-CTITW of October 17, 2000 on stepping up the
application and development of information technology in the cause of
industrialization and modernization in the 2001 - 2005 period;
At the proposal of the Minister of Science and Technology,
DECIDES:
Article 1. - To approve the overall project on application and
development of open source software in Vietnam in the 2004-2008 period
with the following contents:
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I. OBJECTIVES
1. To accelerate the application and development of open source
software, thus contributing to the protection of copyright and reduction of
software procurement expenses, and promoting the development of the
information technology industry in general and Vietnam's software industry
in particular.
2. To build up the contingent of technicians who are qualified for and
master technologies, and promote their creativity in the application and
development of open source software.
3. To create a number of special information technology (IT) products
suitable to the domestic application conditions and demands and based on
open source software.
II. PRINCIPAL CONTENTS OF THE PROJECT
1. Main tasks:
a/ To formulate policies to promote the application and development
of open source software.
-To formulate and promulgate mechanisms and policies to encourage
the application and development of open source software to attract
educational, training and scientific research establishments to participate in
the open source software training, development and research; to encourage
and create favorable conditions for overseas Vietnamese and foreign
specialists as well as foreign companies and international organizations to
invest in open source software trading, development, technology transfer
and training in Vietnam.
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- To promulgate policies to use some open source software in the
State sector.
b/ To organize the application of open source software
-To organize the experimental application of open source software, first
of all the application of open source software in a number of ministries, agencies
and localities, then expand it throughout the country.
- To organize the application of open source software to some
professional utilities as well as to security and defense. To establish and put into
use high-performance and network-computation computer systems based on open
source software to solve application problems which require a strong
computation capacity in ministries, branches and localities nationwide.
c/ To train human resources for application and development of open
source software
- To organize the training of the contingent of open source software
teachers in universities, colleges, vocational and job-training intermediate
schools; teachers for training of State officials and employees.
- To build up the contingent of cadres fully capable of organizing the
application and development of open source software in ministries, branches and
localities.
- To support the training of technicians in service of the work of
organizing and instructing the contingent of open source software professional
cadres in ministries, branches and localities, and work out programmes on
training and maintaining this contingent.
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- To work out and implement programmes on training in the use of open
source software for State officials and employees as well as students in
universities, colleges, vocational and job-training intermediate schools and pupils
of senior-secondary schools. To develop software tools, utilities and applications
in service of teaching and learning activities.
- To attract domestic and foreign organizations and individuals as well as
overseas Vietnamese to take part in activities of training in open source software
in Vietnam.
- To send brilliant teachers, lecturers and students to foreign countries for
short-term and long-term open source software training.
d/ To develop a number of core software, formulate standards and system
of certificates, and train high-level specialists
- To organize research into, proposition and development of a number of
core software of Vietnam, select and localize some software to meet Vietnam's
basic application demands.
- To establish the system for evaluating and inspecting the quality of open
source software products and give use cautions to the community.
- To research, elaborate and promulgate open source software technical
standards and skill standards, and establish the system for testing open source
software skills and granting open source software certificates.
- To encourage the establishment of enterprises trading in and developing
open source software, companies, scientific agencies and educational
establishments providing open source software application support services. To
build open source software development centers and laboratories.
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e/ To enter into international cooperation in open source software
- To join the regional and international open source software
organizations and associations to enhance the cooperation and experience
exchange among members of such organizations.
- To organize the cooperation in open source software development
research and trading with foreign partners.
2. Mini-projects:
a/ Formulation of mechanisms and policies on open source software
application and development, with the Ministry of Post and Telematics assuming
the prime responsibility therefor.
b/Open source software application and training in universities, colleges
and vocational intermediate schools with the Ministry of Education and Training
assuming the prime responsibility therefor.
c/ Open source software application and training in job-training schools
with the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs assuming the prime
responsibility therefor.
d/ Training in open source software use for public servants, State officials
and employees with the Ministry of Home Affairs assuming the prime
responsibility therefor.
e/ Experimental application and development of open source software in
Hanoi City and Ho Chi Minh City with the People's Committees of Hanoi city
and Ho Chi Minh City assuming the prime responsibility therefor.
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f/ Experimental application and development of open source software for
defense purpose with the Ministry of Defense assuming the prime responsibility
therefor.
g/ Experimental application and development of open source software for
security purpose with the Ministry of Public Security assuming the prime
responsibility therefor.
h/ Development of a number of core software, formulation of standards
and system of certificates, and training of high-level specialists with the Ministry
Science and Technology assuming the prime responsibility therefor.
III. SOLUTIONS
1. To raise the community's awareness about the protection of software
copyright and benefits from the open source software for the information
technology development in our country in general and the software industry in
particular.
2. To stringently enforce the software copyright. 3. To organize the
assessment of impacts of and solutions related to the switch to use open source
software in the State sector as well as the compatibility of open source software
applications with commercial software products. To organize research into,
experimentation and multiplication of a number of applied open source software.
4. To provide open source software training in the educational system and
the training establishments. 5. To develop and maintain core open source
software which can bring about common benefits for the community, and
formulate the national standards on open source software.
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6. To develop open source software trading models, especially
professional open source software support service.
7. Funding in service of the open source software application and
development in general and mini-projects in particular shall be mobilized from
different sources of enterprises, individuals and international organizations, ODA
and the State budget.
Article 2. - Organization of implementation
1. The Ministry of Science and Technology shall assume the prime
responsibility for, and coordinate with the ministries, the ministerial-level
agencies, the Government-attached agencies and the People's Committees of the
provinces and centrally-run cities in, organizing the execution of the Project.
2. The Ministry of Planning and Investment shall assume the prime
responsibility for, and coordinate with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Science and Technology in, balancing and synthesizing resources in the State's
annual plans for projects, mini-projects and plans on open source software
application of the ministries, ministerial-level agencies, Government-attached
agencies, and the concerned provinces and centrally-run cities.
3. The Ministry of Finance shall assume the prime responsibility for, and
coordinate with the Ministry of Post and Telematics and the Ministry of Science
and Technology in, formulating financial mechanisms and policies for open
source software application and development.
4. The Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Education
and Training, the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs, the
Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Post and
Telematics and the People's Committees of Hanoi City and Ho Chi Minh City,
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which are assigned to assume the prime responsibility for mini-projects, shall
direct the formulation and execution of mink projects according to current
regulations.
The execution of the above-said mini-projects must ensure the efficient
coordination and integration with other programmes and projects on information
technology.
5. The ministries, the ministerial-level agencies, the Government-attached
agencies, the People's Committees of the provinces and centrally-run cities shall
work out plans on rational use of open source software in their respective
professional operations, and build up the contingent of technicians
knowledgeable about open source software.
Article 3. - This Decision takes effect after its signing.
Article 4. - The ministers, the heads of the ministerial-level agencies, the
heads of the Government-attached agencies and the presidents of the People's
Committees of the provinces and centrally-run cities shall have to implement this
Decision.
For the Prime Minister
Deputy Prime Minister
PHAM GIA KHIEM
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D.2 Decision No. 08/2007/QD-BTTTT
THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
Independence - Freedom - Happiness
No. 08/2007/QD-BTTTT Hanoi, December 24, 2007
DECISION
PROMULGATING THE LIST OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE
PRODUCTS WHICH MEET THE USE REQUIREMENTS OF STATE
AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS
THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
Pursuant to the Governments Decree No. 178/2007/ND-CP of December 3,
2007, defining the functions, tasks, powers and organizational structures of
ministries and ministerial-level agencies;
Pursuant to the Prime Ministers Decision No. 169/2006/QD-TTg of July 17,
2006, providing for investment in and procurement of information technology (IT)
products by agencies and organizations using state budget capital and the Prime
Ministers Decision No. 223/2006/QD-TTg of October 4, 2006, amending a number
of articles of Decision No. 169/2006/QD-TTg;
Pursuant to Circular No. 02/2007/TT-BBCVT of August 2, 2007, of the
Ministry Post and Telematics (now the Ministry of Information and
Communication), detailing a number of contents of the Prime Ministers Decision
No. 169/2006/QD-TTg of July 17, 2006, and Decision No. 223/2006/QD-TTg of
October 4, 2006;
At the proposal of the director of the IT Industry Department,
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DECIDES:
Article 1. To promulgate together with this Decision the List of open source
software products which meet the use requirements of state agencies and
organizations for use as a basis of implementation for Circular No. 02/2007/TT-
BBCVTof August 2, 2007, of the Ministry of Post and Telematics (now the Ministry
of Information and Communication) and the Prime Ministers Decision No.
169/2006/QD-TTg of July 17, 2006, and Decision No. 223/2006/QD-TTg of
October 4, 2006. Agencies or organizations that use state budget funds or state
budget-originated funds for investment in, procurement of IT and execution of IT
application and development projects shall prioritize investment in, procurement of
IT and use of products on the List enclosed with this Decision.
Article 2. The List of open source software products which meet the use
requirements of state agencies and organizations may be amended and supplemented
to suit reality.
Any problems arising in the course of application of the List shall be
considered and settled by the Ministry of Information and Communication.
Article 3. This Decision takes effect 15 days after its publication in CONG
BAO.
Article 4. The director of the Office, the chief inspector, the director of the
IT Industry Department, heads of agencies and units under the Ministry of
Information and Communication, and concerned agencies and organizations shall
implement this Decision.
FOR THE MINISTER OF
INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION
VICE MINISTER
Nguyen Minh Hong
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LIST OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE PRODUCTS WHICH MEET
THE USE REQUIREMENTS OF STATE AGENCIES AND
ORGANIZATIONS
(Promulgated together with Decision No. 08/2007/QD-BTTTT of December 24,
2007)
No. Types Products
1 Office software a/ OpenOffice.org 2.0
b/ OpenOffice.org 2.1
c/ OpenOffice.org 2.2
d. OpenOffice.org 2.3
2 Email server software Mozilla Thunderbird
3 Web browser software Mozilla Firefox
4 Vietnamese keyboard
software
Unikey
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D.3 Circular No. 41/2009/TT-BTTTT
THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM
Independence - Freedom - Happiness
No. 41/2009/TTBTTTT Hanoi, December 30, 2009
CIRCULAR
PROMULGATING A LIST OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE
PRODUCTS QUALIFIED FOR USE BY STATE AGENCIES AND
ORGANIZATIONS
THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
Pursuant to the Government's Decree No.187/2007/ND-CP of December 25,
2007, defining the functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the
Ministry of Information and Communications;
Pursuant to the Prime Minister's Decision No. 169/2006/QD-TTg of July 17,
2006, providing for the investment in and procurement of information technology
products by agencies and organizations using state budget funds and the Prime
Minister's Decision No. 223/2006/QD-TTg of October 4, 2006, amending a number
of articles of Decision No. 169/2006/QD-TTg;
At the proposal of the director of the Information Technology Department,
STIPULATES:
Article 1. To promulgate together with this Circular a list of open source
software products qualified for use in state agencies and organizations (below
referred to as the list of open source software) for use as a basis for the
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implementation of the Prime Minister's Decision No. 169/2006/QD-TTg and
Decision No. 223/ 2006/QD-TTg.
Article 2. State agencies and organizations that use state budget funds or
state budget-originated funds for investment in or procurement of software of types
specified in the list of open source software shall prioritize the investment in, and
use of, corresponding software products on this list.
State agencies and organizations are encouraged to invest in, procure and use
software which is upgraded, modified, perfected or Vietnamized from software
products on the list.
Article 3. The above-said list of open source software may be adjusted or
supplemented so as to suit reality.
Article 4. This Circular takes effect on February 15, 2010, and replaces the
Information and Communications Minister's Decision No. 08/2007/QD-BTTTT of
December 24, 2007, promulgating a list of open source software products qualified
for use in state agencies and organizations.
Any problems and difficulties arising in the process of implementation
should be reported to the Ministry of Information and Communications for study
and settlement.-
FOR THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION
DEPUTY MINISTER
NGUYEN MINH HONG
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LIST OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE PRODUCTS QUALIFIED FOR
USE IN STATE
AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS
(Promulgated together with Circular No. 41/2009/TT-BTTTT of December
30, 2009)
No. Type Products
1 Office software - OpenOffice version 2.4 and or later versions.
2 Email software - Mozilla Thunderbird
3 Web browser software - Mozilla Firefox
4 Vietnamese keyboard
software
- Unikey
5 Operating system software - Ubuntu server operating system version 8.10 or
later versions
6 Database management
system
a/ PostgreSQL database management system,
version 8.3 or later versions -
b/ MySQL database management system, version
5.1 or later versions
7 Messaging server software a/ SendMail messaging server software, version
5.1 or later versions
b/ Postfix messaging server software, version 23
or later versions t
8 Content management
system
a/ Alfresco content management system, version
3.0 or later versions
b/ Drupal content management system, version
6.10 or later versions
c/ Joomla content management system, version
1.5.9 or later versions
9 ePortal - Liferay, version 4.0 or later versions
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Appendix E
Key Industrial Products, and their Support Policies in Vietnam
E.1 Decision No: 19/2001/QD-TTg
THE PRIME MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
VIET NAM
Independence - Freedom - Happiness
No: 19/2001/QD-TTg Hanoi, February 20, 2001
DECISION
ADDING THE COMPUTER PRODUCTS TO THE LIST OF KEY
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS ENJOYING SUPPORT UNDER THE PRIME
MINISTER’S DECISION NO. 37/2000/QD-TTG OF MARCH 24, 2000
THE PRIME MINISTER
Pursuant to the Law on Organization of the Government of September 30,
1992;
Pursuant to Article 3 of the Prime Minister’s Decision No. 37/2000/QD-TTg
of March 24, 2000 adding other products to the list of key industrial products;
At the proposal of the Minister of Industry,
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DECIDES:
Article 1.- To add the computer products to the list of key industrial products
prescribed in the Prime Minister’s Decision No. 37/2000/QD-TTg of March 24,
2000.
Article 2.- The preferential tax policies and other financial policies for the
computer products shall uniformly comply with the provisions in the Prime
Minister’s Decision No. 37/2000/QD-TTg of March 24, 2000 (enclosed appendix).
Article 3.- This Decision takes effect after its signing.
Article 4.- The Ministers of Planning and Investment; Industry; Finance;
Science, Technology and Environment; Trade; Defense; Agriculture and Rural
Development; Aquatic Resources, the Minister-Chairman of the Committee for
Ethnic Minorities and Mountainous Areas, the Governor of Vietnam State Bank, the
General Director of Land Administration, the General Director of Customs, the
General Director of Post and Telecommunications, the Director of the Government
Pricing Committee, the Director of Radio Voice of Vietnam, the Chairman of the
Management Board of Investment Development Support Fund, the General Director
of Vietnam Electronics and Informatics Corporation, and the heads of concerned
agencies shall have to implement this Decision.
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
Nguyen Tan Dung
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E.2 An Appendix of Decision No: 19/2001/QD-TTg
APPENDIX
POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF KEY INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTS APPLICABLE TO COMPUTER PRODUCTS
(Issued together with the Prime Ministers Decision No. 19/2001/QD-TTg of
February 20, 2001)
I. ENTERPRISE ASSUMING THE PRIME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
EXECUTION OF THE PROJECT:
Vietnam Electronics and Informatics Corporation
II. SUPPORT POLICY:
1. On taxation:
- To exempt import tax up to the end of December 31, 2003 for equipment,
machinery and special-use transport means, which are included in the technological
lines to create fixed assets of the enterprise
- Incomes earned from the production of computers by the enterprises which execute
the project shall be entitled to the enterprise income tax rate of 25%, be tax-free for
the first two years after the taxable income is generated, and entitled to 50%
reduction of the payable income tax for the two subsequent years.
- The enterprise shall be entitled to preferential index with the regulating coefficient
of 0.5 to calculate import tax according to the localization rate prescribed in Joint-
Circular No. 176/1998/TTLT of December 25, 1998 of the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of Industry and the General Department of Customs.
2. On capital for the enterprise:
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- When there arises the need to invest in building production establishments, the
enterprise may borrow the States development investment credits from the
Development Assistance Fund for a period of not more than 10 years for each
separate loan. The capital-borrowing enterprise shall not have to mortgage its assets,
but must not assign its assets before its has repaid all its debts (both principal and
interest) for each loan.
- The enterprise directly producing computers shall be allocated full 30% of the
norm working capital, the deficit shall be covered with the States development
investment credit loans from the Development Assistance Fund corresponding to a
production cycle.
- The enterprise shall be supported with the State budget capital source reserves for
scientific and technical research in research and development projects after the
project is approved.
3. Other preferences:
50% reduction of land rent for the enterprise during the period of project execution.-
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Appendix F
Policy on the Management of Online Games in Vietnam
JOINT CIRCULAR No. 60/2006/TTLT-BVHTT-¬BBCVT-BCA of June 1, 2006,
on management of online games
Pursuant to the Government's Decree No. 55/2001/ ND-CP of August 23, 2001, on
the management, provision and use of Internet services;
Pursuant to the Government's Decree No. 90/2002/ ND-CP of November 11, 2002,
defining the functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the Ministry of
Post and Telematics;
Pursuant to the Government's Decree No. 63/2003/ ND-Cpof June 11, 2003,
defining the functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the Ministry of
Culture and Information;
Pursuant to the Government's Decree No. 136/ 2003/ND-CP of November 14, 2003,
defining the functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the Ministry of
Public Security;
The Ministry of Culture and Information, the Ministry of Post and Telematics and
the Ministry of Public Security hereby jointly guide the management of online
games as follows
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Chapter I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1.- Governing scope and application subjects
This Circular governs the production, provision and use of online game services in
Vietnam.
Subject to the application of this Circular are enterprises and individuals producing
online games, enterprises providing online game services, Internet access service
providers (ISP), Internet agents and users of online game services.
Article 2.- Interpretation of terms
1. Online games mean games played on the Internet with the interaction between
players and servers of enterprises providing online game services, and among
players.
Online games defined in this Circular are massively multiplayer online games
(MMOG), including massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMOPRG)
and casual games.
2. Enterprises providing online game services are enterprises that install equipment
systems and directly provide online game services.
Article 3.- Prohibited acts
1. Importing, producing and providing online games with the following contents:
a/ Inciting the people to oppose against the State of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, undermining the national solidarity bloc;
b/ Provoking violence, spreading propaganda about wars of aggression, sowing
hatred among nations and peoples, arousing obscenity, debauchery and crime;
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c/ Disclosing state secrets, defense, security, economic and foreign relations secrets
and other secrets provided for by law;
d/ Supplying untrue information, distorting, slandering and infringing upon the
prestige of organizations as well as honor and dignity of citizens.
2. Providing online game services or acting as online game service-providing agents
in Vietnam without permission of competent state management agencies.
3. Advertising and introducing online games which have not yet been permitted for
circulation in Vietnam.
Article 4.- Production and processing of online games
Game-producing enterprises and individuals shall satisfy conditions and abide by the
provisions of law on software production. The State encourages and supports
domestic enterprises and individuals to research and produce online games. Priority
shall be given to the distribution of online games which are produced at home and
have contents appropriate to national history and cultural traditions.
Chapter II
PROVISION OF ONLINE GAME SERVICES
Article 5.- Conditions for provision of online game services
3. Having obtained written certification by the Post and Telematics Ministry with
the agreement of the Public Security Ministry of satisfaction of technical and
professional conditions prescribed for enterprises providing online game services in
order to ensure information safety and security, service quality and legitimate
interests of service users.
Article 6.- Dossiers and procedures for approval of contents and scenarios of online
games
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1. Dossiers of application for approval of game contents and scenarios
An application dossier addressed to the Culture and Information Ministry comprises:
al An application of the enterprise;
bl Lawful copy of the enterprise's business registration certificate, covering the
provision of online game or video game services (at places other than its head-office
).
c/lnformation on the game, including:
- The name of the online game;
- The origin of the game (imported or produced at home);
- The game owner's certificate of game software copyright and documents
permitting the enterprise to distribute such game in Vietnam;
- The type of the game (MMOPRG or casual game);
- Summary of main contents and scenario of the game;
- Languages used in the game;
- Other necessary information.
2. Procedures for assessing contents and scenarios of online games
The Culture and Information Ministry shall receive dossiers, assess and approve
contents and scenarios of online games.
Within 15 working days after receiving valid dossiers, the Culture and Information
Ministry shall issue a written reply, notifying its approval or disapproval of the
contents and scenarios of the games and the reason therefore.
Article 7.- Technical and professional conditions and procedures for evaluation
thereof
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1. Technical and professional conditions
After completing the installation of equipment systems and the formulation of
technical and professional plans, enterprises shall send reports thereon to the Post
and Telematics Ministry. Within 15 working days after receiving the reports, the
Post and Telematics Ministry shall assume the prime responsibility for, and
coordinate with the Public Security Ministry in, conducting field inspection at
enterprises. If enterprises meet all the conditions for service provision stated in
Clause 1 of this Article, the Post and Telematics Ministry shall issue written
certifications of satisfaction of technical and professional conditions. In case of
refusal, the Post and Telematics Ministry shall issue a written reply, clearly stating
the reasons therefor so that enterprises can resolve existing problems.
For any change resulting from the provision of new games in technical and
professional plans already reported by enterprises to competent state management
agencies, the Post and Telematics Ministry shall consider and issue written replies
within 15 working days after receiving enterprises' reports thereon. Past this time
limit, if the Post and Telematics Ministry issues no written reply, enterprises shall be
entitled to provide games already reported.
Chapter III
RESPONSIBILITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
PROVIDING AND USING ONLINE GAME SERVICES
a/ Request service users to supply enterprises with personal information such as
names, addresses, 10 numbers or other details necessary for identifying service
users;
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b/ Warn service users about undesirable impacts such as physical and mental
complications caused by excessive playing, the rights to disposal of property
accruing in games;
These regulations shall be concurrently sent to the Culture and Information Ministry,
the Post and Telematics Ministry and the Public Security Ministry.
3. Enterprises shall have to store information on service users and supply such
information to competent state management agencies when so requested.
4. Enterprises providing online game services shall register for establishment of
websites and manage information posted on websites as well as information
exchanged by service users in game forums in strict accordance with current
provisions of law.
A game home page shall fully contain the following information:
- Rules of the game;
- Regulations on management of online games and
regulations on assurance of the fairness of games.
5. To apply appropriate measures to ensure legitimate interests of service users and
settle disputes between service users; and to take responsibility before service users
for service quality, information safety and security, and charges.
Enterprises providing online game services must neither create valuable assets in
games for profit¬seeking purposes nor alter information on players' assets or value.
6. To send reports to the Culture and Information Ministry, the Post and Telematics
Ministry and the Public Security Ministry biannually or in unexpected cases, when
so requested.
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7. To be submit to the inspection and examination by competent state management
agencies according to current provisions of law.
8. If wishing to terminate the provision of online game services, enterprises
providing online game services shall report such in writing to the Culture and
Information Ministry, the Post and Telematics Ministry and the Public Security
Ministry, make announcements on game home pages at least 3 months before the
intended time of termination of service provision, and have to ensure interests of
service users.
To have plans to ensure the quality of Internet access services in strict accordance
with current standards when they lease channels to enterprises providing online
game services or provide Internet connection services or when network congestion
occurs.
3. To provide online game services at places which are at least 200 m far from
entrance gates of schools (from pre-schools to secondary education schools) in any
locality.
Article 12.- Responsibilities of service users
1. To strictly abide by relevant provisions of this Circular.
2. Not to post on game forums information in violation of the provisions of Clause
1, Article 3 of this Circular.
3. To supply adequate and accurate personal information such as names, addresses,
10 number as well as other details necessary for their identification at the request of
enterprises providing online game services.
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Chapter IV
INSPECTION, EXAMINATION, AND HANDLING OF VIOLATIONS
Article 13.- Inspection and examination
Inspection agencies specialized in culture and information as well as post and
telematics shall, within the scope of their state management, inspect and examine
activities of producing, providing and using online game services by subjects
defined in Article 1 of this Circular.
Article 14.- Handling of violations
Enterprises and individuals producing and/or providing online games, Internet
agents and users of online game services that violate regulations on the management
of online games shall, depending on the nature and seriousness of their violations, be
administratively sanctioned or examined for penal liability according to the
provisions of law.
Chapter V
ORGANIZATION OF IMPLEMENTATION
Article 15.- Responsibilities of ministries and branches
1. The Culture and Information Ministry:
a/ To direct and guide enterprises providing online game services to observe state
regulations on management and provision of information applicable to online
games.
b/ To coordinate with concerned state agencies in guiding the mass media in
disseminating information on online games and the state management of this
service.
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c/ To inspect, examine and handle violations of regulations on the management of
online games falling within its state management competence.
2. The Post and Telematics Ministry:
a/ To direct Internet service-providing enterprises to work out plans so as to ensure
the quality of transmission lines and Internet access services up to the set standards.
b/ To direct provincial/municipal Post and Telematics Services to assume the prime
responsibility for, and coordinate with concerned units in, enhancing inspection of
Internet agents' activities.
c/ To inspect, examine and handle violations of regulations on management of
online games falling within its state management competence.
3. The Public Security Ministry:
a/ To direct and realize the prevention and combat of offenses related to online game
activities.
b/ To direct professional units, provincial/municipal polices to coordinate with post
and telematics inspectorate and culture and information inspectorate in examining,
inspecting and handling violations in the provision of online game services in their
respective localities according to current provisions of law.
4. Provincial/municipal People's Committees:
a/ To direct authorities of various levels to manage, inspect and examine activities of
enterprises and individuals that produce and/or provide online game services and
Internet agents providing online game services.
b/ To direct provincial/municipal Post and Telematics Services, Culture and
Information Services and Police Departments in organizing periodical and
unexpected inspections at enterprises and individuals that produce and/or provide
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online game services and Internet agents providing online game services in the
localities and in handling violations according to their tasks and powers prescribed
by law.
c/ To coordinate with ministries and ministerial-level agencies in managing
activities of enterprises and Internet agents providing online game services in their
localities.
Chapter VI
IMPLEMENTATION PROVISIONS
Article 16.- This Circular takes effect 15 days after its publication in "CONG BAO"
The Culture and Information Ministry, the Post and Telematics Ministry and the
Public Security Ministry shall, within the scope oftheir tasks and powers, guide
agencies, organizations and units to implement the provisions of this Circular.
Agencies, organizations and individuals are requested to report any problems arising
in the course of implementation to the Ministry of Culture and Information, the
Ministry of Post and Telematics and the Ministry of Public Security for guidance
and settlement.
For the Post and Telematics Minister Vice Minister
LE NAM THANG
For the Public Security Minister Vice Minister
NGUYEN VAN HUONG
For the Culture and Information Minister Vice Minister
DO QUY DOAN
